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Ideational Power in Times of Turmoil
As we marched through the streets, I felt full of energy. It was scary when 
the riot police attacked us, but we managed to push back. Somehow I felt 
strong, and then stronger still when other groups joined us. There was a lot 
of cheering. I was like, Wow, I never knew that so many people were against 
[President] Akaev. . . . At the time I was convinced [uveren] that what we 
were doing was important. For me it was about democracy and freedom, and 
about fighting against corruption. I was convinced that if we succeeded, things 
would be better. . . . When I came home [to the shared flat] that afternoon, 
I found the other girls sleeping. I was amazed that they were not even aware 
of what was going on. [Later] they were critical of my involvement because 
they knew that my parents were against me being involved. But I was just 
amazed that they didn’t care. . . . At that point I did not have doubts. My 
first doubt, as you call it, happened the day after the revolution [when shops 
were being looted]. We formed patrols to protect the shop owners; it was 
dangerous. Aigerim, who had joined [the youth movement] KelKel1 at 
the same time as me, mentioned to me, “This looting was not supposed to 
happen.” That is when I started to doubt. Also because the atmosphere [in 
KelKel] had changed; it became clear that many [of its members] had joined 
for their own interests. For me it had been about discussing ideas and the 
future of our country. . . . Maybe I was also trying to fill a void in myself; to 
be part of a group like this felt good. But for many of the others it was about 
something else, about supporting a family member or about pushing their 
own careers. We had these meetings [in the weeks after the Tulip Revolution]. 
The discussions were no longer about ideas. It was all about dividing up 
the trips [abroad], about who would speak where. . . . I got fed up with it, 
and left. Later on I started to read about the problems with democracy [as a 
concept] and about NGOs and how they were financed from the West. And 
I was disappointed in [the new president] Bakiev. My KelKel acquaintances 
from back then would say, “Yes, Bakiev is terrible, but still it is good that the 
revolution happened.” Personally I don’t know if it was good or bad.
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Mirgul’s account2 of her experiences with the youth movement KelKel and 
her involvement in the Tulip Revolution of April 2005 provides a brief re-
flection on a situation that was at first hopefully embraced as a means to the 
peaceful displacement of a corrupt government, but ultimately resulted in 
widespread disillusionment when the prevailing opposition leader, Kur-
manbek Bakiev, instated a regime that was even more objectionable than 
that of his predecessor, Askar Akaev.3 The intensity of the event, as much 
as its ephemeral and ultimately disillusioning qualities, is reflective of Kyr-
gyzstan’s tumultuous post-Soviet political trajectory, a period in which po-
litical and religious movements and prophets thrived, usually only for brief 
moments.
Situated in this turbulent environment, Mirgul’s story directs attention 
to the mechanisms by which individuals become committed to a cause 
and gain certainty about the meaning and value of the ideas involved. For 
several weeks Mirgul had been convinced that the removal of President 
Akaev from office would result in more freedom and allow for a more 
democratic form of government, both of which were sacrosanct values to 
her at the time. Initially uncertain about the prospects for success, she was 
both surprised and emboldened by the realization that she and her fel-
low revolutionaries were supported in this struggle by a mass of people. 
In those moments she felt great clarity: the goals seemed clear and near, 
and motivation peaked. However, her certainty, commitment, and clar-
ity turned out to be fleeting. When we first spoke about her experiences, 
three years after the revolution, she saw herself as having been terribly 
naive—still an undergraduate student—a young woman who had found 
herself caught up in the moment.
In this book I examine ideational power by focusing on the energy and 
momentum that are built into “flashes of conviction” like the one described 
by Mirgul. The focus is on the affective dimension of collective ideas, on 
the energy that both animates and exceeds societal structures.4 I analyze 
how ideas gain momentum when shared by a group of like-minded 
compatriots and the transformative potential these ideas can have when 
directed toward a clear goal or distinct enemy.
The brightness of the flash of conviction should, however, be examined 
in view of the flickering that came before and the afterglow left in its wake. 
That is, because conviction unfolds in real time, it needs to be looked at 
in relation to the doubts and hesitations that may precede or accompany 
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it, and the satisfactions or disillusionments that may succeed such a flash. 
Mirgul’s conviction was not diminished by her friends’ criticism or her par-
ents’ disapproval. On the contrary, her sense of righteousness was intensi-
fied by their critique, just as the experience of warding off a police attack 
emboldened her. In fact, Mirgul’s belief in and commitment to the cause 
eroded only after an insider (a friend and fellow KelKel member) started to 
express criticism. This set in motion a series of nagging doubts that were 
fed by the egotistic attitude of other KelKel members and the disappoint-
ing conduct of the new government. In this process, the signifiers “free-
dom” and “democracy” changed meaning, now referring to careerism and 
disagreeable geopolitical agendas. These shifts and changes demonstrate 
the importance of paying due attention to the social, epistemic, and affec-
tive dimensions of the making and unmaking of temporary conviction.
By using the concept of conviction I aim to draw attention to the fluc-
tuating intensity and quality of attitudes, motivations, and beliefs. So how 
does this instance of momentary political clarity compare to other forms 
of conviction? I could equally have started this introduction with some of 
the other flashes of conviction that feature prominently in this book. For 
example, the account of a miracle at a Pentecostal church in southern Kyr-
gyzstan would have illustrated the affective energies released by collective 
prayer. A description of the application of rhythmic sound and touch by 
spiritual healers would have made the bodily sensations experienced by 
patients palpable. A sketch of the “inspired fellowship” (Turner 2012, back 
cover) among Tablighi Muslims during their proselytizing trips would 
have provided insight into how fantastical images become experienced as 
real. An account of the arrival of international aid workers in a destitute 
mining town would have illuminated the vital connections between hope, 
conviction, and disillusionment.
These instances of conviction have varying intensities, rhythms, and 
scopes, the documentation and comparison of which will serve to bring to 
light the various dimensions of ideational power. But the point is also that 
the described pattern—the swelling of momentum, the flash of intensity, 
the release of energy—points at a dynamic that exceeds the particularities 
of each instance of conviction. Referring to this dynamic as “pulsation,” 
I theorize how ideational power is produced and released, and with what 
effects. Pulsation describes the trajectories of collective ideas whose intensity 
waxes and wanes over time. Moreover, as a sensitizing concept, pulsation 
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indexes different aspects of ideational power: the assertion of ideas (the 
impulse), their traction within social fields (pressure), and their rhythmi-
cal patterns (throbbing). By taking this approach I aim to understand how 
people become convinced, and how they cease being convinced, of concrete 
assertions of truth. By analyzing different examples of conviction with a 
focus on the impulses and resonances generated by these assertions of truth, 
I will explain the strengths and weaknesses of collective ideas.
These topics are explored in the context of post-Soviet Kyrgyzstan at a 
time of economic collapse and political turmoil. The unsettling effects of 
“post-Soviet chaos” (Nazpary 2002) were felt with particular intensity in 
the mining town of Kokjangak, where most of the fieldwork for this book 
took place. Located in Jalalabad Province in southern Kyrgyzstan, it had 
largely been built between 1930 and 1950. Kokjangak had been a paragon 
of Soviet modernization, a frontier town5 in a largely agricultural and un-
derdeveloped region, its inhabitants depicted in official discourse as pioneers 
in the establishment of a new civilization. This formerly vibrant town had 
fallen hard after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Half of the population 
emigrated, many of its buildings were dismantled, and the remaining ten 
thousand residents tried to make a living through informal mining, lim-
ited agricultural activities, and circular migration. Kokjangak had come to 
resemble what Anna Tsing conceptualizes as chaos—“a frontier spun out of 
control, its proliferations no longer productive for the authorities” (2005, 43).
In these destitute conditions, new visions and ideas were actively 
asserted and hopefully embraced. Right after the Soviet collapse, neosha-
manic practices boomed, and even two decades later there was still an im-
pressive network of spiritual healers and visionaries in the town. From the 
mid-1990s onward, a range of development organizations initiated proj-
ects in Kokjangak, but despite being enthusiastically welcomed, they often 
produced more disappointment than satisfaction. In the early 2000s the 
Pentecostal Church of Jesus Christ set up a congregation that attracted a 
significant following. Not much later Deobandi-inspired versions of Islam 
gained ground, especially among the male youth. And in 2005 there was 
real excitement in the weeks before, during, and after the Tulip Revolu-
tion, especially because the opposition leader (and later president) Kur-
manbek Bakiev had previously lived and worked in Kokjangak and might 
thus direct funds toward the town (a hope that never materialized). While 
new political and religious movements proved attractive in this context of 
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economic hardship and social fragmentation, their failure to fulfill their 
own promises meant that “conversions” were often temporary. By docu-
menting and describing how people in Kokjangak specifically and Kyrgyz-
stan more generally encountered and engaged with a range of charismatic 
and millenarian movements, in this book I offer an ethnographic tribute to 
the post-Soviet condition of uncertainty in Central Asia.
It could be objected that the theoretical focus on fragile instances of con-
viction, based on research in an unstable social field, presents an atypical case 
that has little value apart from being an exotic curiosity. But this would be 
missing the point. Rather, the “extreme” features of this study throw into 
high relief processes that have much wider resonance. In a world where 
power is “no longer routed so centrally through the state” (Ferguson 2004, 
394), and which is characterized not only by transnational flows but also 
by isolation and disconnect, the workings of ideology are changing as well. 
There is something suggestive about Arjun Appadurai’s argument that we 
are shifting from a “vertebrate” world of nation-states to a “nonvertebrate” 
or “cellular” world in which global flows rely on the infinite reproduc-
ibility of minimal ideological and functional principles (2006). If anything, 
this shift has made ideological processes less predictable and more volatile.6 
As I have argued elsewhere, precisely because nationalisms, populisms, 
and fundamentalisms have become so conspicuously present over the past 
two decades, “it is essential not to take their strength for granted, but to ex-
amine the dynamics of conviction and doubt through which their efficacy 
and affective qualities are made and unmade” (Pelkmans 2013, 1). That is, 
the focus on the making and unmaking of conviction in a context where 
the state-system has come undone and its ideological framework imploded 
provides a valuable vantage point from which to gain deeper insight into 
the workings of ideology in the contemporary world more generally.
In this book, the key question is how systems of ideas become animated, 
that is, how they come to matter in the lives of people. The concept “ideol-
ogy” refers to such systems of ideas and forms the larger conceptual back-
bone of the book, but this is approached through “conviction,” a useful lens 
for studying how ideologies are animated. “Conviction” is used to draw at-
tention to the affective dimensions of belief, knowledge, and attitude, and 
suggests variation among subjects and fluctuations over time. “Ideology” 
foregrounds the issue of power, and thereby opens up possibilities for a 
political-economic analysis of ideation. Let me outline in more detail how 
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I employ these two contested concepts in order to lay the foundations for 
the conceptual framework that I develop in this book.
Ideology: Ideas and Power
The concept of ideology is a slippery one that has frustrated generations of 
scholars. A central problem is that because ultimately all ideas are bound 
up with power, the term is often considered too general to have analytical 
purchase. The problem can be detected even in the work of those who em-
ploy a concrete and straightforward definition of the term. Eric Wolf, for 
example, defines ideology as “unified schemes or configurations [of ideas] 
developed to underwrite or manifest power” (1999). When Wolf then ap-
plies the term to the cases in his book Envisioning Power, it becomes clear 
that he uses “ideology” at times to refer to “unified schemes” or doctrines 
that are actively propagated by elites, while at other times he employs it 
much more loosely to refer to ordered “configurations” of collective cus-
toms, practices, and ideas that indirectly “underwrite” the order of soci-
ety. This is no critique of Wolf’s work but rather an observation about the 
different ways in which ideas and power can be woven together. After all, 
dominant ideas not only are advanced through explicit doctrine, but they 
have a material existence in state institutions or rituals, and unwittingly fil-
ter our perceptions of reality. However, the result is that “the term ideol-
ogy threatens to expand to vanishing point” (Eagleton [1991] 2007).7
Intriguingly, while these reflections may suggest that ideology is too 
pervasive to be analytically useful, a contrasting view suggests that we are 
living in a post-ideological era. This “end-of-ideology” position was first 
voiced over half a century ago, when scholars in the United States (e.g., 
Bell 1960) declared that “ideological distinctions” had become “devoid of 
social and psychological significance for most people” and that the exist-
ing abstract political ideologies “lack motivational potency and behavioral 
significance” (Jost 2006, 651). More recently, and more relevantly to the 
geopolitical context of this book, it was the erosion and then collapse of 
Soviet socialism that inspired ideas of the end of ideology, even “the end 
of history” in the sense that with the victory of capitalism there would be 
no longer any credible alternative ideologies left (Fukuyama 1989). Such 
end-of-ideology visions dovetailed with the frequently offhand depiction 
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of the post-Soviet era as constituting an “ideological vacuum” (Buckley 
1997; Karagiannis 2009, 93). This perceived vacuum was seen as problem-
atic and dangerous precisely because it seemed to indicate the absence of 
collective values, which also translated into ideas of a “spiritual vacuum” 
(Vorontsova and Filatov 1994) and a “moral vacuum” (Wanner 2011, 214).8
Announcements of the death of ideology have always been rather con-
tradictory, possibly because a vacuum easily becomes a site of turbulence, 
or, as Clifford Geertz put it, “It is a loss of orientation that most directly 
gives rise to ideological activity” (1973, 219). Not entirely surprising then 
is Terry Eagleton’s exclamation that “it is announced that the concept of 
ideology is now obsolete,” when in fact we are witnessing a “remarkable 
resurgence of ideological movements,” as he wrote in response to Francis 
Fukuyama’s claim about the death of ideology ([1991] 2007, xx).9 Writing 
about ideological activity in Russia during the 1990s, Eliot Borenstein aptly 
commented that the post-Soviet condition is more appropriately described 
as one of ideological excess than ideological void, and provided “fertile 
ground for fantasies of an apocalypse” (1999, 439, 447). But this ideological 
excess, which refers to the conspicuous presence of nationalist, market, de-
velopmental, and religious visions, also suggests the fragility of each single 
ideology and the lack of a stable and dominant ideological framework.
What are we to do with these opposing stances concerning the ideol-
ogy concept and the contradictory views about the role of ideology in the 
contemporary world? To clarify the discussion it is useful to momentarily 
adopt Slavoj Žižek’s distinction between three modes of ideological opera-
tion: ideology in-itself, ideology for-itself, and ideology reflected into itself. 
The first, ideology in-itself, is the most explicit incarnation of ideology, 
which refers to the active assertion of “a doctrine, a composite of ideas, 
beliefs, concepts and so on, destined to convince us of its ‘truth’ ” (Žižek 
1994, 10). Second and somewhat more indirect are the “institutions, rituals 
and practices” that give “body” to ideology, rather similar to what Althusser 
([1971] 2008) refers to as “ideological state apparatus” and includes all in-
stitutions (such as schools, museums, courts, regulatory bodies, etc.) that 
play a role in reproducing state ideology, whether directly or indirectly. 
Finally, ideology as “reflected into itself” refers to the “quasi-‘spontaneous’ 
presuppositions and attitudes” of self-declared non-ideological practices 
(Žižek 1994, 15). This ideological mode of operation is more or less what 
Bourdieu refers to as doxa, as that which “goes without saying because 
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it comes without saying” (1977, 167–69). The point of bringing up these 
distinctions is to suggest, not only that those who speak about the absence 
of ideology and those who speak about its omnipresence might actually be 
talking about different modes of ideological power, but also that the rela-
tive weight of these different modes depends on the nature of society and 
the position of the relevant collective ideas within it.
In stable and well-integrated political systems the dominant ideas tend to 
be internalized and naturalized, making ideological work less conspicuous. 
For example, Žižek argues that in late capitalism the weight of “ideology as 
such is diminished: individuals do not act as they do primarily on account 
of their beliefs or ideological convictions—that is to say, the system . . . 
bypasses ideology in its reproduction and relies on economic coercion, legal 
and state regulations, and so on.” But although “ideology has moved to 
the background [it] has by no means disappeared” (1994, 14–15). Rather, 
precisely because the dominant ideas have become part and parcel of peo-
ple’s common sense, they can be reproduced almost invisibly through the 
ideological state apparatus. Thus, what Daniel Bell (1960) and Fukuyama 
(1989) referred to as the “end-of-ideology” could also be seen as the epit-
ome of ideological efficiency, of the temporary hegemony of a specific set 
of ideas within a particular sociopolitical configuration. In such a situation 
“dominant power” does not need to rally a population behind a greater 
cause or convince people to defend “the truth,” but instead can rely on their 
pragmatic acquiescence.10 The flipside of this is that the more ideology is 
naturalized—the more it comes to be taken for granted—the less it is able 
to directly motivate the sentiments and actions of people. Therefore, de-
spite all the problems of Bell’s end-of-ideology thesis, there is value in his 
implicit suggestion that there are situations in which ideologies no longer 
act as sets of belief capable of being “infused with passion” (1960).
By contrast, in situations of sociopolitical fragmentation and rapid soci-
etal change “ideology” moves to the foreground. This means that existing 
ideologies become denaturalized, first because in unstable situations the 
dominance of dominant power cannot be taken for granted, and second 
because ideology-infused common sense is challenged by changing circum-
stances. This may easily lead to the explicit defense as well as radicaliza-
tion of dominant ideas.11 Post-Soviet Central Asian corollaries are easy to 
point out. A good example of the intensification of dominant ideas would 
be the Stalin-style cult of personality that developed in Turkmenistan in 
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the 1990s, in which the country’s first president appeared as a latter-day 
Islamic prophet leading his chosen nation (see Hann and Pelkmans 2009). 
Different but equally conspicuous is the futuristic redesigning of Kazakh-
stan’s capital, Astana, sometimes described as the “Dubai of the steppe,” 
a glorification of ideas of modernity that are firmly rooted in the Soviet 
project (Buchli 2007; Laszczkowski 2011).
Similar state-directed tendencies toward “extreme expression” have been 
present in Kyrgyzstan, but none obtained semihegemonic status. Instead, 
the ideological landscape became more radically fragmented and was there-
fore frequently depicted as an “ideological vacuum,” which, as we have 
seen, is simultaneously the terrain of ideology par excellence. That is to say, 
Kyrgyzstan essentially developed into a laboratory for testing out ideologies. 
Indeed, it was seen as a frontier and “mission field” by evangelicals, pious 
Muslims, and (secular) development specialists. Precisely because none of 
the advanced visions could rely on a stable ideological (state) apparatus, they 
became at once more conspicuous and volatile. The most disturbing exam-
ple of this in Kyrgyzstan’s recent history is the 2010 conflict, when ideas of 
ethnic purity, feeding on political and economic tensions, radicalized with 
such speed that towns and cities across the south of the country erupted in 
massive violence, resulting in hundreds of casualties (see chapter 1). In other 
words, when power fields are unstable, ideology becomes denaturalized, 
but this fragility of ideology simultaneously triggers its reassertion result-
ing in an ideological excess. From this perspective, Kyrgyzstan is a particu-
larly interesting case in which to observe the workings of conviction in a 
“post-ideological” world and to draw attention to conviction’s fragility.
Conviction: Power of Ideas
The concept of ideology is usually associated with dominant power,12 but 
dominance is not what makes ideas powerful in the sense of potent or 
effervescent. In fact, there appears to be a partially inverse relationship 
between the “strength” (or tenacity) of ideology and its “potency” (as the 
ability to move people to action). This tension needs to be kept in mind 
when focusing on conviction. The “energized state” that I am trying to 
capture has been explored by many others, through the perspectives of 
charisma, collective effervescence, communitas, and affect. In their own 
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specific ways, each of these terms tries to capture the emotive “energy” 
that is produced in the connections between individuals (such as leaders 
and followers), within liminal groups (made up of equals), and between 
humans and their environment. In this book I will make use of the insights 
generated through these approaches while applying them to the relation-
ship between subjects and collective ideas.
There are several reasons why I propose conviction as the conceptual 
focus for a study of ideational power instead of using the more common 
alternatives. The first is that conviction connects the fields of religion and 
politics better than related terms such as “belief” or “opinion.” Second, 
more so than opinion, disposition, attitude, and knowledge, the term “con-
viction” makes the affective dimension of the relationship between subject 
and ideas palpable. It is for this reason that I avoid the term in the plural, 
because to speak of people’s religious or political convictions would be a la-
beling exercise characteristic of “topographic approaches” instead of an ap-
proach that is able to capture “processes” (Crapanzano 2004, 8). It is in the 
singular that the affective dimension comes to the fore, as conveyed when 
we refer to someone as being “full of conviction,” another one as “lacking 
conviction,” and a preacher (or politician or car salesman) as “speaking 
with conviction,” that is, with clarity and purpose. The goal of this book 
is to understand how this quality of conviction is gained and lost, and to 
which actions or inactions this may lead.
In exploring the connections between people and collective ideas, 
Althusser’s theory of interpellation ([1971] 2008) is a useful point of reference. 
His famous example, or “theoretical scene,” of interpellation is that of a 
police officer who hails (interpellates) a person in the street by calling out 
“Hey, you,” on which the person recognizes being addressed and turns 
around. In the moment of turning, that is, in the submissive response to 
the voice of ideology, the person is (re)produced as a subject through a 
process of mutual recognition. Althusser depicts interpellation as an inter-
nal process in which individuals “are always-already subjects” (46, italics 
in the original); that is, he presents ideological interpellation as an unfail-
ing mechanism in the production of subjects. This suggests, quite clearly, 
that Althusser works with a concept of society in which different tenets 
of ideology form a coherent whole that is durably integrated with the so-
cioeconomic fabric of that society.13 Unfortunately, this seamless depiction 
of interpellation is unhelpful for understanding of ideational power in 
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fragmented ideological landscapes, where the ideological state apparatus 
has collapsed and/or where new ideologies assert themselves. The ques-
tion, therefore, is how can we make productive use of the idea of inter-
pellation (without necessarily clinging to the term itself) and apply it to 
fragmented ideological landscapes?
I argue that the three elements of interpellation—the voice of ideology, 
the response of the listener, and the mutual recognition—need to stay at the 
center of analysis, while rejecting the assumptions that permeate Althusser’s 
writing. Whereas for Althusser the “voice of ideology” is quintessentially 
that of the state, we need to look at concrete and nonhegemonic assertions of 
religious, political, and economic truths. While Althusser seems to assume 
that the listener’s response is conditioned by guilt and a concomitant desire 
for the law,14 this needs to be complemented with attention to the more im-
mediate needs and desires that make subjects reach out to certain instantia-
tions of ideology and ignore or reject others. And while for Althusser the 
outcome of interpellation is one of blanket submission, we need to ponder 
possibilities such as ideological ambivalence and rejection (by “bad subjects”) 
or enthusiastic embrace (by neophytes, for example), and study its variation 
within a population, as well as how this changes over time.
I use the concept of pulsation for exactly this purpose: to explore the 
instability of the links between these elements without presuming the ef-
fect of the configuration and moreover to draw attention to the generative 
capacity of ideology as opposed to assuming a finalized result. Pulsation is 
first of all about the impulse or the voice of ideology: the proclamations of a 
future of abundance through the neoliberal gospel; of health and prosper-
ity for those who accept Jesus in their hearts; of peace and happiness for 
those who follow the ways of the Prophet. This also makes one wonder 
about the kind of impulses that were generated by assertions of “scientific 
atheism,” and how this may be related to the difficulties in producing de-
voted atheists (see chapter 3). As Thomas Csordas has argued (2007, 261), 
some messages are better transposable and certain practices more portable, 
something that has immediate relevance for the ability to bind and invigo-
rate new and old subjects.
This bring us to the second aspect of pulsation, namely that the impulse 
needs to trigger a meaningful response. I argue that the voice of ideology 
can gain traction only when there is a productive tension. Whether we 
take Marx’s view that the articulation of protest starts with the “sigh of the 
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oppressed creature” ([1844] 2002, 171) or follow Foucault’s argument that 
“where there is desire, the power relation is already present” (1978, 81), for 
the voice of ideology to be heard there needs to be a gap between a desired 
horizon and a detested reality. The Tablighis and Pentecostals promised 
to release people from the bonds of slavery caused by addiction and illness; 
the development specialists proclaimed that they would end poverty; the 
revolutionary leaders that they would bring an end to corruption. More-
over, the voice of ideology can only produce commitment and conviction 
for as long as its utopian horizon is seen as realistic and in reach.15
Finally, pulsation refers to the rhythmic fluctuation (or resonance) that 
the mutual recognition may produce. This can be seen as a form of Emile 
Durkheim’s collective effervescence, in which people’s “very act of congre-
gating [generates] a sort of electricity [that] launches them to an extraordi-
nary height of exaltation” (1915, 217–18). Or, to use Victor Turner’s term 
communitas, it is among equals who temporarily come together in situations 
of liminality that we find the highest levels of commitment and conviction 
(1969). While acknowledging the value of these older works, in this book 
I emphasize that the buildup and release of such affective energies is a pre-
carious affair plagued by contradictions. Throughout the book, I explore the 
ideological fervor generated among church congregations, religious travel 
groups, and revolutionaries. Similar to Durkheim’s collective effervescence 
and Turner’s communitas, these intense experiences of togetherness tended 
to be limited in duration, as were the clarity of vision, the commitment to a 
goal, and the conviction of truth that accompanied the experiences.
Pulsation triggers many questions, including about what kinds of col-
lective ideas are attractive under what conditions, and about how com-
munal bonds may generate conviction. As has been pointed out above, not 
only do ideological voices assert themselves most explicitly and forcefully 
in contexts of fragmentation and crisis, it is also then that mutual recogni-
tion is particularly fragile. All this makes a comparative analysis of differ-
ent ideological “voices” in such contexts particularly worthwhile.
The Book
It is now more than twenty years ago that I first ended up in Kyrgyzstan. At 
the time of my first visit I was an undergraduate student in anthropology 
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who spent his summers traveling through Eastern Europe. One of those 
was the summer of 1994, when a friend and I hitchhiked from Amsterdam 
to Warsaw, took a train to Moscow, and there, although lacking the nec-
essary visas, bought tickets for a train that took us through Kazakhstan to 
Kyrgyzstan’s capital, Bishkek, where we arrived seventy-two hours later.16 
Kyrgyzstan had been independent for merely three years and was going 
through a deep economic crisis. People were struggling, nostalgic about 
the past, but also hopeful about the future.
Intrigued by the people I met and the challenges they faced, I decided to 
return the following year to carry out five months of fieldwork for my mas-
ter’s thesis, which I did in the provincial city of Karakol in northeastern 
Kyrgyzstan. Back then I was primarily interested in people’s adjustments 
to, and interpretations of, the new market economy. This specialization 
landed me a job with the United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP) in 1998, when I was tasked with setting up a poverty alleviation 
program in Jalalabad Province (oblast′). It was during this one-year stay 
that I also began to work in Kokjangak, the mining town that later would 
become my primary field site.
When I realized that international development was not my calling, 
I decided not to renew my contract and moved away from Central Asia 
to conduct my PhD research in the Georgian border region with Turkey. 
Chance had it that in 2003 I returned to Kyrgyzstan to study missionary 
encounters and dynamics of religious conversion, as part of a Max Planck 
Institute for Social Anthropology research program on religion and civil 
society. Much of the research data presented in this book was collected 
during this fourteen-month fieldwork period. However, the materials for 
several topics (chapter 3 on atheism and chapter 4 on Tablighi Islam) were 
collected during shorter research visits (totaling six months) between 2008 
and 2013. In fact, it was only during those later years that my earlier in-
terests in (political and economic) uncertainty and my subsequent interests 
in (religious) beliefs and practices came together in a project on convic-
tion, that is, in a project that connects the anthropology of politics and of 
religion.
I recount my personal trajectory because it has contributed significantly 
to the shape of this book. The relatively long duration of research has al-
lowed me to relate the events and encounters that form the empirical core 
of most chapters to the slower-paced shifts and changes of Kyrgyzstan’s 
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ideological landscape (see especially chapter 1). My long-term involvement 
has also made it possible to make an informed selection of ethnographic 
cases to illuminate complementary aspects of the dynamics of conviction.
It would have been possible to present this book as a contribution to the 
study of religion, given the attention to changes in the religious landscape 
throughout, and the inclusion of two chapters about concrete religious 
movements—the Tablighi Jamaat in chapter 4 and a Pentecostal church in 
chapter 5. However, such a framing would push the chapter that focuses 
on neoliberalism and nationalism (chapter 1) to the margins, and leave 
those on atheism (chapter 3) and spiritual healing (chapter 6) hanging in 
an uncomfortable position. But the issue has ramifications beyond those 
of textual organization. The point is, as Maurice Bloch has argued, that 
“no valid theoretical distinction can be made between the transcendental 
social and the ‘religious’ ” (2013, ix). Setting it apart from what he calls the 
“transactional social,” the transcendental, for Bloch, refers to those aspects 
of life that draw on the imagination, whether we tend to categorize these 
as social, political, or religious (Bloch 2008, 2060). And that is ultimately 
what this book is about: documenting the ways in which people orient 
themselves to transcendental values and utopian horizons, following the 
trajectories of collective imaginations in uncertain conditions, observing 
how existential, epistemological, and ontological concerns merge in the 
struggle for a livable future.
This, then, brings us back to Mirgul’s story of the Tulip Revolution 
with which this introduction began. The story highlighted the role of 
the transcendental in political struggle and emphasized that conviction is 
ultimately about the epistemic, emotive, and social processes that propel 
the connection with a utopian horizon. When Mirgul reached out to the 
ideas of democracy and freedom, she did so by identifying with a group 
of like-minded others who attempted to realize a common goal. This 
utopian horizon receded, indeed revealed itself as a ploy for careerist and 
geopolitical interests, as soon as the revolution was won and the group of 
revolutionaries disbanded. The ideas of democracy and freedom turned 
out to be moving targets—“floating signifiers”—with increasingly disil-
lusioning qualities. As such, this story was also about the volatile context, 
one in which political and religious movements emerged and receded, in 
which hope and disillusionment quickly followed each other. It is to this 
topic that I now turn.
Part I




The Reordering of Kyrgyz Society
Located in the middle of Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan’s capital, Ala-Too Square 
stands out for its immensity and emptiness. Created in 1984 to mark the 
sixtieth anniversary of the Kyrgyz Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR), it was 
designed to accommodate oversized state spectacles and military parades. 
The square is traversed by two parallel roads and lined with buildings cov-
ered in marble: a massive cube that houses the National History Museum 
to the north; the presidential office building, or White House, behind a 
row of poplars in the northwest; arched white buildings along the square’s 
east and west flanks; and, to the south, the robust Ministry of Agriculture, 
behind which the snow-covered Ala-Too Mountains can be seen on clear, 
smog-free days.
If a time-lapse video had been made of the square between 1984 and 
the present day, it would reveal meaningful details about the political 
rhythms and their transformations in Kyrgyzstan over those three de-
cades. During the first seven years of coverage, the video would draw 
attention to the yearly Victory Day celebrations and October Revolution 
18    Uncer ta in  Times  and  Place s
parades that punctuated time in what was then a quiet, Soviet provincial 
backwater. Those expecting to see turbulence in the period directly before 
or after Kyrgyzstan gained independence, on August 31, 1991, would be 
disappointed—the square remained eerily quiet, a visual indicator of the 
reticence and wariness with which the political elite and the population at 
large greeted the disintegration of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.1 
The economic crisis of the 1990s caused the square to deteriorate, leaving 
the fountains waterless and causing the pavement to crack open, which 
even the colorful new state spectacles such as those on Independence Day 
could not conceal. It was not until the turn of the century that the square 
began to play a more active role in the public life of the newly independent 
country. Collective prayers started to fill the square at the end of Ramadan 
(orozo ait) and the Feast of the Sacrifice (kurban ait), marking the return 
of Islam to public life and triggering debate about the proper place of reli-
gion in an ostensibly secular state. In this period the square also became an 
important site for expressing political discontent, featuring frequent dem-
onstrations and meetings, and forming the center stage of two revolutions. 
During the largely peaceful Tulip Revolution of March 2005, the square 
was occupied by students and others dressed in pink and yellow shirts, 
before groups of young men stormed and occupied the White House 
(Lewis 2008, 142). Similarly, in April 2010 the square filled up just before 
the grand finale, when demonstrations culminated in an open clash with 
security forces, resulting in a battle in which at least eighty-six people lost 
their lives and numerous buildings around the square were burned down.
These public events are suggestive of the rhythms of Kyrgyz political 
life, and the issues that fueled collective action. We will return to these 
events, but not before considering the more slow-paced ideological cur-
rents that informed them. To gain an overview of these slower trends 
we could do worse than to take our time-lapse video camera and zoom 
in on the three statues that successively occupied the square’s central 
fifteen-meter-high pedestal. In 1984, the first statue to adorn what was 
then still named the Lenin Square was, unsurprisingly, a statue of Lenin, 
ten meters tall and with his outstretched right arm pointing southward 
toward the Ala-Too mountain range. What is unique about this Lenin 
is that he remained standing on his pedestal long after 1991. While in the 
following months and years Lenins were being removed from the central 
squares of most Soviet successor state capitals, Bishkek’s Lenin ended up 
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having a longer post-Soviet than Soviet life by the time he was moved in 
2003. Then, at midday on August 16, Lenin was carefully lifted from his 
pedestal, watched in silent protest by only a handful of people waving a 
flag of the USSR.2 But instead of being destroyed, Lenin was reinstalled 
only a hundred meters away behind the National History Museum, placed 
on a lower pedestal, faced northward, with his outstretched hand point-
ing to the Jogorku Kenesh (parliament) and the American University of 
Central Asia.
Back on Ala-Too Square, the statue replacing Lenin was the Erkindik 
(Liberty) statue, modeled after the Greek goddess of liberty but given a 
Kyrgyz face and holding in her outstretched hand not a torch but a tunduk, 
the wooden centerpiece of the roof of a yurt and symbol of the Kyrgyz 
nation. It might be fitting that Erkindik oversaw two revolutions (in 2005 
and 2010), but this was a “liberty” quite different from what Akaev, Kyr-
gyzstan’s first president, had envisioned when he commissioned the statue. 
Erkindik had been designed to underscore the values of democracy and 
Bishkek’s Ala-Too Square in August 2003, with Lenin statue,  
soon to be removed, and the National History Museum
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sovereignty that Akaev’s government had promoted since independence, 
and which had earned the country the international reputation as an “is-
land of democracy” in the mid-1990s. However, as soon as Erkindik was 
placed on her pedestal, she started to draw criticism, ranging from objec-
tions to her short-sleeved dress that revealed too much bare bronzed skin 
and was therefore deemed non-Kyrgyz and un-Islamic, to the complaint 
that holding the tunduk is a sacrosanct act reserved for elderly men, and 
suspicion that the president’s wife had been the model for Erkindik’s face 
(see Cummings 2013, 612–13).
Plans to replace Erkindik were made under the authoritarian presi-
dency of Kurmanbek Bakiev, who had come to power after the Tulip 
Revolution of 2005 and was ousted in Kyrgyzstan’s second revolution, in 
2010. Bakiev had consulted with advisers and artists about the construc-
tion of a new statue, but “most of the concepts put forward were too local 
or marginal, and thus unsustainable and unworkable at a national level” 
(Morozova 2008, 19). As a result, Erkindik remained on the square until 
2011, when she was unceremoniously removed and replaced by the solid 
national hero Manas, who was seated in full armor on his mighty stallion.
Manas was a legendary medieval king who had united the forty Kyrgyz 
tribes to lead them to victory on the battlefield, as narrated in the Epic of 
Manas. This epic poem developed over centuries, and although several ver-
sions have been written down since the late nineteenth century, it contin-
ues to be recited orally by narrators called manaschi. Since independence, 
the epic and its hero have become a key symbol of the nation-building 
effort, increasingly presented as the epitome of Kyrgyz culture (van der 
Heide 2008). Despite official attempts to boost Manas’s internationalist cre-
dentials, this Kyrgyz symbol was ultimately exclusionary for many of the 
republic’s non-Kyrgyz citizens (see also Wachtel 2013, 977). The Manas 
statue, designed by a Kyrgyz sculptor and cast in bronze in Moscow, was 
said to have arrived in Kyrgyzstan in 2011 on Kadyr-tun (the holy night 
of the Ramadan) and was unveiled during Orozo ait, cleverly tapping into 
a combination of religious and nationalist sentiment that had become in-
creasingly prominent during the preceding years.
The passing away of the communist Lenin, who made way for the lib-
eral Erkindik, who in turn was replaced by the national hero Manas, pro-
vides one glimpse of the ideological shifts that unfolded in Kyrgyzstan. 
But while the succession of statues reflects broader ideological currents, it 
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does so in a rather out-of-sync manner. Thus, Lenin entered the square at 
a moment when the Soviet Union was already in decline, and he outlived 
the USSR by more than a decade. Likewise, Erkindik was erected in 2003 
when the “freedom” buzz of the 1990s had lost its allure and “democratic” 
president Akaev had become increasingly autocratic, only two years be-
fore he was ousted in the Tulip Revolution. Finally, although the medieval 
Manas with his message of Kyrgyzness was supposed to be timeless, he en-
tered the square after Kyrgyz nationalism had shown its dark side during 
clashes with the Uzbek minority in June 2010, and after the new govern-
ment had pledged to promote an inclusive model of statehood.3
Statues, and certainly statues on the central squares of capital cities, carry 
significant symbolic weight. They are designed to root state ideology in ter-
ritory (literally anchoring it to the soil), to make abstract ideas concrete (even 
give them a face), and to allow otherwise fleeting messages to transcend 
time (by making them immemorial). These are some of the reasons why 
the toppling of prominent statues—Saddam Hussein in Baghdad, Lenin in 
Kiev—are powerful symbolic gestures that mark the end of epochs, bold 
Bishkek’s Ala-Too Square with the new Manas statue, April 2014
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acts that desacralize former leaders or ideologies (Verdery 1999; Grant 2001). 
Similarly, the erection of a new statue can be a powerful act of inaugurating 
a new beginning or marking a passage. Clearly these potentials informed the 
rotation of statues on Ala-Too Square; they were erected and removed to 
signal ideological change and to legitimate state power. However, the delays 
in the removal of Lenin and then Erkindik, and the belatedness, whether in 
arrival or departure, of all three statues, illustrate the difficulties that succes-
sive regimes experienced in gaining and maintaining symbolic hegemony. 
If we agree with Philip Abrams (1988) that the “nature of state power lay 
first and foremost in its ideational force, as a discursive effect of political 
discourse” (Grant 2001, 336; see also Comaroff and Comaroff 2000, 322–23), 
then the awkward dance of statues on Ala-Too Square revealed the diffi-
culty of producing a “state idea” able to infuse a sufficiently sacred aura, one 
providing the legitimacy and authority necessary for effective government. 
Indeed, Lenin’s belated removal and the ridiculing of Erkindik, as well as 
Erkindik’s and Manas’s untimely arrivals, highlighted the precariousness of 
producing symbols sufficiently encompassing and powerful to connect with 
the population at large and instill a sense of inclusion and purpose.4
So what was being symbolized? I already noted that the succession 
of socialist, liberalist, and nationalist statues reflected real changes in the 
larger ideological landscape, even if the timing was off. But there is more 
to it. Lenin’s gaze projected a communist utopia onto the Kyrgyz hori-
zon, his arm gesturing the people toward this bright future. By contrast, 
Erkindik’s message of liberty failed to outline a future, relying instead on 
the universal trope of “freedom” that was as detached from the local real-
ity as she herself was floating through the air. And Manas—well, he stands 
firmly on the ground, but his gaze is primarily directed into a mythical past 
determined by kinship relations. The succession of statues, then, suggests 
the gradual loss of political vision, the erosion of progressive civic ideol-
ogy. Moreover, while Lenin reached out to all nations, such an encompass-
ing stance remained unrealized by his successors. Erkindik mixed Kyrgyz 
particularity with a universal vision of freedom but did so unsuccessfully, 
while the archetypal Kyrgyz hero Manas represented an ethnic world with 
which few Russians, Uzbeks, or representatives of other minorities identi-
fied. The statues seem to have become not only increasingly shortsighted 
but also exclusionary, changes that, as we will see, have had real-time par-
allels in Kyrgyzstan’s recent political history.
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Obviously none of the above claims, which are based on a reading of 
just three statues, should be taken at face value. Instead they should be seen 
as hypotheses to be examined by following the trajectories of socialism, 
(neo) liberalism, and nationalism in the post-Soviet period. In the remain-
der of this chapter I explore how these ideologies translated into political 
practice, and analyze the tensions between rhetoric and reality that has 
characterized Kyrgyzstan’s so-called transition. Moreover, by connecting 
the succession of statues to the political events unfolding on the square 
and beyond we can see how Kyrgyzstan’s unraveling transition became 
interspersed with recurrent eruptions of political turmoil. This complex 
relationship provides insight into the reconfigurations of political and so-
cial space in the decades that followed the Soviet collapse.
Projections of Transition
“Transition” has the dubious honor of being one of the terms used most 
frequently to characterize post-Soviet trajectories, both by those who lived 
through the period and by those who observed and wrote about it. Al-
though the dictionary meaning of “transition” is simply a period of change 
from one to another relatively stable situation, in its application to postso-
cialist countries, “transition” obtained distinct teleological qualities, that is, 
the observed changes were all viewed in relation to a predetermined final 
endpoint. As others have noted, transition ideas were essentially a slightly 
modified version of modernization theory, both of which convey a linear 
progressive and teleological kind of thinking, assuming the final stage to 
be a version of market democracy (e.g., Carothers 2002).
These assumptions drove the reform agenda of the first independent 
government of Kyrgyzstan headed by President Askar Akaev. In the early 
1990s, when the country was on the brink of economic collapse, Akaev’s 
government opted for a transition strategy of “shock therapy” and closely 
cooperated with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, 
and various multilateral development institutions to carry out a compre-
hensive structural adjustment program. The reforms included the liber-
alization of markets, the privatization of property, and the reduction of 
welfare programs. Kyrgyzstan introduced its own currency in May 1993, 
and by mid-1997 it had privatized approximately two-thirds of the state 
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sector (Anderson 1999, 71). Preparations for this comprehensive restruc-
turing of the economy were carried out in close cooperation with interna-
tional organizations. To illustrate, over 50 percent of bills passed through 
parliament in the 1990s were drafted by international organizations and 
international NGOs (Cooley and Ron 2002, 19). No surprise then that Kyr-
gyzstan became essentially the poster child for the Washington consensus. 
For example, a high-ranking Western diplomat commented in 1994 that 
“politically, Kyrgyzstan is light-years ahead of the other new republics. 
Economically, it is carefully and methodically preparing the way for a 
market economy.”5
Although international pressure on Kyrgyzstan’s government to adopt 
the structural adjustment package was significant, it would be wrong to 
see the Akaev government as merely a passive recipient of an externally 
imposed neoliberal agenda. In fact the president was a very vocal spokes-
person of (neo) liberal ideology (Anderson 1999, 81). Possibly his rather 
excessive references to former US presidents such as Abraham Lincoln 
and Thomas Jefferson (Akaev 1993, 9, 18; see also McGlinchey 2011, 87; 
Cummings 2013) were intended to impress US donors, but they were also 
indicative of the kind of future society he envisioned. A good example is a 
published speech from 1993 in which Akaev presented a straightforward 
view of the direction of transition. He started by positing that Kyrgyzstan 
would have been prosperous if not for “some irrational path in history” 
due to which the country spent “seventy years . . . in the grip of a totali-
tarian system” (1993, 10–11). The way to rectify this perceived historical 
travesty was full-out liberalization: religious freedom, political freedom, 
economic freedom (1993, 11–12). This was neoliberalism in almost its pur-
est form, which optimistically hoped (or naively assumed) that when given 
“freedom,” society would rid itself of the imposed “irrationalities” and be 
guided by a natural or intrinsic drive toward the final destination of liberal 
modernity.
The labels by which Kyrgyzstan came to be known, such as the “Swit-
zerland of Central Asia” and “island of Democracy,” referred not just to 
the economic sphere but also to the promotion of “freedom of informa-
tion, a free press, and freedom of association” (Akaev 1993, 22), which had 
resulted in a significantly more pluralistic media landscape than existed 
in neighboring countries, and the emergence of a range of nongovern-
mental organizations. Attracted by this liberal environment were not only 
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numerous (secular) development organizations, but many organizations 
with political and religious agendas as well, creating anxiety among the 
political establishment and the population at large, and triggering calls for 
regulation. It soon became clear to the political elite that the challenge was 
to ensure that this emerging “civil society” would indeed remain “civil” 
and make a positive contribution to the common good. The government 
was particularly concerned about interethnic stability and cooperation, 
a sensitive topic because of recent clashes (in 1990) between Kyrgyz and 
Uzbeks and because of the “brain drain” of emigrating Russians and Ger-
mans. The topic became a central tenet of Akaev’s political ideology, and 
was reflected in his slogan “Kyrgyzstan—our common home,” which was 
meant to convey that all inhabitants of the republic, irrespective of their 
ethno-national and religious background, were an integral part of the 
newly independent country:
I would propose the following philosophy. Your country is your home. 
Thus, our Kyrgyzstan is our common home. Indeed, it has been built by 
all of us, including Kyrgyz, Russians, Uzbeks, Germans, Jews, Uyghurs,  
Koreans, and Karachays. They built it without any doubt that they will 
live in this home as a single family in friendship and harmony, for eternity. 
(Akaev 1995, 97, in Murzakulova and Schoeberlein 2009, 1238)
This idea of a “common home” in which all nations contribute to the de-
velopment of a harmonious society bears a strong resemblance to Soviet in-
ternationalism. As Asel Murzakulova and John Schoeberlein have pointed 
out, this was a “vision of a civic nation in the good traditions of the Soviet 
intelligentsia” (2009, 1238). In fact, ten years earlier Mikhail Gorbachev 
had used the exact same phrase to refer to the USSR.6 But if Gorbachev 
had invoked “our common home” in order to smooth over ethnic tensions 
that erupted in the mid-1980s in the Caucasus and the Baltics especially, 
in Akaev’s case there was an built-in tension. His internationalist refer-
ences coincided with the particularistic effort of building an ethno-nation 
around the Kyrgyz majority, not least by elevating the mythical figure 
Manas as the key symbol of Kyrgyz nationhood.
Kyrgyzstan’s secular leaders had expected that in the “postatheist” era, 
the return of religion would serve to strengthen the moral fabric of soci-
ety and underpin the cultural historical traditions of the population. In 
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one of his commentaries on the topic, Akaev summarized his views on 
the position of Islam in Kyrgyzstan as follows: “Here in Kyrgyzstan Islam 
was assimilated in a rather untraditional form. What we see here are the 
outward trappings of Islam without the exalted religious fanaticism and 
ideology. On the other hand, our brand of Islam absorbed many of the 
cultural traditions of the peoples in the region. . . . Our brand of Islam can 
play a stabilizing, consolidating role.”7 As we will see, however, this view 
was to be shaken as the years progressed, when it turned out that interest in 
“traditional” versions of Islam (and Christianity) remained subdued, while 
new religious movements quickly gained in importance and visibility.
It is important to remember the distinct spirit of optimism and possibil-
ity that existed in the early 1990s, as also David Lewis (2008) has observed. 
For a few years there was a real sense that things would improve quickly. 
In 1995, many of my acquaintances did not doubt that the transition to 
capitalism and democracy would be completed, even if they quibbled as 
to whether it would take five, ten, or as long as twenty years. But as time 
progressed, not only did the imagined endpoint recede further into the 
future, the country turned out to be moving in a very different direction. 
Despite economic liberalization, the anticipated (and promised) foreign 
investments never arrived. The loss of jobs was presented as a temporary 
setback, a side effect of the transition, but the reality was that stable formal 
employment remained rare even twenty-five years later. And although the 
Akaev government presented Kyrgyzstan as a “common home” for all na-
tionalities, approximately half the population belonging to its minorities 
left the country for good.
One of the key problems with the economic reform programs, as also 
Janine Wedel has observed (2001), was that the Washington consensus 
did not sufficiently take into consideration the preexisting power rela-
tions, pretending instead that one can build a market economy through 
deregulation. Ignored were the tensions unleashed by privatization and 
the deep inequalities that the “free market” produced. And to assume that 
a cooperative heterogeneous population would emerge on the basis of an 
ideal of “international citizenship” was to ignore the tensions that afflict 
nation-state building. What thus needs to be analyzed is how former So-
viet reality became refracted through the prism of the two grand narratives 
that were advanced in the 1990s and the 2000s: liberalism and nationalism. 
Crucially, the tropes of liberalism and nationalism became interwoven 
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with the policies and laws of independent Kyrgyzstan, and affected how 
citizens experienced their own position in relation to the Kyrgyz state.
Privatization Chaos
When Kyrgyzstan embarked on a path of radical reform, the aim was to 
become an affluent market democracy in five to ten years. But while in the 
mid-1990s Kyrgyzstan counted as a hope-inspiring (neo-) liberal beacon in 
the region, twenty years later it had become an example of transition gone 
hopelessly wrong. Although it had been “doing everything right” from the 
perspective of the international community (Connery 2000, 4), the “shock 
therapy” strategy failed to attract major investors or result in sustainable 
economic growth. Poverty levels remained high despite a slow recovery in 
macroeconomic terms since the late 1990s; in 2003 real GDP was still only 
78 percent of what it had been in 1989 (Pomfret 2006, 108). The accumu-
lation of foreign debt during fifteen years of “transition” was staggering, 
to the extent that in 2006 the country met the criteria for access to the IMF 
and World Bank’s Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative. Two de-
cades after gaining independence, Kyrgyzstan was at the bottom of former 
Soviet republics in terms of economic indicators, ranked among the most 
corrupt countries in the world, and had become politically volatile.
The reasons for this turn of events were many, but the most impor-
tant ones can be illustrated by returning to the problematic assumptions 
of transition. Of the many critics of transition thinking, Thomas Caroth-
ers (2002) has been the most systematic in documenting the assumptions 
on which transition thinking was based, including, first, that the starting 
conditions and other specifics of “transitional countries” matter very little 
for the onset or the outcome of the transition process (8); second, that these 
transitions “are being built on coherent, functioning states” (8–9); and 
third, that fast reform is superior to gradual reform (see also Spoor 1995, 
54, 61; Wedel 2001). The case of Kyrgyzstan dramatically illustrates the 
problems with these assumptions, which together demonstrate the fallacy 
of the overarching assumption, namely that “any country moving away 
from dictatorial rule can be considered a country in transition towards de-
mocracy” (Carothers 2002, 6), to eventually become a market democracy 
modeled on the North American example.
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As has become more than obvious since, the starting conditions of in-
dividual countries have massively affected their post-Soviet trajectories. 
In fact, the economic prospects for an independent Kyrgyzstan had never 
been good. During Soviet times its economy had been based largely on ag-
riculture and animal husbandry, coupled with coal and metallurgic mining 
activities as well as the production of components for the military industry. 
It lacked the natural riches of its neighbors such as oil and gas and had 
relied on a steady flow of subsidies from Moscow throughout the Soviet 
period. After independence, not only did the subsidies stop, but the mostly 
Russian markets for several of Kyrgyzstan’s main commodities—meat, 
wool, machinery components, refined sugar—imploded with the disinte-
gration of the Soviet Union. It is no big mystery why “transition countries” 
with close proximity to the European Union (such as the Baltic countries) 
fared considerably better, and why in the Central Asian context, the two 
countries that lacked substantial natural resources (Kyrgyzstan and Tajik-
istan) became not only the poorest post-Soviet republics but also the ones 
with the weakest state structures.
This brings us to the second point, the assumption that transition was 
built on functioning states. In reality, Kyrgyzstan’s state system crumbled 
and fragmented under the weight of “transition.” Talking about the upper 
echelons of Kyrgyz politics, Eric McGlinchey writes that “Kyrgyzstan’s 
political mess is one of chaos” (2011, 2). He argues that because Kyrgyzstan 
lacked sufficiently large economic resources, the government was unable 
to buy the loyalty of its fragmented elite, resulting in considerable political 
instability (80–113). Actually, the problem extended far beyond the elite 
groups that McGlinchey focuses on. During much of the 1990s, the state 
was unable to pay its employees in health care, taxation, education, polic-
ing, and administration the kind of salaries that would meet minimum 
living costs, and often failed to pay out salaries for months on end. As 
Catherine Alexander (2009) has argued, for Kazakhstan in the 1990s this 
had the effect of the social contract coming undone, with the state losing 
its legitimacy. This resulting erosion of civil service was counteracted by a 
strengthening of informal ties, which increasingly personalized the state.
An interesting illustration of these processes is in Aksana Ismailbekova’s 
book Blood Ties and the Native Son (forthcoming), which gives a detailed 
analysis of the political trajectory of Rahim, an aspiring leader in northern 
Kyrgyzstan. For Rahim to advance his political career the key issue is to 
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extend his kinship-based support network by becoming regionally seen as 
a “native son,” that is, as someone who will respectfully honor and recip-
rocate the support received from his home base. Perhaps ironically, these 
bonds of kinship and locality were solidified at moments that also symbol-
ized capitalism and democracy: in the course of privatizing a factory, as the 
result of grants received from international development organizations, 
and especially on election days. Showing how these processes unfold in the 
context of “transition,” Ismailbekova argues that kinship-based patronage 
practices should not be seen as the antithesis of democracy but rather as 
part of the development of a vernacular democracy with specific Kyrgyz 
features.
Finally, there is the issue of “fast” versus “gradual” reform. In Cen-
tral Asia and more widely across the former Soviet Union, Kyrgyzstan 
counted as a fast reformer. But when in 1995 I talked with a group of 
Kyrgyz farmers about privatization, they told me: “If they [the govern-
ment] would have privatized [all the assets] right away in 1991, we would 
have had thriving farms, but instead they waited, then they changed their 
minds, and in the meantime everything fell apart.” These farmers were 
probably right in some respects, but the point is that a fast reform was 
never going to succeed in a situation in which the state system lacked the 
strength, coherence, and will to pull off a massive overnight transforma-
tion. Moreover, while the state system lacked willpower, the uncertainty 
and confusion about the direction of change fostered short-term rent 
seeking by those ordinary citizens and power holders with access to state 
resources. The result was catastrophic. As John Farrington (2005) docu-
ments, 57 percent of the livestock simply disappeared between 1989 and 
1999.8 Industrial production did not fare any better, with most of the (coal) 
mines and textile and food-processing factories closing their doors during 
the 1990s. In a situation where starting conditions are already unfavorable, 
and where the political structure lacks muscle to enforce its decisions, at-
tempts at fast reforms are likely to be, in the words of Max Spoor (1995, 61) 
“hasty reforms” with disarticulating consequences.
In The Anti-Politics Machine, James Ferguson points out that develop-
ment projects typically fail in reaching their objectives, in part because they 
are based on faulty assumptions and blueprints. Instead of focusing on fail-
ure, he proposes to focus on what failure produces, because, he says, “im-
portant political effects may be realized almost invisibly alongside . . . that 
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‘failure’ ” (1990, 255). Analogously, we may ask: If in Kyrgyzstan neoliberal 
reform failed to produce a free market and a stable democracy, what did 
it produce instead? How was the political economy reconfigured as a re-
sult of neoliberal failure? It is important to keep in mind Joma Nazpary’s 
observation that in Kazakhstan in the 1990s “privatization of state prop-
erty [was] considered by the dispossessed as the root of chaos” (2002, 60). 
Beyond reflecting widespread frustration, this view rightly points at the 
affinities and interlinking of privatization, destabilization, and predatory 
accumulation. What had happened, in effect, was that economic liberal-
ization allowed Soviet-rooted informal orders to assume new prominence 
and become the de facto regulating mechanisms.9 Moreover, as the country 
entered a situation that depended on access to money rather than access to 
resources (Verdery 1996; Ledeneva 1998), Soviet forms of clientelism were 
transformed into post-Soviet “corruption,” a process by which informal 
practices became monetized.
This dramatic development was, in many ways, the logical outcome of 
a poorly thought-out concept of “transition,” which failed to acknowledge 
that political, economic, and other spheres of life are thoroughly intercon-
nected, that therefore markets don’t exist in vacuums, and indeed that “the 
economy” does not exist as an independent entity or separate sphere. The 
actual outcomes of “liberalization” could have been anticipated if “power” 
had been inserted into the equation. In fact, several prominent sociologists 
and anthropologists, most notably Caroline Humphrey (1991), Katherine 
Verdery (1996), and Michael Burawoy and Pavel Krotov (1992), very early 
on predicted that informal orders based on kinship, friendship, and local-
ity would become the de facto ordering principles.
This turn of history was not entirely unanticipated within Kyrgyzstan 
either. Ironically, President Akaev seems to have been aware of the prob-
lems (as well as the possibilities for self-enrichment) even while upholding 
his image as a staunch believer in “transition” when he wrote in 1993 that 
the transition “has occurred somewhat illogically.” Specifically, he noted 
that on the economic front “we enact economic freedom, while lacking 
developed property relations, primarily private property” (Akaev 1993). 
This illogicality, in a weak state, produced disastrous effect for the econ-
omy overall, while allowing well-placed political entrepreneurs (including 
Akaev) to appropriate large chunks of the economy.
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This conjunction highlights the conceptual affinities between corrup-
tion and privatization. The classic definition of corruption as the “use of 
public office for private gain” may be reconfigured to hypothesize that the 
transformation of the public sector after socialism entailed an alternative 
mode of privatization—the “privatization of public offices and assets” by 
(groups of) well-placed individuals—without significantly changing the po-
litical culture, and without erasing existing networks of power. This process 
excluded the majority of citizens, while creating uncertainty for everyone 
(McGlinchey 2011; Shishkin 2013).10 Ultimately, then, the Kyrgyz “transi-
tion” revealed in tragic detail how privatization and corruption feed on each 
other. Neoliberal policies had produced not an ideal-typical “free market” 
but rather, to use the local vocabulary, a “wild market” (dikii rynok).
Divisive Nationalism
In a landmark publication, Yuri Slezkine demolished the popular notion 
of the Soviet Union as a “breaker of nations” by documenting and boldly 
asserting that “Soviet nationality policy was devised and carried out by na-
tionalists” (1994, 414). In the context of Central Asia’s history, it is tempt-
ing to combine this perspective with the even bolder statement by Ernest 
Gellner that nationalism “invents nations where they do not exist” (1983). 
Indeed, in this region nations had not been in existence before the Russian 
Revolution. Its population had drawn lines of differentiation on the basis 
of religion, locality, tribal affiliation, language, and mode of livelihood, but 
these lines crosscut each other in numerous and often inconsistent ways 
and certainly did not congeal into coherent national categories. In fact, the 
labels “Kyrgyz,” “Kazakh,” “Uzbek,” “Tadjik,” and “Turkmen” were an-
nounced as national categories only in the 1920s, and they obtained sub-
stance in the decades that followed (Roy 2000, xvi).
The people who were categorized as Kyrgyz initially hardly identi-
fied with that label, referring to themselves primarily in terms of kinship, 
as member of a tribe or tribal segment, as pastoralists in contrast to the 
agriculturalists of the Fergana Valley, and as Muslims in contrast to the 
Russian administrators and settlers. But as Francine Hirsch (2005) and 
Olivier Roy (2000) have argued, by delineating ethno-territorial boundaries, 
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developing administrative structures within those territories, and relegat-
ing power to local elites, the Soviet regime provided the incentives that 
infused ethno-national categories with a social and political life.11 These 
categories gained further substance through the introduction of modern 
schooling in standardized national languages, and the promotion of cul-
tural repertoires that included national cuisine, dress, music, and, in the 
case of the Kyrgyz, a national epic. As all successful inventions are, these 
were rooted in existing cultural material, but this was standardized and 
generalized to fit the needs of nationhood.
The national projects of the newly independent states were in many 
ways continuations of the nationality policies of the Soviet Union, while 
entering a context in which the supranational civic structure of the Union 
of Soviet Republics no longer existed. Indeed, after 1991 no one has seri-
ously doubted the legitimacy of the five Soviet-produced Central Asian 
nations, nor were there serious attempts to create a pan-Turkistani state. 
When in 1991 Benedict Anderson wrote a new foreword to his famous 
book on the logics of nationalism, it may well have been that he had the 
new map of Central Asia in mind when stating that “history seems to be 
bearing out the ‘logic’ of Imagined Communities better than its author man-
aged to do” ([1983] 2006, xi).
Though the Central Asian experience thus fits the general contours of 
the grand narrative of modern nationalism, the devil is in the details. Al-
though these nations were either “invented” or solidified in the early twen-
tieth century, this happened as part of the politics of the Soviet “affirmative 
action” empire (Martin 2001). That is, the national categories were pro-
duced before the territorial units to which they corresponded gained their 
own independent political life. Moreover, because of the (unavoidable) 
incongruence between territorial divisions and ethno-national categories 
(and because of the forced and voluntary labor migrations), each newly in-
dependent post-Soviet country contained significant preformed minorities 
with their own designated homelands elsewhere. The Kyrgyz SSR is a case 
in point. In the last Soviet census, of 1989, only a slight majority, 52 per-
cent, of its population was classified as ethnically Kyrgyz (Anderson 1999, 
42). Additionally, the republic was home to a large contingent of Russians 
(21%) and Uzbeks (13%), as well as many smaller minorities, of which 
Tatars, Uyghurs, Germans, and Ukrainians were the most numerous.
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These ethno-national categories gained new significance when the 
overarching Soviet civic administrative structure made way for sovereign 
national territories, often with negative consequences for minorities. As 
Rogers Brubaker has pointed out, while the age of nationalism appeared 
to be drawing to a close in other parts of the world, post-Soviet Eurasia 
was “moving back to the nation-state, entering not a post-national but a 
post-multinational era” (2011, 1786). To draw attention to the incomplete-
ness of the nation-state project Brubaker proposes to speak instead of “na-
tionalizing states” (2011). This is a useful perspective because even though 
the “nations” remained uncontested in the geopolitical arena, at the subna-
tional level they competed with other frames of belonging. In Kyrgyzstan 
there was considerable tension between national, regional, and tribal com-
ponents of collective ideology.12
To illustrate these tensions it makes sense to return to the Manas epic 
and its hero, Batyr-khan Manas, whom we already encountered in the 
form of his statue. The epic had been treated with ambivalence by So-
viet authorities, alternately being denounced as reactionary and celebrated 
as representative of native culture, in which case it was presented as “ex-
pressing the deepest moral aspirations of the masses” and reflecting the 
“working conditions of the people” (van der Heide 2008, 182–83). Plans to 
celebrate the epic’s thousand-year existence had been made since the 1930s, 
but were postponed time and again, most likely because the epic revolves 
around warfare between the Kyrgyz and Chinese-speaking Kalmyk 
tribes, a diplomatically sensitive issue. However, as soon as Kyrgyzstan 
declared independence, Manas was promoted as the cornerstone of the 
government’s nationalizing efforts, and his one-thousandth anniversary 
was celebrated in 1995. Manas came to be presented as “the embodiment 
of the Kyrgyz self-image” (Thompson et al. 2006, 178), and the epic as 
a model for moral and spiritual guidance to the Kyrgyz nation (van der 
Heide 2008, 272; Marat 2008). Schoolchildren were taught the seven les-
sons of Manas: patriotism, unity of the nation, international cooperation, 
defense of the state, humanism, harmony with nature, and the aspiration 
to obtain knowledge and skills (Akaev 2003, 420–24). Celebrated narrators 
of the epic (manaschis) were given prominent places in the new pantheon of 
national heroes. A flood of popular publications and public events further 
helped elevate the epic to the standing of a national ideology.
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Notwithstanding the substantial strengths of Manas as a national sym-
bol, he also revealed cracks in the state-building effort. The first tension 
was that the principle of “genealogical relatedness” on which Manas wor-
ship was built did as much to divide the Kyrgyz into tribes as unite them 
as a nation (Gullette 2010). The figure of Manas, whose place of birth and 
death is believed to have been in the Talas Valley in northwestern Kyrgyz-
stan, found more resonance in the north of the country than in the south, 
where the epic and its hero had never played a prominent role. The sec-
ond tension was that as an ethno-national mythological hero, the figure of 
Manas implicitly excluded all non-Kyrgyz, thereby reinforcing the notion 
that ultimately Kyrgyzstan is the home of the ethnic Kyrgyz rather than 
for its substantial non-Kyrgyz population.
The government was all too aware of the gravity of these issues. In the 
period between 1989 and 1999 the Russian population in Kyrgyzstan de-
creased by 313,000 (from 916,000 to 603,000), which represented a drop 
from 21.5 to 12.5 percent of the total population. In addition, some 58,000 
Ukrainians and 80,000 Germans left the Kyrgyz Republic, mostly in the 
early 1990s. This exodus was particularly problematic because it consti-
tuted a significant brain drain, as Russians and other “Europeans”13 were 
more likely to have completed higher education and were strongly rep-
resented in the technical, managerial, and educational spheres. Although 
economic factors formed the main reason for this massive emigration 
(prospects were not good in Kyrgyzstan), it was also the case that many 
“Europeans” did not feel at home in an independent Kyrgyzstan, where 
the Kyrgyz language was replacing Russian as the main administrative 
language and where careers were increasingly dependent on being part of 
networks that followed lines of ethnicity and kinship (Kosmarskaia 2006).
Akaev tried to counteract these tensions during his presidency, from 
1991 to 2005, by stressing the integrative elements of Manas, and the ap-
plicability of his wisdom to humanity as a whole. This is a recurring theme 
in his book Kyrgyz Statehood and the National Epos “Manas,” in which 
he writes that a key idea of the epic is “transethnic consensus, friend-
ship, and cooperation” (Akaev 2003, 283). Moreover, through his slogan 
“Kyrgyzstan—our common home” that we have encountered earlier, 
Akaev stressed that the Kyrgyz nation should be seen as a “polyethnic 
alloy,” one that is stronger than the “initial materials” (2003, 32). Accord-
ing to Murzakulova and Schoeberlein, this kind of recycling of “Soviet 
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internationalism” was meant to suggest continuity with the Soviet past and 
to appeal to Kyrgyzstan’s minorities, especially Russians, while the gov-
ernment’s use of nationalist symbolism was aimed at pleasing the Kyrgyz 
majority population. Both aspects were, according to the authors, aimed 
at obtaining “the solidarity and loyalty of different groups within the state 
and when one of them does not function, the other is deployed” (Murza-
kulova and Schoeberlein 2009, 1239). Although tensions remained, this 
two-track approach served the goals of simultaneously legitimizing power 
and softening the anxieties of minorities.
Things changed after the Tulip Revolution of 2005. As Madeleine 
Reeves points out, while President Akaev’s slogans had celebrated Kyr-
gyzstan as a common home for a multiethnic population, Bakiev’s rheto-
ric emphasized “patriarchal values and deference to political authority” 
(2014b, 69). In other words, while during Akaev’s presidency the govern-
ment still used inclusive rhetoric to appeal to Uzbeks, Russians, and oth-
ers, the absence of a civic ideology under Bakiev and more frequent use of 
nationalist rhetoric heightened the sense of insecurity among Uzbeks and 
other minorities (Cummings 2012, 86).
As mentioned above, attempts to create a civic nation rooted in a Soviet 
internationalist ideal had never been entirely successful. They had gone 
hand in hand with policies and a reimagining of the nation with which 
non-Kyrgyz were hardly able to identify. In northern Kyrgyzstan, most 
Russians who were able to return to Russia did so because they no longer 
saw a future. The ethnic composition was different in the south. There, the 
substantial Uzbek minority had never migrated to Kyrgyzstan, but had 
ended up on the wrong side of the border when the administrative bound-
aries between Soviet Socialist Republics were delineated in the 1930s. Dur-
ing the Soviet period this did not matter very much, and the Uzbek part 
of the population of the Kyrgyz SSR had oriented itself to the cities in 
Uzbekistan, where many followed secondary education and found mar-
riage partners. These connections were maintained after the collapse of the 
Soviet Union, but this also meant that the Uzbek minority in Kyrgyzstan 
was caught between states’ borders, occupying a marginal position with 
regard to both countries (Liu 2012, 44).
To sum up, the ethno-national categories that were fixed and fastened 
through Soviet classificatory processes reflected previously existing lines 
of differentiation in economic activities, settlement patterns, and marital 
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relationships. But the categories had long been fluid and permeable, and 
continued to be so during the Soviet period. The categories Kyrgyz and 
Uzbek were infused with new relevance, however, after the demise of the 
multinational Soviet state. In conditions of uncertainty and fragmentation, 
the national categories achieved affective qualities that rendered them sa-
lient as a mobilizing force, around which ideas of “the people” could be 
rallied. During particular episodes this allowed for an intensification of 
“groupness” (Brubaker 2004)—a surge of populist nationalism, with de-
structive tendencies.
Volatility in a Weak State
On the morning of June 10, 2010, as I was sitting in a Bishkek office, news 
started to pour in about clashes between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks in the south-
ern city of Osh. I discussed the news with Elmira, the office secretary. At 
that point we knew very little about what was happening, but she was cer-
tain that things would remain quiet in the capital: “In the south they have 
a different mentality; here [in the capital] people are more civilized and ed-
ucated.” Over the next twenty-four hours the conflict spread from Osh to 
several other towns in the south, including Jalalabad and Bazar-Korgon, 
two places I had previously lived and had many friends and acquaintances. 
I was on the phone with young Uzbek men from Bazar-Korgon who had 
tried to escape into Uzbekistan only to find the border gates closed to them. 
I talked to an Uzbek mother of an all-female household who was terri-
fied, as she was listening to the approaching gunfire (which luckily never 
reached her street). I phoned a Kyrgyz acquaintance in Kokjangak who 
mentioned that, even though there were clashes in nearby Jalalabad (a 
mere thirty kilometers away), he was certain that nothing would happen 
where he lived because the mixed population in this former mining town 
had long been accustomed to interacting civilly across ethnic lines.
The conflict raged for three days, leaving hundreds of people dead, 
80 percent of whom were Uzbek, and thousands of houses burned.14 More 
than one hundred thousand women and children temporarily fled to Uz-
bekistan, and approximately three hundred thousand people were inter-
nally displaced (Kyrgyzstan Inquiry Commission 2011). The police and 
military had done very little to stop the violence, and in some instances 
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actively aided Kyrgyz attackers, thereby significantly contributing to the 
destructive force of the conflict (International Crisis Group 2010). Mass 
violence did not spread to Bishkek, but for about a week people in the 
capital lived in fear, with streets left deserted in the evenings, the territory 
of young men with cars, ghetto blasters, and booze.
Since the mid-2000s Kyrgyzstan has experienced a series of tumul-
tuous political events, of which the two revolutions, of March 2005 and 
April 2010, and the above-described bloodshed between Kyrgyz and 
Uzbeks in June 2010 were the most dramatic ones. The Tulip Revolution 
of 2005 started after fraudulent elections had left several opposition leaders 
out of parliament, creating unrest among significant factions of the po-
litical elite, which then started to merge with the frustrations of ordinary 
citizens about a “transition” that was going nowhere. Still, no one expected 
that the protests, which initially seemed a provincial affair, would travel 
so quickly to the capital and remove Akaev from power with so little re-
sistance. As one of the main opposition leaders (and the later president) 
Kurmanbek Bakiev reportedly exclaimed: “We did not expect this at all. It 
was not part of the plan.”15 The sudden breakdown of state structures set 
the stage for several chaotic days in the capital, but a sense of calm returned 
after two days.
The background to the second Kyrgyz revolution, of April 2010, was 
frustration about the cronyism and predatory practices of the Bakiev re-
gime. Frustration culminated with several increases in energy prices, 
which were blamed on the malversations of the presidential family, and 
after which people in the provinces started attacking government offices. 
In contrast to Akaev in 2005, Kurmanbek Bakiev and his family did not 
leave without a fight, resulting in clashes that left eighty-six people dead 
(Matveeva 2010). In the chaos that followed the April 2010 revolution 
several instances of intercommunal violence erupted, of which the earlier 
described June 2010 conflict between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks was the most 
devastating.
These two revolutions as well as the 2010 bloodshed have been much 
commented on.16 Not only have these events been constitutive of the po-
litical landscape and should thus be prominently discussed in a contextual 
chapter, they also powerfully illuminate the affective dimension of poli-
tics. Though each revolution had been long in coming, when actual fight-
ing broke out, it took people by surprise. Through these dramatic events, 
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rooted in messy realities, certainty was being produced. Indeed, it was 
during the days of conflict that the contours of “imagined communities” 
achieved frightening clarity (McBrien 2013, 259–60). And it was during 
the 2010 revolution that the notion of “the people” gained crucial impor-
tance (Reeves 2014b). In these events the slow-paced ideological shifts were 
interrupted by fast-paced contentious politics.
It is not difficult to see how these dramatic political events were rooted 
in the murkiness of the “transition.” The last years of Akaev’s rule were 
characterized by dwindling hope that the transition would ever be com-
pleted. Kyrgyz society had been descending into a negative spiral of in-
stability and anomie. Increasing frustration with the regime started to 
intertwine with the frustrations of important segments of the political 
elite. The years after the Tulip Revolution revealed a further worsening of 
the situation. Protests that focused on price hikes, administrative incom-
petence, and imprisonment of politicians had become commonplace in the 
capital as well as in the provinces. Tensions along ethnic lines became more 
visible (Tabyshalieva 2013) and often focused on land entitlements. Ad-
ministrative offices had increasingly become dominated by Kyrgyz (and 
organized along regional and tribal lines), a process that intensified after 
2005, thereby further marginalizing minority groups.
Even if in hindsight it is clear that the dramatic events were rooted in a 
failed transition, at the moment they happened everyone was taken aback. 
Ironically, even the leaders of the Tulip Revolution commented that they 
had not planned for revolution. And regarding the clashes of 2010, Julie 
McBrien argues that “no one imagined and no one anticipated the vio-
lence” (2013, 257). One reason is people’s tendency to distance themselves 
from violence and turmoil, preferring to attribute them to barbarism or 
uncivilized behavior (as in Elmira’s dismissal). Another reason is that the 
triggers that set off dramatic chains of events were seemingly minor: elec-
toral fraud in 2005 (such fraud had happened before); a hike in energy tar-
iffs in 2010 (painful but one in a row of hikes); a fight between young men 
(once again).17 What happened in each of these cases, however, was that 
these small triggers started to reverberate with other frustrations, fears, 
and anxieties. Within an already fragmented political landscape, these in-
cidents symbolized a broken space that separated people from power, feed-
ing into a “constitutive antagonism” (Laclau 2005, 85) that provided the 
impetus for group mobilization and radicalization.
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In the case of the conflict between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks, the anxieties 
of the Kyrgyz majority were fueled by Uzbek calls for emancipation. In-
deed, in the period leading up to the conflict, the “politically marginalized 
Uzbek minority had become increasingly involved in regional and national 
politics, and had made more vocal demands for equal treatment and op-
portunities” (McBrien 2011, 3). This was perceived in some Kyrgyz circles 
as an affront to the country’s sovereignty, imagined as an “ethno-national 
and popular institution,” as David Gullette and John Heathershaw (2015, 
125) have pointed out. In the case of the 2005 Tulip Revolution the trig-
ger was electoral fraud, which started to resonate with the suspicion that 
Akaev was consolidating the influence of the presidential family on the 
national political scene. Moreover, these practices were uncovered at a time 
when opposition newspapers published images of some of the family’s spa-
cious residences along with a list of companies that belonged to, or were 
controlled by, the Akaev family. Outrage about these practices played an 
important role in the unrest—numerous reports noted that protesters were 
driven by a sense that Akaev and his family had “gone too far.”18 In the 
2010 revolution it was the combination of the announced rise in energy 
prices together with the sentiment that the Bakiev family’s greed had spun 
out of control.19
The trigger, far from being trivial, creates a focal point around which 
discourse “thickens” as it reverberates with accumulated resentment and 
frustration, which then becomes tied to the aspirations of temporarily mar-
ginalized elites, thereby kicking in a new and semiautonomous dynamic 
of violence. As Bruce Kapferer has argued, it is during conflict that po-
litical myths—fantasies of purity, justice, or supremacy—become “imbued 
with commanding power” (1988, 47). In a similar vein the 2010 revolution 
served to crystallize “the people” (el) versus the government, and more-
over, as Reeves (2014b) astutely notices, the notion of “the people” obtained 
exclusivist ethnic Kyrgyz connotations, paving the way for episodes of vio-
lence against non-Kyrgyz minorities in the months ahead.
In Bishkek in the months after the April 2010 revolution a standard 
joke was that while other democracies have elections every four or five 
years, Kyrgyzstan has a revolution every five years. But whereas one could 
make jokes about corrupt politicians, and perhaps even celebrate the peo-
ple’s ability to remove corrupt autocrats from power, similar jokes did not 
exist about the ethnic conflicts that occurred in 1990 and 2010 between 
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Kyrgyz and Uzbeks. Don Kalb argues in his (2005) article “From Flows 
to Violence” that market-led development programs have destabilizing 
effects. In Kyrgyzstan, political turmoil was rooted in a disastrous tran-
sition that left people frustrated and hollowed out the state, becoming a 
shell to be captured and mobilized by rotating factions. In this fragile en-
vironment, seemingly small triggers could set in motion chains of action 
and reaction with transformative potential, but often resulting in further 
disillusionment and astonishment about the fragility of order. As one of 
my friends from Bazar-Korgon told me: “I had never expected that [these 
atrocities] would happen here, in our town.” But those violent events did 
occur, producing temporary clarity about who is friend and who is foe, yet 
blurring the future.
Lenin’s Shadow
I’m afraid that I don’t really know what capitalism means. I conceive of it 
as the development in the West. When someone uses the word “capitalism” 
I think about the United States. I think of a highly developed industrialized 
country. At the moment, Kyrgyzstan is moving in the direction of capitalism 
in all spheres of life. I don’t know what this means. We have a wild market 
and perhaps that is a first step on the road to capitalism, [but] I don’t think 
that Kyrgyzstan will become a capitalist country very soon.
These sentences were written by an undergraduate student at the Issyk 
Kul State University in northeastern Kyrgyzstan in 1995, after I had asked 
her and fifteen fellow students to write take-home essays on the topic of 
capitalism. Several students copied or paraphrased the contents of Soviet 
encyclopedias and/or their parents’ opinion, such as one who said that “cap-
italism is the socioeconomic structure that is based on private property and 
the exploitation of people,” and another that “money is the dominant factor 
in capitalism. You can buy everything with money, even labor force. Peo-
ple are divided into poor (the laborers) and rich (the capitalists).” Ironically, 
these lines described the post-Soviet reality of the times quite accurately. 
However, even the students who employed such communist language 
ended their essays in ways that radically departed from a communist or 
socialist perspective. The last-quoted student, for example, continued by 
writing that “although capitalism still has these and other problems [refer-
ring to poverty and inequality], I do think that it is a good system. After all, 
many of the highly developed countries have a form of capitalism.” Taken 
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together, the essays appeared to reflect “minds in transition,” in which the 
dominant theme was hope that the problems would be overcome and that 
the country was treading a path toward prosperity. In the words of one stu-
dent, “Our country will become civilized and people won’t be unemployed, 
but will instead work hard and receive high wages.”
What struck me in these essays was the students’ ability to continue 
believing in a future affluent society despite living in increasingly impover-
ished conditions. And crucially, the essays suggested two mechanisms for 
how such hope could be maintained. The first involved denial that capital-
ism had already “arrived,” by stating instead that their society was “mov-
ing in the direction” or was still only in the “first stage” of what was going 
to be capitalism, and that this would ultimately replace the despised “wild 
market.” This response was understandable as the reality they experienced 
was radically different from the capitalism that they imagined to exist in 
“highly developed industrial societies.” This, moreover, points to the sec-
ond mechanism, which was to imagine capitalism as a return of the state. 
Inherent in the dismissal of the “wild market” was the idea that the market 
would be tamed by a proactive government. Similar sentiments surfaced 
when I talked (we are still in 1995) with a teacher who had not been paid 
his salary for months, yet who did not consider becoming an entrepreneur 
a viable option:
If I would give up this job and become a trader, I would end up with noth-
ing. At the bazaar there are no pensions. And what happens when you get 
ill? When everything goes back to normal in a few years, those traders will 
be empty-handed: without work, without money, without anything!
As empty signifiers (Laclau 1993) capitalism and democracy were able to 
signal the impending arrival of affluent society. Many conceptualized cap-
italism as a better functioning version of socialism, and only gradually real-
ized that the welfare state they had lost was not going to come back.
In the two decades that have passed since 1995, the “return to normal” 
never happened. In the end, the kind of advanced capitalism that could 
guarantee affluence for most people did not develop, nor did the state step 
back in to reign in exploitation and provide a safety net for its weaker 
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citizens. Liberal ideology did not come with a concrete vision of how to 
reorder society but closely followed the Washington consensus, which 
amounted to privatizing the state, a process favoring the well-endowed 
and well positioned, while leaving the majority of residents scrambling 
for survival. It produced a volatile situation ruled by money, one ordered 
along unstable lines of clientelism and patronage. When in the early 2010s 
my acquaintances reflected on the 1990s they would speak of hardship and 
confusion and emphasize that they had been in shock. But they would also 
say that the present was not much different; they had simply gotten used 
to their chaotic lives.
Although from an outsider’s perspective the neoliberal shift of the 
1990s had objectively constituted a “passing of mass utopia” (Buck-Morss 
2000), it took a while for this realization to set in. This was not in small 
measure due to the fact that “capitalism” and “democracy” were power-
ful empty signifiers that perpetuated hope, meanwhile narrowing political 
debate and thereby legitimizing the Akaev government. As such it was a 
convenient cover, or mask, for a reconfiguration of politics and economy 
that went on behind the scenes. Given the discrepancy between neoliberal 
rhetoric and chaotic reality, it was only a matter of time, though, for this 
mask to be revealed for what it was and for “transition” to come unstuck.
This unraveling of transition does not mean there are no utopian proj-
ects left. Rather, the downfall of the hegemonic state machinery for the 
production and distribution of hope produced anxieties and fears (cf. Hage 
2003, 3), while providing a boost to other hope-generating mechanisms 
and movements. The shattered transition not only destabilized economic 
lives but also opened up a space in which a range of ideological movements 
could thrive. It was because of this that evangelical Pentecostals talked 
about Kyrgyzstan as a “ripe harvest field” (cited in Pelkmans 2006b, 29); 
and Islamic piety movements such as the Tablighi Jamaat saw Kyrgyzstan 
as a “clean slate,” and were able to connect with the sensibilities of young 
Muslim men (as discussed in chapter 4). Hence, the post-Soviet condition 
is more appropriately described as one of ideological excess than ideologi-
cal void (Borenstein 1999). But this ideological excess, which refers to the 
conspicuous presence of nationalist, market, developmental, and religious 
visions, also suggests the fragility of each single ideology.
With the passing of two decades, the dream of a capitalist future of 
abundance turned out to be a mirage that could never be reached, while 
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the memory of socialist security and order receded into the past. The im-
ages of abundance and safety never disappeared but were reconfigured to 
become part of other ideologies, or indeed lingered on in the thoughts of 
those living through hardship. For now, let me give just one example, of 
a woman in her fifties who was fighting back her tears when we talked in 
2013 in her flat in the small former mining town of Ak-Tiuz. Ever since 
she had lost her job eighteen years previously she had retained some hope 
that eventually she would be able to work again as a nurse. She was hope-
ful when, earlier that year, a Canadian company was recruiting a nurse 
to be based in her small town (not least because she was the only resident 
with an education in nursing), but in the interview she was told that her 
experience was out-of-date. A young woman from a neighboring town 
was hired instead. Angrily she said that in the past employers would have 
always looked first at whether locally skilled labor was available: “back 
then they cared about the community.” True or not, Mirgul’s hopes had 
been informed by how labor used to be organized in former times, a co-
alescing of the past and the future in the present that resulted in despair.
Lenin used to adorn not only Ala-Too Square but countless other squares 
throughout the country. These provincial Lenins do not have the same 
allure, but they have equally interesting things to say about the course 
of history. In post-Soviet Kyrgyzstan most of these Lenins remained in 
place even when their surroundings radically altered. A good example is 
the Lenin that stood in front of the entrance of the tool-parts factory in 
Kokjangak. The factory went bankrupt, the buildings were dismantled, 
and the construction materials sold, leaving behind nothing but a field of 
concrete waste. But in the middle of this rubble, Lenin was still stand-
ing. I cannot say if this Lenin’s survival was deliberate, but another Lenin 
in the same town suggested that this might well have been the case. This 
other Lenin had been standing in front of the city hall. When, in 2002, he 
was moved away from the entrance to be repositioned nearby, his legs ac-
cidentally broke off. Instead of discarding the maimed statue, a cast was 
built around Lenin’s legs, such that it would look as if he was leaning over 
a wall.
It is tempting to interpret this treatment as an act of “restorative nostal-
gia” (Boym 2001), but the people I asked about it were evasive, presenting 
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The patched-up Lenin statue in the center of Kokjangak, August 2009
it as an artistic innovation or making jokes about their wobbly Lenin. 
Whether or not this Lenin offered comfort or acted as an anchor in lives of 
turmoil, destroying Lenin or leaving him injured would clearly have been 
inappropriate.
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If these stories reflect nostalgia for a past in which there was order and 
purpose, a final Lenin story brings out the ambivalent aspects of this rela-
tionship with the past. Beside the main road in Ak-Tiuz, near the town 
hall, stands a silver-painted statue of Lenin. At first sight there is nothing 
remarkable about this Lenin; it is one of the “standard” Lenins, one in 
which he brings his left hand up to his chest while looking into the distance 
as if addressing an audience. But what is striking about this particular statue 
is that it bears saw marks—horizontal lines cut into his chest, waist, knees, 
and ankles. Reportedly, some men had made the cuts in order to find out 
whether Lenin’s insides contained anything of value, but on discovering 
that his insides contained nothing but air and concrete, they didn’t proceed 
with dismantling the statue. In its wounded guise, the statue appears sym-
bolic of the ways in which past, present, and future have come together. In 
the Soviet past, the future was present in slogans and plans pointing to a 
utopian communism. However, this utopian vision turned out to be quite 
hollow when the Soviet Union started to descend, just as the statue turned 
out to be worthless when attacked with a saw.
And yet the hollow Lenin is still standing, twenty-four years after the 
demise of the Soviet Union. Lenin was no longer revered, and yet there 
was no symbol to replace him with. This in itself could be taken as indica-
tive of the weakness of the state, and of the fragility of the new ideologies 
that were being advanced. Just like in so many other locations, there was 
no lack of visions for the future—in fact there was an excess of them—but 
their institutional backing was weak or absent, and many people had be-
come doubtful of their promises of a better future. The turmoil of ideas 
that swept through Kyrgyzstan showed the fragility of each ideological vi-
sion, which in any case only addressed a part of the population. By contrast, 
even though Soviet implementation used to be chaotic (Kotkin 1995) and 
produced many excesses, its vision of a better future remained unwaver-
ing. Perhaps it was for this reason that this Lenin was patched up. His cuts 
were smoothed over and given a new lick of paint in 2014. What the fate 
of these Lenin statues appeared to signify was not so much nostalgia for a 
past that was lost as nostalgia for hope in a better future.
2
Condition of Uncertainty
Life in an Industrial Wasteland
A middle-aged Kyrgyz man, dressed in worn-out clothes, was walking 
through the park, looking around with apparent incredulity. He noticed me 
sitting in the shade of a tree, and called out: “What is this place? This looks 
like Afghanistan. It’s one fucking war zone.” We had a short conversation. 
“I used to live here,” he explained, “but everything has vanished. I still 
recognize the park because it has Lenin standing over there, but that’s all.” 
He had returned (in 2008) after an absence of almost twenty years, having 
worked in construction throughout Russia. On his last assignment, just after 
he and his working party had started on a construction project in Sochi, his 
possessions, including his passport, were stolen. Left with just a minimal 
sum, he had barely made it back to the hometown he no longer recognized.
Between 1960 and 1990 Kokjangak had approximately twenty thousand 
inhabitants, many of whom worked in the coal mine (up to four thou-
sand employees) and the sewing and radio-parts factories (together fifteen 
hundred employees). But with the scaling down and eventual closure of 
the mine and factories after the collapse of the USSR, half its population 
moved away, until stabilizing at around ten thousand by the late 1990s.1 
Kokjangak came to be known as one of the poorest settlements in Jalala-
bad Province, a town where the remaining population struggled to make 
ends meet. They mixed small-scale urban-based agriculture and animal 
husbandry with informal mining activities and jobs in the service sector, 
and relied to a significant degree on state benefits and remittances sent by 
relatives working in Russia.
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Amid these overwhelming changes the only constant appeared to be 
uncertainty. The crumbling of the socialist welfare state and the unwieldi-
ness of the “wild market” economy had the effect that inhabitants could 
neither rely on state provisions nor be confident that their private initiatives 
paid off. This “post-Soviet chaos” (Nazpary 2002) should not, however, 
be understood as the absence of order but rather as a structured disorder 
that allowed for predatory accumulation by those in power.2 The residents 
shared this predicament with most other ordinary citizens of Kyrgyzstan, 
who all experienced the painful postsocialist “transition,” the destabiliz-
ing effects of two revolutions, and continuing political instability. But in 
Kokjangak this uncertainty was exacerbated by the unraveling of social 
networks (due to massive outmigration) and the complete disappearance 
of industry. The uncertainties were intricately connected to the decaying 
urban landscape. As inhabitants projected their frustrations, fears, and 
hopes onto their surroundings, the landscape impressed itself onto them, 
meshing with existential and ontological concerns.
Abandoned train tracks leading to the former coal mine in Kokjangak, July 2008
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Residents who continued to live in Kokjangak through the 1990s may 
never have experienced the sudden shock of bewilderment expressed by 
the returnee quoted above; yet the city’s downfall continued to confront 
everyone who had known Kokjangak in its Soviet glory. Residents were 
reminded of those better times on a daily basis when passing the remain-
ders of what once were buildings, or when dealing with the absence of 
drinkable tap water, garbage disposal, and public transportation. In con-
versation they used indicators of places that had ceased to exist: they said 
“behind the office building [za kontoroi]” when referring to the coal mine’s 
headquarters, where nothing but the concrete foundations remained; 
“near the bus station [vozle avtovokzala]” referred to a place from which 
no bus had departed since the mid-1990s. When they described their city 
to outsiders, key words included “war zone,” “devastation,” and “death.” 
Kokjangak was a “dying city” (umeraiushchii gorod) or, in the words of 
a newspaper reporter, a “lifeless stokehole” (potukhshaia kochegarka).3 To 
add insult to injury, in the early 2000s Kokjangak was administratively re-
classified, losing its status of “city” (gorod) to become a “settlement of urban 
type” (poselok gorodskogo tipa).
Aiming to capture the process of decline, an article titled “Dying City” 
in the national newspaper Vechernii Bishkek wrote about Kokjangak: “It 
is not difficult to destroy a city. There is no need even to bomb it. All that 
is needed is to take away hope and belief in tomorrow. Then the city will 
destroy itself.”4 It is worthwhile to reflect for a moment on this presumed 
absence of hope. Certainly, people’s dwindling confidence in the future 
revival of their town played a role in their decision to leave. Kokjangak 
was a “dying city,” a postindustrial wasteland, a ruin of Soviet modernity. 
Its entire territory was covered with scars—reminders of a different and 
better past, of the pain of recent rupture, and of the struggle to survive. 
And yet, seemingly paradoxically but also logically, the hopelessness of 
the situation and the collapse of grand ideology generated renewed hope 
and triggered the appearance of new ideological visions. As Jarrett Zigon 
has rightly argued, hope is not the product of good times but arises in 
conditions of struggle (2009, 262). Moreover, it can never completely free 
itself from that struggle. “Hope can never be fully divorced from hope-
lessness any more than hopelessness can be divorced from hope” (Cra-
panzano 2004, 114); they drive each other on and are in constant risk of 
slippage.5
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In this chapter, then, I examine both the absence of ideology and its 
hesitant return, offering a meditation on hopeless situations and the con-
comitant glimmering of hope. By focusing on the inhabitants of a desti-
tute former mining town and urban wasteland, I aim to understand how 
political-economic transformation and urban decline affect how people 
engage with the big questions of existence: How to survive? What to do? 
Who and what to trust? What to believe? As we will see, in this instance 
the condition of uncertainty produced an apparent openness to new ideol-
ogies, yet an openness that was coupled with reticence, a curiosity matched 
with suspicion, all of which resonated with the landscape.
(Pre-)Historic Sketch
The name “Kokjangak” literally means “blue-green nut” and refers to the 
modest walnut forest that once covered most of the uphill valley where 
the city was built. Residents praised the location’s climatic features; lo-
cated on a southern slope of the Ala-Too Mountains it is protected from 
the cold northern winds in winter, whereas its elevated location (between 
1,200 and 1,400 meters) means that summers are not as hot as in the basin 
of the Suzak Valley (which is a branch of the Fergana Valley). In the early 
twentieth century the hills belonged, according to the Osmonov family tra-
dition, to their grandfather Osman, who had been given the land by a pow-
erful bey in appreciation of provided services. Some years later, however, 
he had to tolerate the presence of Russian explorers (geologists). Osman’s 
contempt for and distrust of these Russians reputedly was such that he for-
bade his children to talk to them or eat their “heathen bread,” and eventu-
ally he moved his household a kilometer downstream to what is now the 
neighborhood kȯlmȯ (the Kyrgyz word for sovkhoz, state farm).6
Coal-mining activities started in the 1910s (Kashirin 1988) but were in-
terrupted after the Russian Revolution and the ensuing struggle for power 
(1918–22) between Bolsheviks and Basmachis, with the latter allegedly re-
sponsible for blowing up the mine.7 Mining activities expanded in the sec-
ond half of the 1920s. A Russian communist who was sent to Kokjangak 
to organize labor reported that in 1927 there were “approximately seventy 
miners who extracted the coal with primitive means, primarily by hand,” 
and who in their free time would carry out voluntary work to speed up the 
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development of the town (quoted in Chormonov and Sidorov 1963, 102).8 
Urban development accelerated after Kokjangak became connected to the 
provincial city of Jalalabad by train tracks and a gravel road in 1932. By 
1939 Kokjangak had developed into a sizable town with eight thousand 
inhabitants, of which 1,009 were employed in the mine (ibid., 123, 129).
As elsewhere in the Soviet empire, the rapid urbanization and industri-
alization of the Stalinist era were accompanied by coercion, severe short-
ages, and other excesses (cf. Kotkin 1995; Fitzpatrick 1999). The plateau 
just above the city center is a reminder of this coercive past. Called Zona 
(the zone), it refers to the labor camp that was located there until the 
1960s. It had been created for German prisoners of war and was subse-
quently used for other convicts, both categories of which were deployed 
in labor-intensive infrastructural projects. People who came to Kokjangak 
on their own accord during the 1930s and 1940s encountered conditions 
that were hardly more favorable. An elderly Kyrgyz man told me: “When 
they arrived, there often was not even a place for them to sleep. During 
the first nights many ended up sleeping on the warm coal waste, but this 
was warm because [poisonous] gas was still burning inside. One morning 
twenty dead bodies were found. All had died in their sleep.” Despite such 
tragedies, moving to town was often preferable to the impoverished life in 
the villages: in Kokjangak, at least, “they paid workers in products and in 
money.”
The same man also spoke to me about the arrival of deportees from the 
Caucasus, mostly Kurds and Chechens, and the ensuing tensions with the 
established population:
They are also Muslim, but they are different. They wouldn’t sleep at night. 
Instead they roamed around, stealing our cattle and other possessions. We 
tolerated it for a while, but then one night our men gathered, mounted their 
horses, took clubs with them, and beat up [the Chechens]. That was justi-
fied, because back then there weren’t enough men around to protect each 
household—so we had to teach them a lesson.
Built on a foundation of coercion and tension, Kokjangak gained city sta-
tus (it became a gorod) in 1943 and retained its position as a small yet re-
gionally important industrial city throughout the Soviet period. Mining 
towns such as Kokjangak were purposely designed as modern socialist 
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cities, showcases of Soviet progress, as described in the following text about 
the history of mining in the Kyrgyz SSR:
Former poverty-stricken mining settlements transformed into comfort-
able and well-equipped [blagoustroennye] socialist cities . . . which please the 
eye with their multilevel architectural ensembles, their paved [asphalted] 
roads, green gardens and parks, their houses of culture, schools, stadiums, 
and much else that beautifies the miner’s life [byt]. (Chormonov and Sid-
irov 1963, 162–63)
This description captures the Kokjangak that continued to occupy the collec-
tive imagination after its demise—a modern city with a diverse population, 
with abundant work in its coal mine and factories. Stories about these hey-
days will feature throughout this chapter, but the following (slightly edited) 
excerpt from a document produced by the city administration in the year 
2000 offers a usefully detailed reflection of this image of modern urbanity:
The city of Kokjangak has a developed infrastructure for electrical power, a 
communal hot water and central heating system, drinking water supply and 
a sewage system. . . . There are four post offices with sixteen employees pro-
viding telecommunication services. . . . The House of Culture, built in 1948, 
has a capacity for 600 visitors. . . . There is also a disco-club, a cinema called 
shakter [miner] and a city radio broadcasting center. . . . The city newspaper 
Kokjangak Kabarlary has a circulation of a 1,000 copies. A children’s recre-
ational center called Barchyn is located two kilometres outside the city and 
was constructed in 1976. It has eighty beds and is visited annually by about 
250 children in three shifts. There is a central city stadium, built in 1958, with 
capacity for 2,000 spectators. (http://www.citykr.kg/en/kokjangak.php)
In short, Kokjangak had everything that one might expect of a small So-
viet industrial city. But reading these features described in the present 
tense in a document written long after the USSR collapsed is surreal, not 
only because some of these modern features come across as anachronistic, 
but also because many of the services and venues had either stopped work-
ing or ceased to exist. As the document proceeds:
The House of Culture requires a complete overhaul and renovation of 
its equipment. . . . The city printing house no longer operates due to the 
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deterioration of the printing presses. . . . The children’s recreational center 
has not functioned in the last two years. . . . 1,500m3 of solid waste have ac-
cumulated over several years, which creates the conditions for the spread of 
infectious diseases. (www.citykr.kg/en/kokjangak.php)
The list could have been longer, because the mentioned cinema and 
disco-club had been reduced to rubble, the stadium had become pasture-
land for cows, and the central heating system was no longer able to heat 
the schools let alone the apartment buildings that also used to be connected 
to the system. When I first visited Kokjangak in 1998, the contours of the 
modern Soviet city were still distinctly visible, but they rapidly faded in 
subsequent years.
By 2008 the Soviet past had become a chimera, with even returnees 
failing to recognize their hometown. In the context of such encompassing 
transformation, in which the city’s infrastructure had collapsed and half 
its population had left for good, the connections between past and present 
were tenuous. Kokjangak was a city that was being undone. Even the doc-
uments detailing its history had vanished. When I asked the mayor about 
the books, reports, and newspapers produced in and about Soviet Kokjan-
gak, he told me, only partly in jest, that these had all disappeared in toilets. 
Whether this was literally true or not, written proof of the town’s Soviet 
history had largely vanished. It is this apparent disconnect and absence of 
written documents that prompted me to use the label “(pre-)history” in 
this section’s heading. However, this “prehistoric” Soviet past cast a heavy 
shadow on how residents engaged with the present, and it also channeled 
and directed hopes for the future. As we saw, the ghost of the Soviet past 
had come to life even in documents of a “city” administration that was 
administering a “settlement of urban type.”
Destabilized World
You should have come here ten years ago! Do you see this bank note? [I 
am being shown a bank note that is perfectly folded into the shape of a 
shirt.] These ten rubles used to be enough to buy a man’s shirt! Our shops 
were the best in the region. They always had meat and fish, and sometimes 
even Dutch cheese! You know, back then we had Moscow provisioning 
[moskovskoe obespechenie]. Now we have nothing.
Kyrgyz man, former miner, in his forties
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When there was the Soviet Union our city was prestigious. We lived proudly; 
we had Moscow provisioning. We didn’t worry about tomorrow. We had 
everything. Health care and education were for free. On Sundays we would 
rest in the city park. We were all equally rich, and happy. But now, when we 
go out it is like stepping into a nightmare.
Kyrgyz woman, teacher, in her fifties
These voices from the second half of the 1990s were typical of the imme-
diate post-Soviet period, when comparisons with the Soviet past were on 
everyone’s mind. The most frequently invoked term in such comparisons 
was “Moscow provisioning.” Literally, this referred to the privilege en-
joyed by industrial towns of strategic significance to be directly provided 
with consumer goods from Moscow, instead of having to rely on slower, 
longer, and leaner distribution channels that passed through two retail di-
visions, republican (SSR) and provincial (oblast). In practical terms this 
meant that the state shops in Kokjangak had a greater variety of food than 
those elsewhere, and that consumer goods ranging from shoes to furniture 
were more frequently available. Town dwellers were envied for this priv-
ilege, and would often act as brokers to secure scarce goods for relatives in 
less privileged places.
It might seem odd that this Moscow provisioning occupied such a cen-
tral place in the collective memory given that after 1991 consumer goods 
became much more widely available. The significance of Moscow provi-
sioning, however, was that it highlighted two valued aspects of Soviet life, 
and in so doing also symbolized the post-Soviet downfall. The first is that 
during Soviet times, the goods and services that were available had always 
been affordable. In fact, well-paid workers such as miners and engineers 
were often unable to spend their entire earnings, because housing, trans-
portation, and basic food items were subsidized and available at little cost, 
while luxury items were hard to come by. This situation was reversed in 
the 1990s when affordability instead of availability became the primary 
concern. The reference to Moscow provisioning was thus also a critique of 
a situation in which goods and services had become more expensive and 
prices less predictable, a period in which living standards had plunged. 
Second, apart from strictly economic concerns Moscow provisioning in-
dexed a “cultural and aesthetic connection—of the ‘center in the periph-
ery,’ ” as Reeves (2014a, 114) has helpfully suggested. To receive Moscow 
provisioning was an indicator of significance and privilege within the 
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Soviet political economy. It conjured a sense of modernity, of being cul-
tured, educated, and Russophone, and in doing so it produced a sense of 
distinction from, and superiority over, other settlements in the region. As 
will be shown below, the loss of this privileged position contributed to a 
sense of existential and epistemological anxiety.
* * *
After finishing education, you were expected to arrange your employment 
within a few months. If not, the police would call on your house. . . . It turns 
out that back then we lived well but didn’t want to work, whereas now 
there is no one who forces us to work, and we end up sitting at home, which 
turns out to be very bad. (Nurbek, Kyrgyz man in his late forties)
Surely not everyone cherished memories of police checks on slackers, but 
the underlying positive valuation of order was a common theme. When we 
talked, in 2008, the memory of compulsory work must have looked par-
ticularly attractive to Nurbek, because apart from infrequent casual work 
as a driver he had indeed been “sitting at home” for several years, in sharp 
contrast to the stable employment and sufficient income he had enjoyed 
during the first ten years of his adult life. Unemployed and in his late for-
ties, in 2008 he was living with his two teenage children, dependent on 
remittances sent by his wife, who was working in the Russian city of No-
vosibirsk and had not been home in eighteen months.
During Soviet times, Kokjangakians largely relied on salaried income 
(more so than collective farmers in the neighboring villages, who had 
private plots and livestock) and were thus greatly affected by the loss of 
coal-mine and factory jobs. Diversifying the income base was difficult be-
cause the possibilities for animal husbandry and cultivating crops were lim-
ited in this urban environment. Households initially resorted to reductive 
strategies (saving on food) as well as depleting strategies, which involved 
the selling of furniture and other household items. The most common 
regenerative activities during this period were petty trading and circular 
migration, but these activities often failed to generate sufficient profit and 
sometimes even resulted in further indebtedness (Howell 1996, 68–70). 
Access to state benefits became more important from the mid-1990s on-
ward, but the amounts would cover only a small part of household needs. 
The selling of construction materials from abandoned houses and other 
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buildings was an important regenerative activity for as long as it lasted 
(roughly 1995 to 2005). Small-scale mining started to develop when the 
coal mine was closed entirely in 1999. Increasingly, remittances sent by a 
spouse or child working abroad (usually in Russia) were critical to many 
households.
What the new sources of income had in common was that they were 
unpredictable in terms of availability and reward, in stark contrast to bu-
reaucratically organized Soviet industrial labor. The case of coal mining 
is instructive. Nurbek often emphasized the “order” (poriadok) of work in 
the mine. Work back then had been tough but also honest (chestnaia), with 
its ten-hour shifts, regular payments, and prospect of early retirement. He 
shared stories about the family feel of his work party (komanda), his “stern 
but just foreman” who he had admired as a young man, about the ex-
pertise of specialists who were responsible for planning and safety, and 
the authority of the (Russian) director. This bureaucratic and patrimonial 
structure had caused its own frictions, but nevertheless stood in marked 
contrast to the informal mining activities that had come in its stead.9 The 
men involved in these new small-scale mining activities rarely had access 
to air drills or other power equipment, instead using crowbars, pickaxes, 
and shovels to dig mine shafts into the hills, often working for weeks un-
derground without protection, and without knowing whether they would 
hit a coal layer.
* * *
During Soviet times, each neighborhood was different. The center and the 
Twenty-Third Quarter were mostly Russian, [Neighborhood] Forty was 
a mix of Uzbeks, Tatars, and others. The Kurds and Baptists each lived 
closely together [at the outskirts] as if in their own village. We would rarely 
go there; it felt strange. We Kyrgyz lived almost everywhere, but hardly 
in the center. Somehow that was considered to be too European. (Nurbek)
The sketched pattern suggests an ethnic mosaic rather than the kind of 
melting pot that Soviet texts proudly proclaimed when mentioning the 
number of nationalities coexisting and cooperating in its cities. The mix 
was diverse, but inhabitants tended to cluster together on the basis of or-
igin, ethnicity, and religion. In everyday speech, the category “Russians” 
included Ukrainians but not the Russian Baptists, who were categorized 
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separately on the basis of religious affiliation. The Kurds, who had been 
deported from the Georgian border region with Turkey to destinations 
across Central Asia in 1944, all lived together in a couple of streets, whereas 
Tatars lived interspersed throughout the town. Interethnic marriages were 
not exceptional. They were fairly common between Tatars and Russians, 
as well as between Tatar and Russian women and Kyrgyz men, but several 
of the other groups, such as Kurds, Baptists and Uzbeks, observed more 
strictly the norm to marry among “one’s own.”
Positive references to the former heterogeneity abounded and usually 
glossed over the coercive roots and persistent inequalities of the mix. Thus, 
when talking about some of the architectural highlights of the town, it 
was pointed out that they reflected the skills of their German constructors, 
without mentioning that these Germans had been prisoners of war work-
ing in forced-labor projects. And when discussing the rapid expansion of 
town, it was rarely mentioned that this was achieved in no small measure 
through the forced labor of deported groups from the Caucasus. Oth-
ers spoke approvingly of the many “cultured” (kulturnye) and “learned” 
(uchennye) Russians who occupied the top ranks of the mine and factory 
management, without reflecting on the inequalities between “Europeans” 
and “Asians” in the Soviet economy. But whatever the imperfections and 
underlying tensions of the Soviet internationalist ideal, the diversity of 
the population was remembered positively as having made Kokjangak a 
“real” (nastoiashchii) city, and one that was “cultured.”
The exodus of the 1990s not only sliced the population in half but 
also radically altered its composition. Whereas up to 1990 Russians and 
other “Europeans” made up approximately 50 percent of the population, 
this dropped to a mere 9 percent by 2004 when 75 percent of its popu-
lation was ethnically Kyrgyz.10 The first to leave had been those with 
good prospects for resettling elsewhere, among whom the vast major-
ity of residents with professional and family connections in Russia and 
Ukraine.11 Notwithstanding the overwhelming out-migration, the town 
saw a few newcomers as well, mostly recently divorced women who 
came to Kokjangak because apartments could be bought at prices close 
to zero. Although the size of the population stabilized in the mid-1990s 
at around ten thousand, this was only a deceptive stability, with many 
remaining residents using Kokjangak as a resting point in their increas-
ingly migratory lives.
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In short, Kokjangak’s population became much more homogeneous 
in terms of ethnic and educational indicators, and in the process became 
increasingly similar to neighboring rural settlements. Possibly because of 
this flattening, some inhabitants became even more inclined to stress the 
distinctiveness of urban life. Thus, the town’s Kyrgyz inhabitants often 
prided themselves on having a better command of Russian than Kyrgyz 
people living elsewhere, and many Kyrgyz parents tried to get their chil-
dren placed in the one remaining Russian-language school.12 When in 2010 
conflicts erupted between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks in the nearby city of Jalala-
bad and in several smaller settlements in the region, my Kyrgyz acquain-
tances told me that such violence would not happen in Kokjangak because 
its inhabitants were more “civilized” (tsivilizovannye). It had, after all, been 
a mining town.13 This urban legacy was particularly treasured by the older 
generations, those who had invested most in the Soviet ideal of modernity. 
But despite their best efforts, the downfall of the town was unstoppable, 
and outsiders had come to associate Kokjangak with poverty, crime, and 
disease.
* * *
These [five-story apartment buildings] used to be the most prestigious living 
quarters—they had all the amenities [udobstvie]. They are no longer pres-
tigious, of course. About half the apartments are empty. Did you hear this 
joke about “going to the fifth floor”? . . . No? Well, it is better that way 
[Nurbek says with a knowing smile].14
The amenities in these centrally located apartments (built in the 1970s) 
were running water, central heating, electricity, gas, and built-in kitchens 
and bathrooms with plumbing. That is, they had the amenities that were 
lacking in most freestanding houses and older apartment buildings (such 
as the barak and the kommunalka). The first tenants of these apartments 
belonged to the privileged layers of society; they were employed in mana-
gerial and engineering positions, or had good jobs in the city administra-
tion. However, none of these positive connotations still held. The roofs had 
started to leak, the central heating and gas had long been disconnected, and 
water had to be carried with buckets to the top floors because of low water 
pressure in the pipes. Moreover, former occupants had often stripped their 
apartments of window seals, doors, and floors on departure, leaving gaping 
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holes in the buildings. A clear indicator of decline was that in 2004 apart-
ments were sold for as little as forty dollars.15 The city center was not only 
being emptied out in a material sense, it also became perceived as a black 
hole in moral terms, as already suggested by Nurbek’s comment above. 
Single mothers occupied the least desirable top floors, and residents of all 
floors were those with few other options, among whom were many elderly 
Russians. It had become a place of last resort, known for its frequent scan-
dals related to domestic and other violence, drug abuse, and alcoholism.
In the center of town it was not just the high-rises that were collapsing; 
most freestanding houses were vanishing altogether. These houses were 
bought up by middlemen who were primarily interested in the construction 
materials, leaving nothing behind but the concrete foundations. But while 
the formerly prestigious city center was emptied out, the outlying neigh-
borhoods experienced a different dynamic. These had been less prestigious 
because of their distance from shops and workplaces as well as their lack 
of amenities. But given the collapse of urban infrastructure, such consid-
erations had lost their relevance, while at the same time the advantages of 
The five-story apartment buildings in the center of Kokjangak, August 2009
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living in the outskirts had grown in significance: the larger backyards al-
lowed for cultivating vegetables, growing fruit, and keeping some cattle, 
while their location provided better access to pastureland. Certainly, the 
outlying neighborhoods also lost a significant part of their population, but 
many of the abandoned houses (including a few two-story apartment build-
ings) were being reused as stables or storage places. Kadyr, for example, 
had gone to some length to register his neighbor’s property under his own 
name. He then transformed the neighboring house into a stable for raising 
bulls and for storing hay and wood, and merged the two yards into a sizable 
vegetable plot.
The result of these processes is a town with a hole in the middle—a 
couple of largely empty administration buildings in the midst of ruins and 
decaying apartment buildings—with life continuing in the increasingly 
village-like neighborhoods. This centrifugal dynamic was not contained 
within city boundaries; the loss of city status and reclassification as “settle-
ment of urban type” meant that residents were now required to travel to 
the district (raion) capital (thirty-five kilometers to the south) for many 
administrative issues. Moreover, as mentioned, residents increasingly de-
pended on “the beyond” for work and for remittances. In the 2000s most 
families had one or several members who were engaged in ongoing circu-
lar migration to Russia, in particular to Ekaterinburg and Novosibirsk.16 
Inhabitants felt that while in previous times they had been living in a place 
that mattered, they had ended up on the margins of even their own net-
works. No longer the pinnacle of Soviet modernization it had been in the 
past, Kokjangak started to blend in with the rest of the region.
To recapitulate, the memory of Moscow provisioning was so powerful be-
cause it gave voice to the experience of deprivation in the present: the dis-
appearance of Soviet industry and its supporting economy; a demographic 
transition that signified severance from the centers of power; and a spatial 
inversion that indicated the town’s growing irrelevance and moral down-
fall. Life in Kokjangak had not only become bleak in purely economic 
terms; the pain was intensified by a sense of disorientation, and the loss of 
relevance and status.
What was lost in the midst of economic hardship was a sense of being 
distinctively modern, with “modern” here referring to the idea of being 
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advanced (in comparison to the past and in comparison to neighboring locali-
ties) as measured by education, technology, and consumption. These indica-
tors had always been celebrated in official descriptions of the city and summed 
up in statistics detailing the metric tons of excavated coal, the number of hos-
pital beds, the kilometers of paved roads, the capacity of the stadium, and the 
number of yearly visits to the cinema. This emphasis on numbers had pro-
duced a “quantified modernity” that functioned to smooth over the problems 
of the Soviet project. The strategy never succeeded entirely, and inhabitants 
had been painfully aware of the shortcomings of the Soviet modernist project 
and the coercion and contradiction on which it was built. Nevertheless, this 
quantitative surface had provided a semblance of modernity that continued 
to provide a compelling frame of reference. Moreover, this quantified mo-
dernity, with its always-increasing numbers, had been explicitly future ori-
ented. As a “work-in-progress” (Hirsch 1997), as a past imperfect in which 
there was relative stability and hope of a better future, the Soviet project con-
tinued to nourish longing thoughts long after its decay.
This forward-looking Soviet “work-in-progress” was experienced as 
not only having come to a standstill but of moving in reverse. The refer-
ences to a better past, of a city that had been modern and cosmopolitan, 
suggested a process of decline, as also seen in the use of descriptors of the 
present such as “primitive,” “loss,” and “dying city.” Moreover, inhabit-
ants experienced the new situation as one of chaos in which the stability 
and predictability of the late Soviet period had given way to uncontrollable 
flux. In order to highlight this aspect of uncontrollability, it might be ap-
propriate to refer to the changes not as a process of “demodernization” but 
as a process of becoming “postmodern.” In a short but insightful article, 
Unni Wikan (1996) presents the life story of a Buddhist nun in Bhutan, 
whose experiences with abuse, death, and oppression Wikan interprets as 
“an extreme example of a typical condition of things falling apart,” and 
suggests that this can be taken “as a prototype for postmodern life” when 
approached from the perspective of the dispossessed (1996, 279). In Kok-
jangak residents had been forced out of the relative comfort zone that their 
island of Moscow provisioning had provided. The world no longer came to 
their city, and so its inhabitants were forced to go out to the world, becom-
ing in the process more cosmopolitan than they previously had been.
This tilting of perspective is not to dismiss or downplay the effects of 
impoverishment and dispossession but to acknowledge the flip side of this 
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process. In the words of Caroline Humphrey, “The dispossessed are people 
who have been deprived of property, work, and entitlements, but we can 
also understand them as people who are themselves no longer possessed” 
(2002, 21). Or, as Magnus Marsden shows, despite cosmopolitanism often 
being associated with affluent urbanites, conditions of marginalization and 
uncertainty may just as well foster an attitude of open-endedness, thereby 
enhancing “potentialities for engagements with others” (2008). But before 
moving to a discussion of the ways that inhabitants of Kokjangak held on 
to lost values and reached out to new ideas, let’s first explore in more detail 
how inhabitants navigated this uncertain terrain.
Navigating Post-Soviet Chaos
The closure of the coal mine had allowed the big shots to enrich themselves 
and had pushed ordinary people into poverty. That much was certain, but 
the reasons for closure and the techniques of enrichment were hotly de-
bated and contested in the late 1990s, and into the early 2000s.
There were those who argued that the coal mine had had its days; the 
increasing length of the shafts indicated that the coal reserve was almost 
depleted and that coal mining had stopped making economic sense even 
in the last years of the USSR. “The thing is,” a former engineer told me, 
“metal and wood [for scaffolding] are expensive and coal is cheap, so when 
the coal is too deep it no longer makes sense.” The investments required 
for scaffolding, ventilation, and excavation had started to outweigh the 
value of the extracted coal, which led to collapse as soon as the planned 
economy was replaced with a market economy in which prices of com-
modities were no longer fixed at politically convenient levels by the central 
government. But there were others who argued that closure had been due 
to a tragic policy mistake. In the mid-1990s the Akaev government de-
cided the country would switch from a coal-based energy supply to one 
based on hydroelectric energy, oil, and gas. The decision backfired when 
price levels of imported oil and gas quadrupled, and nationally produced 
hydroelectric power proved unable to meet demand. Undoing the mis-
take was complicated because by that point the coal mines had already 
deteriorated and required massive investments. In the case of Kokjangak 
such investment was not forthcoming, and several potential investors had 
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withdrawn after having expressed initial interest. Finally, and this was the 
most widespread opinion, there were those who said that it had all been 
intentional; directors and politicians had conspired in order to benefit from 
the bankruptcy and subsequent privatization.
Whether closure had been inevitable, a tragic mistake, or the result of 
conspiracy, it allowed successive directors—there had been four between 
1991 and closure in 1999—to enrich themselves. The largest misappro-
priation took place in the early 1990s when the director and his associates, 
together with officials from Bishkek, pocketed a series of grants originally 
intended to secure the mine’s future. Next, while the mine’s scale of opera-
tion was being downsized, its inventory started disappearing. There was 
a persistent rumor about what happened to the relatively new and very 
expensive excavators (that had been purchased in the late 1980s). The offi-
cial line was that they were irretrievable—buried inside a deep mine shaft 
following a gas explosion—but several insiders insisted that the explosion 
happened after the excavators had been removed, and only happened so 
as to cover up the stealthy sale of this equipment to buyers from China. 
Verifying such stories was complicated by the fact that each of the four di-
rectors left Kokjangak as soon as a successor appeared on the scene. More-
over, any paper trail—if it had ever existed—disappeared with the closure 
of the mine in 1999.
The exact history of accumulation and dispossession remains, and 
most likely will remain, unknown. In fact, if this history could have been 
documented in detail, it would never have taken place. The techniques 
of enrichment existed only because they were shrouded in a haze, the de-
tails remaining undocumented and knowable only by proxy. This fog-
giness was characteristic not just of the mine but more generally of the 
political-economic space that inhabitants navigated.17 As we will see, the 
condition of uncertainty had implications that pointed beyond the eco-
nomic to ethical, epistemological, and ontological concerns.
* * *
Almaz was visibly annoyed: “Right when we finally reached the coal the 
officials [chinovniki] appeared, demanding their share. They haven’t given 
us a thing—no salary, no equipment, nothing. That is how things are here. 
They neither provide work, nor do they allow us to work.” We had a shot 
of vodka and the conversation switched to more frivolous matters, but 
Condi t ion  o f  Uncer ta inty    63
the issue must have continued to occupy his mind, because not much later 
Almaz added, “Actually we are helping lots of people. Some people plant 
grain, others tomatoes, and we dig coal. People need coal. That is how it 
should be, right? But our officials, they don’t care, they come when they 
want to fill their pockets. But when we need them, they say: ‘We won’t give 
you anything.’ ”18 A honking car arrived, and after quickly buying two more 
bottles of vodka, Almaz took his leave to join his friends, while I remained 
behind with Lola in her kiosk. “These guys don’t earn that poorly. Actu-
ally they are my best clients,” Lola commented. “But I wouldn’t want to be 
in their place, going into those holes not knowing if you will ever see day-
light again.”
When I first got to know Almaz, in early 2004, he was nineteen years old 
and was in between things, quite literally. He officially lived with his par-
ents but in practice spent most nights at one of his friends’. He somewhat 
studied for a bookkeeping degree as an external (zaochnyi) student, the 
main activity for which, he told me, consisted of making the right pay-
ments. In any case, he did not think a degree would land him a job, it was 
just that his parents insisted he should have one. Since his final year in 
school (two years previously) he had been working off and on in small-scale 
mining as an apache. The name apache was used for the (mostly young) 
men who were engaged in the most informal of mining activities, and was 
based on similitude. In the words of an acquaintance, “It is because they 
run in the mountains like the Apaches, just as we know it from the mov-
ies.” Finding the coal layers was a laborious process of trial and error. With 
the aid of only shovels and picks, Almaz and his mates would dig narrow 
shafts into the mountain slope in search of coal, usually between ten and 
twenty meters deep before hoping to hit a thin layer of coal (eighty centi-
meters thick). Several times Almaz’s group had worked in vain for weeks.
Over the following months Almaz continued to work as an apache, but 
his attitude seemed to be changing. We talked a week after a tragic incident 
happened at a short distance from where he had been working. A young 
guy had been inside a shaft when it collapsed. He was dead by the time 
his mates managed to dig him out. Several men died from such accidents 
each year, but according to Almaz, “no one really knows because people 
don’t want to talk about it.” One reason for this silence was that public at-
tention could very well bring an end to informal mining, thereby shutting 
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off the main source of income for many families.19 This particular tragedy 
had gotten under Almaz’s skin. Even though he rationalized the tragedy 
by saying that those guys had been working in a dangerous spot—a week 
earlier their shaft had partly caved in after rainfall—seeing this happen 
at such proximity made the risks of these kinds of mining activities very 
palpable. “When you are inside the mine it is OK, you just work like mad,” 
he said. “But waking up in the morning knowing that you have to go back 
in, that’s the worst.”
Almaz had been making plans to find work in Russia. In 2005 he trav-
eled to Ekaterinburg in Russia, where he joined a group of Kyrgyz men 
from Kokjangak in construction. For the next three years we were out of 
contact, but when I returned to Kokjangak in 2008, Almaz was there as 
well, once again engaged in mining activities. He had worked in Russia for 
a year and a half, but preferred not to talk about his experiences, which had 
brought him very little of value, including financially: “You know, work in 
the mines is dangerous, but what are the alternatives? Our people also die 
in Russia.” Possibly his negative experiences in cold, faraway Russia had 
made him more accepting of the dangers of mining at home. But some-
thing else had changed as well. Almaz had started to become interested 
in Islam.
When I visited Almaz at his workplace in 2008, he introduced me to 
his foreman, who was also an active member of the conservative Islamic 
movement Tablighi Jamaat (see also chapter 4). We had a short conver-
sation in which I asked him about his views on the dangers of mining 
and the troubles caused by the chinovniki. I did not manage to record a 
verbatim script of his words, but they were close to the following: “Look, 
in here we trust in Allah; the future cannot be known; we are earning 
money; we are able to provide for our families; Allah is really great.” 
Later, Almaz told me that his new work group (komanda) was very dif-
ferent from what he had experienced before: the men were all serious 
and supportive, and they had a responsible leader. Moreover, his own life 
had changed. No longer did he spend his earnings on alcohol, but instead 
he was making plans for marriage. Whether due to his experiences in 
Russia, his involvement with Islam, or both, Almaz came across as more 
mature and self-confident.
As all young people in Kokjangak, Almaz found himself confronted 
with numerous uncertainties and dangers, needing to navigate an 
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environment in which there were no good alternatives, only least bad op-
tions. Almaz’s complaints about the chinovniki at the beginning of this sec-
tion had contained important hints for how to understand the post-Soviet 
condition. His statement about honest labor—“that is how it should be, 
right?”—suggested that he neither opposed “planned economy” nor 
“the free market” per se, but rather resented the decay of the former and 
the impotency of the latter, which had resulted in a “wild market.” The 
chinovniki were exemplary of this: they had been a necessary evil of the 
bureaucratic Soviet system, who in the new conditions had turned into 
parasitic predators backed by fake documents and a corrupt legal system. 
The sense of chaos was precisely this, not the absence of order—a free-for-
all—but rather the unfairness and unreliability of the remnants of Soviet 
bureaucracy. In the midst of this chaos Almaz had been in search of justice 
and stability, which in 2008 he found not in the state or an economic ideol-
ogy, but in the authority of an informal religious leader.
* * *
Lola had been charged with drug possession and spent three nights in jail, 
losing 20,000 Kyrgyz som (KGS) [which amounts to 400 USD] on her way 
to the judge. Eventually her case was dropped, but she still had to come up 
with an additional 5,000 KGS to cover procedural expenses, or they would 
reverse the process and put her on trial anyway. When I asked if these were 
legal payments she answered: “I don’t know, but they told me that it was 
according to the law and they showed me a document. Now I have to find 
5,000 som. At home they scold me because of all these extra expenses.” Atyr-
gul commented dismissively that it was never about the law but about how 
much money they could squeeze out of Lola, and added: “If I would be 
president, everything would be different.” We all laughed.
Atyrgul was intimately familiar with these problems. In fact, her brother 
had been imprisoned just a few months previously, and was about to be 
transferred to a prison in the north of the country. The charges were drug 
possession and use of violence. Atyrgul acknowledged that her brother 
was sometimes involved in shady business, but she didn’t believe that to 
be the reason for his imprisonment, speculating that the police officers 
had planted the drugs on him. “I know these police officers. This is how 
they make money. They put someone in prison, wait for relatives to buy 
him out, and split the money.” Atyrgul herself had collected money from 
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friends and relatives to buy her brother out of jail, but the required bribes 
turned out to be too high in his case. She had come back frustrated: “There 
is no good police, they are like mafia. The judges are the same. It doesn’t 
matter who the [accused] is, they will assume he is guilty. They only lis-
ten to the police.”
Three years previously, after she and her “good-for-nothing” husband 
separated, Atyrgul had moved to a fifth-floor apartment with her two chil-
dren. She was not someone to complain, but confided that having to be 
“husband and wife at the same time” drove her to despair at times. When 
we talked in May 2004 she had held her job at the military office for about 
a year. She had found the job through an acquaintance, and in order to ac-
tually be appointed she only had to “throw in” (kidat′) the modest amount 
of 500 KGS (10 USD), plus a month of work without pay. Her main task 
was to contact the families whose sons were being drafted into the military. 
When she told me that her monthly salary was 1,050 KGS, an amount 
vastly insufficient to feed a family of three, I asked her: “But how do you 
actually live?” She replied: “I don’t know . . . well, sometimes I’m lucky 
at work.”
The following week I accompanied Atyrgul on one of her routes, con-
tacting families with sons soon to be enlisted. At one point I waited on the 
street while Atyrgul was conversing with a woman inside a courtyard, and 
when she returned she reported that the woman had asked her to make in-
quiries at the military office in Suzak (the district center), and given her 500 
KGS for this purpose, hoping that she would manage to return with the 
voennyi bilet (literally, “war ticket,” which provides deferral or exemption 
from being drafted). “Being lucky” meant running into a family that was 
prepared to go to some length to keep their son out of the army. In most 
cases she received only a small fee for assisting in getting a deferral, but 
some families aimed at removing their sons from the register altogether, a 
more complicated and lucrative procedure. “It’s not huge money,” Atyrgul 
explained, “my boss gets fifty and I get fifty [USD].”
Later that day, the town-hall cashier refused to release Atyrgul’s salary 
because her boss (in Suzak) had not been coming to work for over two 
weeks and thus had not signed off on her paycheck. Atyrgul made a scene, 
phone calls were made, and she was promised that her paycheck would be 
available for collection the following day. She commented to me that she 
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hoped her boss would be made redundant, which would give her a chance 
to get his job instead. Sure, she would have to hand money to the army of-
ficer (polkovnik) in Suzak, but she was optimistic that she would be able to 
collect the amount needed. Atyrgul always talked matter-of-factly about 
these realities, thereby indicating that harboring any (Weberian-style) 
ideal-type notions of bureaucracy would be entirely out of place. She navi-
gated this messy reality by presenting herself as a strongheaded woman, 
a fighter (boevaia zhenshchina) not afraid of anyone. The arrest of her 
brother, as much as it affected Atyrgul negatively, had at least the mildly 
positive effect of strengthening her tough image, as someone from a scan-
dalous family (skandal′naia sem′ia) who was not to be messed with.
Atyrgyl actively worked the tensions between corrosive bureau-
cratic structures and flexible informal arrangements. As a skilled and 
self-conscious actor she managed to survive, making small sums of in-
formal money every once in a while. But ultimately this “chaotic” system 
worked against people like her, against those who lived on the margins 
of society and were unable to mobilize strong support networks. In fact, 
when I tried to get in touch with her in 2009 I failed. Lola told me that 
Atyrgyl had lost her job the year before, and had taken her two children to 
Bishkek in search of work and a better future.
* * *
Lola and her friends Chinara and Atyrgul were discussing the local Peace 
Corps Volunteers. Lola suggested that they were spies, but Chinara inter-
jected: “What spies? There is nothing here that can be of interest to their 
government.” Atyrgul replied that she had heard that the volunteers were 
sent over by the US government as a form of punishment, because why 
else would someone come to Kokjangak? Without reaching consensus,  
Chinara concluded: “Anyway, they have their own businesses. Take Carrie, 
she made a deal with Khatamov [director of the town’s employment cen-
ter], and together they split the money. Did she ever contribute to some kind 
of [community] project, or give people money? No, of course not, she kept 
the money herself.” Atyrgul half jokingly said that this showed how well 
Carrie had adjusted to Kyrgyz reality, and it prompted her to mention the 
Kyrgyz saying: “If you fail to eat the meat of others like a wolf, your own 
meat will be taken” (Karyshkyr bolup biröönün, etim zhulup albasam, se-
nikin zhulup alat).
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The lack of trust, the sense of suspicion, and the notion that everyone be-
comes drawn into this “post-Soviet chaos” was evident in this conversa-
tion. The reference to wolves’ dinner etiquette reflected the idea that life 
in Kokjangak amounted to a zero-sum struggle, and brought to mind 
Hobbes’s state of nature in which “the condition of man . . . is a condi-
tion of war of everyone against everyone.” In fact, the same human-animal 
comparison featured in the Greek saying from which Hobbes had taken 
his inspiration: “homo homini lupus est” (a man is a wolf to another man).20 
Just like in Hobbes, the reference to animalistic behavior contained a neg-
ative value judgment, suggesting that order is to be preferred over chaos, 
a sentiment we also came across in the various nostalgic references to the 
Soviet past. The post-Soviet condition, in the words of my acquaintances, 
was to be seen as dikii (untamed) or as bardak (chaos), a term with the sec-
ondary meaning of “brothel,” thus weaving ideas of moral decay into dis-
cussions of animal-like struggle.
Notwithstanding the similarities, my acquaintances’ descriptions of 
“post-Soviet chaos” reveal important differences with the Hobbesian state 
of nature. Inhabitants of Kokjangak did not suggest that chaos followed 
from the equality of citizens in the absence of a “power able to over-awe 
them all” (Hobbes 1651). Instead of pure randomness, what was sketched 
was a situation in which hidden orders loomed below a seemingly order-
less surface. Here, just like in chaos theory, chaos referred not to pure 
disorder but to “order within apparent disorder,” possibly even to “de-
terministic kinds of order . . . arising from the generalized properties of 
complex dynamical systems” (Mosko 2005, 7). The miners argued that the 
main problem was not the collapse of the state but the remainders thereof; 
the women insisted that the police had turned into a predatory machine 
targeting ordinary people, and they suggested that local NGO representa-
tives plotted to channel external funds into their own pockets.
The logics underlying these observed predatory practices were tacitly 
understood, and the tactics employed were recognized by all. However, 
the efficacy of these practices depended on remaining in the shadow of 
the largely empty rhetoric of privatization, bureaucracy, and development. 
Moreover, precisely because of their shadowy nature these tactics were 
never hegemonic.21 In other words, the overwhelming sense of chaos and 
unpredictability was not caused by random disorder, but because informal 
hierarchies, networks, and lines of exclusion operated below the surface. 
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Not only did these hidden orders cause uncertainty, they produced and 
enlarged inequalities in ways that were difficult to predict.
The ethnographic examples in this chapter all reveal aspects of this cha-
otic configuration. The collapse of the Soviet infrastructure had produced 
a rush for spoils that inhabitants presented as chaotic, in which the ac-
tivities of the police, officials, NGO workers, and Peace Corps Volunteers 
were characterized by secrecy and obscurity. Far from being “random,” 
everyone recognized the logics of dependency, reciprocity, and protection 
on which they were based. The rush for spoils had the “predictable” effect 
of enriching the well-placed and leaving poorly connected inhabitants in-
creasingly impoverished and marginalized.
Chaos, then, is about the cracks through which people fall; it is about the 
opportunities it creates for those able to manipulate the situation and the 
immoral behaviors that people are pushed into. Ultimately, it is about the 
reordering of society at a moment when connections are unstable, in which 
new lines of inclusion and exclusions are being drawn and old ones are 
being reinstated or intensified. In such circumstances, Katherine Verdery 
comments, “people of all kinds could no longer count on their previous 
grasp of how the world works” and “became open to reconsidering . . . 
their social relations and their worlds of meaning” (1999, 35). Or, to go 
back to an already-mentioned observation by Geertz, “it is a loss of orienta-
tion that most directly gives rise to ideological activity” (1973, 219). It is to 
such reconsiderations and reorientations that we now turn.
Reorientation
On a cold morning in November 1998 a white UNDP jeep arrived in 
Kokjangak, coming to a halt next to a small office building. Two days 
previously a UNDP worker had made a phone call to a local NGO, 
expressing the intent to include the town in a “Participatory Poverty 
Alleviation Project,” and therefore wishing to meet with poor inhabitants.22 
The phone call had not been without effect. A crowd of two hundred people 
had assembled in the open area in front of the NGO’s office. The two 
UNDP workers, one of whom was me, struggled to get through the crowd 
into the office, which was equally packed. People were jostling to enter 
their names and passport data on long lists. As my colleague and I found 
out later, rumors had circulated that the UNDP was about to embark on a 
massive aid program. And instead of relying on local intermediaries—who, 
as everyone knew, would channel funds to their own people—this time the 
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UNDP would be working directly with recipients. Together my colleague 
and I addressed the crowd outside while standing on top of the stairs leading 
to the office. We explained that the project would not be handing out grants, 
but would provide access to microcredit to poor residents after they had first 
received various forms of training and been “socially mobilized” for at least 
half a year. This had the desired effect of thinning out the crowd—those 
who had expected immediate assistance left the scene—but at least a hundred 
inhabitants stayed and came to subsequent meetings.
For a brief moment, the UNDP workers had produced a wave of antici-
pation in Kokjangak. Unavoidably, this initial enthusiasm slumped when 
it became clear that no quick salvation was forthcoming. Nevertheless, in 
the following weeks sixty inhabitants joined the Poverty Alleviation Pro-
gram, which continued to run in Kokjangak for the next twelve years (and 
would include up to two hundred inhabitants). When in 2008 I talked 
again with some of the earliest participants about their experiences, several 
mentioned the mix of anticipation and skepticism with which they had ap-
proached the project and its missionaries, only gradually becoming com-
mitted as the project got on its feet, something that was accompanied by 
an adjustment of expectations as the project established its routine func-
tioning, which included monthly meetings, training sessions, provision of 
access to microcredit, and the initiation of small infrastructural projects. 
To my acquaintances, the involvement of foreigners had been simultane-
ously promising because of their external position (which would poten-
tially disrupt the usual patterns of exclusion) and worrying because of their 
naïveté (which made them easy targets for manipulation by those in pow-
erful positions).
I present this example because it provides a glimpse of the vola-
tile dynamics of hope in a destitute environment and the “attitude of 
open-endedness” (Marsden 2008) that had emerged. There are many rea-
sons why this development mission never instilled the kinds of convic-
tion that some political and religious missions managed to produce (even 
if only temporarily). And yet the events made me think about the simi-
larities and differences between the ways in which secular and religious 
projects travel, the variations in the fluctuations of affect, and how exter-
nal ideological projects become entangled with local views and interests. 
In previous decades “activists” had raised awareness of the truth of “sci-
entific atheism” and more broadly of socialism. In the new millennium 
development activists had taught inhabitants about rights, sustainability, 
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and financial mechanisms; meanwhile Tablighi Muslim travelers tried to 
impress on inhabitants the importance of coming closer to Islam; several 
Pentecostal missions aimed at bringing the “Good News” of the New Tes-
tament; leaders of the opposition rallied inhabitants to join them in oust-
ing the government; and spiritual healers offered solutions tailored to the 
problems of individuals. These multiple visions alternately focused on the 
here and now or the afterlife, differently emphasized the collective or the 
individual, and demanded a break with the past or instead tried to demon-
strate continuity. As we will see in the next chapters, each of these charac-
teristics influenced the specific rhythms, intensities, and reach of concrete 
ideological currents.
At the start of this chapter I quoted a Vechernii Bishkek newspaper ar-
ticle stating that “it is not difficult to destroy a city. One does not even need 
to bomb it. All that needs to be done is to take away hope and belief in 
tomorrow. Then the city will destroy itself.”23 In some ways this had been 
true enough—the city had indeed collapsed with the emigration of half its 
UNDP workers and their local counterparts holding a meeting in Kokjangak,  
November 2003
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population and the closure of the mine and the factories. Nevertheless, the 
materials contained in this chapter suggest that the relation between hope 
and destitution needs to be examined more closely, precisely because, as 
Zigon has titled an article, “Hope Dies Last” (2009). Even or especially in 
the direst of situations hope provides the “the energy, the petrol” needed to 
live and act. If we see hope as a method that reorients knowledge, directing 
it toward an imagined future (Miyazaki 2004), then the “taking away of 
hope”—the removal of one imagined future—will push people to imagine 
alternative ones. For many, this had meant a spatial relocation of hope: 
they had made the decision to leave the town, moving to horizons where 
they expected to have better lives. But even those who stayed behind found 
new points of reference in their “hopeless town.”
Writing about the indigenous inhabitants of Sakhalin, Bruce Grant 
has made a related argument. He argues that in the twentieth century the 
Nivkhi were caught between two master narratives: a narrative of “cul-
tural authenticity” that depicted the Nivkhi as “children of nature” with 
their own language, customs, and rituals; and a “stride” narrative that pre-
sented the Nivkhi as having leaped into modernity and become true mod-
ern Soviet citizens. But in the late 1980s, the modernist narrative imploded 
with the decline and collapse of the Soviet system, while the cultural au-
thenticity narrative proved empty because much knowledge about “tradi-
tional” ways of living had vanished or was no longer relevant. However, 
Grant writes, they were “discovering symbolic capital amid the ruins of 
both these myths” (1995, 158).
How does the case of Kokjangak compare? More than anything else, 
the inhabitants of Soviet Kokjangak had identified with the modernist 
narrative. The memories of Moscow provisioning and the remainders of 
the modern Soviet mining city continued to influence people’s expectations 
and desires. But with the state having lost its ability to project the future, 
having lost the “mechanisms for the projection of hope” (Hage 2003, 3), 
ideas of the modern started to connect in novel ways with tradition. Alexia 
Bloch argues that “the postsocialist condition requires us to pay close at-
tention to competing ideologies and systems of meaning that give life 
to shifting subjectivities and the place of ideology in the multiple forms 
that modernity takes” (2005, 556). This is what I will do in the rest of the 
book, tracing a range of ideological movements and their spokespersons as 
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they presented their vision and tried to convince residents of their truth. 
The chaotic nature of the post-Soviet condition rendered any new capital, 
whether economic, social, or symbolic, highly unstable. Nevertheless, these 
new ideologies pierce into this foggy future, even if only for a moment, as 






What Happened to Soviet Atheism?
It was July 2009, and after a day of various work activities, Kadyr and 
I drove up a hill overlooking Kokjangak, picked up some beers along the 
way, and sat in the grass, relaxing and talking about the things that were 
on our minds. Kadyr knew I had been asking people questions about athe-
ism, and he decided to share the following anecdote, of which I had already 
heard other versions (and not only in Kyrgyzstan). The anecdote was about 
a young antireligious activist who had been sent to the summer pastures to 
lecture the herdsmen of the collective about evolution. When the activist 
finally finished his long and tedious lecture in which he had explained that 
our human ancestors were apes, one of the oldest herders raised his voice: 
“This is all very well, and I am willing to accept that your forefathers were 
apes, as long as it is clear that mine were decidedly human.” We laughed, 
but it remained unclear what the laughter was about. Were we—or was 
Kadyr—simply laughing at the narrow-mindedness of the antireligious 
activist and the quick-wittedness of the herder? Or were we perhaps also 
ridiculing the old man as a remnant of an outdated worldview, as someone 
who could not be taken seriously either?
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The anecdote and the ambivalence that spoke through it testify to the 
kinds of epistemological conundrums that Kadyr and many others of his 
generation and background experienced. Kadyr was in his late forties, 
married, with four children, living in a modest house on the outskirts of 
Kokjangak. He had studied in Bishkek (then still named Frunze), sub-
sequently worked as an engineer in the coal mine, and, after the mine’s 
closure, lived off his small plot of land and his modest income as direc-
tor of a local credit union. Kadyr would describe himself as a Muslim, 
a designation that for him was tightly interwoven with Kyrgyz culture 
and tradition. If asked, he would add that he was “not close to religion,” 
which referred to the fact that he never went to the mosque and did not 
pay attention to the pillars of Islam. His secular position resembled that 
of many middle-aged town dwellers and was linked to a set of values that 
reflected having lived through the late Soviet period. Though Kadyr had 
never cared about scientific atheism, and, as we saw, was happy to ridicule 
it, the larger Soviet framework to which atheism had been tied was still of 
relevance to how he saw himself: modern, educated, and cultured.
The home of Kadyr and his family in the neighborhood Kȯlmȯ, April 2004
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In this chapter we will look at the ways in which people like Kadyr 
position themselves in relation to atheism, and subsequently gain insight 
into what happened to Soviet scientific atheism more generally. This 
atheism had vanished from public view in the early 1990s, almost as if its 
heavy-handed dissemination for a good seven decades had never taken 
place. As reflected in the anecdote, atheism came to be an object of ridi-
cule and dismissal. In this chapter I ask what this public dismissal reveals 
not only about the “postatheist condition” but also about the features of 
“actually existing atheism” during the Soviet period. Drawing attention 
to contradictions in the architecture of atheism, I argue that the absence 
of a utopian dimension in Soviet atheism prevented its authentic real-
ization and failed to incite lasting commitment and conviction in most 
people, which in turn enabled the swift removal of atheism at the end of 
the Soviet period.
However, the ambiguity of laughter suggested that the ridiculing and 
dismissal of atheism did not necessarily go very deep, and the anecdote 
could also be read as letting the antireligious activist off the hook. The 
staging of an elderly and presumably uneducated herder suggested ap-
prehensiveness about religious ideas, in this case as a legacy of a “back-
ward” past, but which was also linked to the idea that religiosity indicates 
narrow-mindedness. Such notions were particularly common among peo-
ple who presented themselves as “not religious” or “not close to religion,” 
whose anxieties were being fueled by the proliferation of new religious 
voices. In other words, the public dismissal of atheism did not mean that 
the various attitudes and ideas associated with it melted into thin air. Ironi-
cally, the public disappearance of atheism triggered renewed defenses of 
that which had never been desired.
Surface Disappearance
Back in 1999, when Soviet life was still a recent memory, I had a conver-
sation with a friend who was an academic and former Communist Party 
member living in Bishkek, someone who referred to himself as being “not 
religious.” The previous day he had watched, on his regular TV channel, 
a US-made documentary decrying evolutionary theory. The documentary 
had presented scientific evidence in support of the view that the world 
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was only several thousand years old, and used this to uphold the strength 
of intelligent-design theory. “It is amazing,” my friend told me, “all those 
years I had assumed that evolution was a fact, but, as it now turns out, that 
was just atheist propaganda.” What interested me about this incident were 
not the specific strengths or weaknesses of either theory, but rather the re-
classification of the “fact” of evolution into Soviet “propaganda” precisely 
because it happened in such an ad hoc manner. It suggested that because 
all previously acquired knowledge had potentially been propaganda (in 
the sense of having deliberately been distorted), knowledge itself had be-
come unstable. But did this imply that atheism had simply evaporated? 
Or was the fact of evolution (and more broadly scientific atheism) perhaps 
never completely accepted as factual? And even if accepted as fact, what 
kind of intellectual and emotional investment, if any, did that indicate? 
For an investigation of these issues, a good point of entrance is the observa-
tion that evolutionary theory and atheist ideology vanished from the pub-
lic sphere in August 1991. The contrast between two books from the early 
1990s written by Kyrgyz scholars conveniently illustrates this disappear-
ance of atheism from public discourse.
In 1991, before August of that memorable year,1 Melis Abdyldaev, 
a Kyrgyz philosopher and scholar of atheism, published, in Russian, Iz 
istorii religii i ateizma v Kyrgyzstane (From the History of Religion and 
Atheism in Kyrgyzstan). The book contains a detailed history of the suc-
cesses of the antireligious struggle, as well as the various obstacles that 
had to be overcome. His tone is often jubilant, and toward the end of the 
book he writes that “at present we have an entire battery of function-
ing people’s universities of atheism” (1991, 110), delivering atheist activist 
graduates (propogandisty–ateisty) who are prolific in their activities. For 
example, one of Kyrgyzstan’s provinces had no less than ninety teach-
ers of atheism who gave a total of 2,221 lectures on atheism in the year 
1986–87 (116–17). Abdyldaev acknowledges that the atheist project was 
by no means completed, and lists the familiar problems such as the use of 
crude and offensive techniques (109; see also Ro′i 1984, 31). But he envi-
sions a bright future in which religion will have withered away, and he 
proposes that this goal will be reached faster if atheist activists engage 
more seriously with the philosophical basis of their project and proceed in 
nonconfronting manners, for example by promoting nonreligious rituals 
(1991, 126–27).
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Just two years later, in 1993, another Kyrgyz scholar, Anara Tabysh-
alieva, published (also in Russian) Vera v Turkestane: Ocherk istorii religii 
Srednei Azii i Kazakhstana (Belief in Turkestan: Essays on the History of 
Religion of Central Asia and Kazakhstan), which traces the history of vari-
ous religious traditions. In a chapter titled “Soviet Times,” Tabyshalieva 
mentions the closure of mosques and churches, the change of alphabet, the 
hujum, or unveiling campaigns, and the terror of the 1930s when believers 
were regarded as Trotskyites and imperialist spies (1993, 112–15), all as 
aspects of the long and erratic struggle against religion. But while Abdyl-
daev focuses on the massive antireligious input, Tabyshalieva stresses the 
limited or even contradictory output. For example, she suggests that the 
cheap literature on atheism often functioned to trigger interest in religion 
(116),2 and argues that the antireligious regime ultimately failed to incul-
cate atheist worldviews in its citizens. She concludes that “the renaissance 
of religiosity turned out to be the unexpected answer to the long and indif-
ferent domination of atheism [and] the loss of belief in a communist or a 
socialist future” (122).
Tabyshalieva’s book is an example of atheism’s disappearance, of how 
it vanished almost overnight from scholarly work, political rhetoric, 
and public discourse. But at least the book still mentions Soviet atheism. 
Later texts on the history of religion published in Kyrgyzstan invariably 
reduced the Soviet atheist project to a couple of paragraphs at most, its 
authors often jumping from pre-Soviet to post-Soviet times (see, for ex-
ample, Chotaeva 2004; Moldobaev 2002).3 Political spokespersons equally 
distanced themselves from atheism, and used references to Muslimness 
and “nomadic spirituality,” such as those found in the epic of Manas, to 
bolster their claims to power. It would be problematic to conclude from 
such trends that Kyrgyzstan was rapidly becoming a “religious place,” but 
what is significant is that direct references to atheism had become con-
spicuously absent. The “atheist experiment” had become an object of ridi-
cule, an awkward memory to be forgotten, and an increasingly irrelevant 
historical artifact.
When Tabyshalieva wrote that the renaissance of religion was the “un-
expected answer,” she touched on a core element in the argument that 
Alexei Yurchak later expounded in his book Everything Was Forever, Until 
It Was No More (2005). Writing about the Soviet system as a whole, he 
states that “although the system’s collapse had been unimaginable before 
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it began, it appeared unsurprising when it happened” (1). Yurchak solves 
this seeming paradox by arguing that the Soviet system and its ideology 
had been eroded from the inside out, and that people had already oriented 
themselves in new directions when the collapse occurred. Focusing on the 
role of language he documents the unfolding of a shift from “constative 
meaning” in which the content of ideological statements was understood 
to refer (relatively straightforwardly) to societal realities, to “performative 
meaning” in which ideological language becomes largely self-referential. 
In practical terms this meant that the content became subservient to the 
form, that is, both speakers and listeners increasingly focused on how 
things were being said, instead of what was being said. This “hegemony of 
form” obscured and destabilized the relation between signifier and signi-
fied, between ideological discourse and the reality to which it ostensibly re-
ferred.4 Moreover, because the specific content of ideological language had 
become largely irrelevant, people became increasingly creative in looking 
for meaning elsewhere. In hindsight, this opened up creative possibilities 
that prepared Soviet citizens for the collapse, even if they had been un-
aware of it at the time.
Although Yurchak does not address atheism or antireligious discourse, 
the similarities are obvious. Scientific atheism had been an integral part of 
Soviet ideology, and Soviet citizens did not expect it to disappear before 
it actually did. Moreover, the hegemony of form had obscured the weak-
nesses of the antireligious efforts. This is not to say that the antireligious 
position was mere pretense. For teachers, atheist activists, and Communist 
Party members it constituted a discourse of familiarity and mutual un-
derstanding.5 But even for them atheism did not in and of itself project an 
attractive vision onto the world. While people continued to perform alle-
giance to atheism, their attitudes had become increasingly ambivalent and 
ironic, so that once the Soviet Union collapsed, atheism could be dismissed 
without much further discussion.
Notwithstanding these similarities, the case of atheism has several dis-
tinctive features. Another reference to Tabyshalieva may clarify this. She 
speaks of the renaissance of religiosity as the answer to “the long and indif-
ferent domination of atheism, to the social disruption and economic disap-
pointments that were chaotically produced, and most importantly to the loss 
of belief in a communist or a socialist future” (1993, 122, emphasis added). 
Along with many authors Tabyshalieva writes about the disillusionment 
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with the communist project that characterized the late Soviet period, but 
she appears to suggest, by using the word “indifference,” that in the case 
of atheism the implicit illusion may never have existed. Hence the kinds of 
cynicism that ensued were of a different nature. Consider the well-known 
Soviet joke “They pretend to pay us and we pretend to work,” which was 
popular precisely because it summed up the sense of disillusionment with 
the Soviet project and its disempowering effects. This joke could be easily 
translated to atheism, and many citizens of the Soviet Union would have 
agreed with the formulation “They pretend to eradicate religion, and we 
pretend to be atheists.” But the effect is different. Whereas in the original 
anecdote everyone would agree on the importance of fair payment and the 
ultimate goals of (socialist) labor, in the reformulated version even the goal 
(of eradicating religion) was being questioned.
The important difference, then, seems to be that atheism never had a 
utopian element independent from the larger Soviet structure of which 
it was a part. This was evident when I asked an acquaintance if in her 
view atheism still existed, and received an answer full of surprise as to why 
I would even ask that question: “Atheism? All the institutions have disap-
peared!” At one level this was a straightforward truism, but what spoke 
through it was the assumption that “of course” the idea of atheism could 
never outlive its centralized institutionalized form.
Soviet atheism represented an extreme instance of the “hegemony of 
form” that had rendered ideological content redundant. This explains, to 
a degree, why Kyrgyz scholars, politicians, and ordinary citizens were able 
to distance themselves so quickly from the Soviet atheist project. There 
is a problem, though. If allegiance to atheism was largely about “form,” 
can we not also postulate that atheism’s dismissal was similarly about 
“form,” giving us only very few insights into the continuities and disconti-
nuities that operated below the surface? In other words, by answering one 
riddle—how and why did atheism disappear from public discourse?—we 
have created new ones. If we can speak of disappearance at all, what was it 
that had disappeared, and what had come in its stead?
The former communist mentioned in the beginning of this section had 
reclassified the “fact of evolution” as fantastic “propaganda,” and had done 
so with relative ease because he had never been emotionally invested in 
this “fact.” This calls for an exploration of what “actually existing atheism” 
had amounted to. Equally relevant to mention is the ad hoc nature of the 
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former communist’s reclassification. He was flirting with creationism at 
that very instance, but in later years would often talk dismissively about 
the new prominence of religious voices in the public and political domain. 
As will be documented below, atheism, to the extent that it existed, did 
leave important traces on people’s attitudes and dispositions, which in spite 
of its surface disappearance would take on relevance in new contexts.
The Problem of Realizing Atheism
The suggestion “hegemony of form” provides an important clue for why 
atheism could be easily dismissed. But why did Soviet atheism fail to be 
emotionally and intellectually embodied? Yurchak’s emphasis on the rou-
tinization of ideological language,6 together with Weber’s more encom-
passing argument regarding routinization through institutionalization 
(1968, 54–61), are important considerations, but these need to be aug-
mented by an analysis of the architecture of atheist ideology itself. I provi-
sionally hypothesize that an important reason for the “hegemony of form” 
in the case of atheism is that it is an empty ideology in the sense that it does 
not offer a forward-looking idea that allows people to identify with it or, 
in Althusser’s words, to be interpellated by it.
Yurchak unwittingly points at the possibility of such a line of inquiry 
when he refers to Soviet ideology as a case of “failed interpellation” 
(2005, 116–17), but does so without following up on the brief reference to 
Althusser. Reconsider the anecdote of the atheist activist and the herdsman 
that started off this chapter. One of the many ironies of this anecdote is 
that, despite it having traveled widely across (post-)Soviet space, it is un-
likely that such encounters happened often. The reason is that the failure 
of interpellation is a two-way process, as can be illustrated with reference 
to Althusser’s original example, concerning the police officer who hails an 
individual—“hey, you there!”—at which the addressee turns round, and 
in the moment of turning becomes (is reaffirmed as) an ideological subject 
([1971] 2008, 48).7 The point of the comparison is not just that the herds-
man who “turned” ridiculed and indeed emasculated the “police officer,” 
but that the atheist activists were themselves often hesitant in hailing in-
dividuals. Instead of confidently hailing, they would hesitantly whisper, 
“Hey, you there.” Frequently they would only “hail” on paper but not in 
What  Happened  to  Sovie t  Athe i sm?   85
person, or they would end up drinking vodka with the audience they were 
supposed to enlighten.
This may appear a flippant caricature, and we will have time to revisit 
it, but these are the elements that come through strongly in the complaints 
of late Soviet scholars. The problem with atheism in the 1970s and ’80s 
was its inability to produce a compelling alternative to religion. Sure, the 
antireligious efforts did not lack in quantity (of publications, manpower, 
etc.), but they often lacked zeal. Thus, while the course Foundations of 
Scientific Atheism was being taught in hundreds of universities and tech-
nical high schools across the country, “complaints continued that there was 
much laxity and little enthusiasm on the part of students and instructors” 
(Pospielovsky 1987, 112). And while the “number of atheistic lectures . . . 
in Uzbekistan doubled from 28,289 in 1966 to 47,921 in 1976” (Kocaoglu 
1984, 146), it was highly doubtful that these lectures (whatever number 
were actually delivered) convinced many people.
Notwithstanding the massive antireligious efforts (and not only on 
paper), Soviet sociologists acknowledged the lack of progress in inculcating 
atheist worldviews and attitudes. By 1981, writes Dimitry Pospielovsky, 
“the establishment’s main concern was with the increasing amount of in-
difference to atheism and atheist propaganda, a kind of agnosticism as it 
were, in the ranks of the Soviet youth” (1987, 117). Some blamed this on 
the “conciliatory attitude to religion on the part of some communists and 
Komsomol members, and their participation in religious ceremonies and 
services” (Ro′i 1984, 33). Ro′i concludes on the basis of literature written 
by Soviet scholars in the Kyrgyz SSR that “atheistic propaganda lacked 
drive and specificity” (31). Working with similar literature David Powell 
concludes that “perhaps the most basic failure of atheist propaganda is its 
failure to reach believers” (1967, 372).
Atheism has a problem of interpellation because it lacks a utopian 
dimension or a “devotional core.” Returning to Althusser, he argues 
that all ideology is centered around an “Absolute Subject” that “inter-
pellates around it the infinity of individuals into subjects in a double 
mirror-connexion,” thereby subjecting these individuals to itself “while 
giving them . . . the guarantee that this really concerns them and Him” 
([1971] 2008, 54). But this understanding of ideology cannot be applied 
easily to atheism, as can be illustrated even by looking at the term itself. 
“Atheism” combines the prefix “a-” indicating “absence of,” with the suffix 
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“-ism” indicating an active stance or ideology. That is, just like “amorality” 
indicates not immorality but the mere absence of morality, so can a-theism 
be seen as the mere absence of “theism” or religion. The more “active” or 
energized types of atheism can be either antagonistic or substantive. In the 
antagonistic version, atheism manifests itself as an anti-theism, deriving 
its fervor from its contrarian position. In the substantive version, atheism 
manifests itself as athe-ism, developing an alternative set of values to aspire 
to.8 However, each of these possible versions of atheism contains an inter-
nal contradiction.
(Not) Remembering Soviet Atheism
As mentioned, in Kyrgyzstan after 1991, Soviet atheism had become an 
embarrassment of sorts, something preferably to be forgotten. Most peo-
ple I spoke to simply dismissed the topic. This silence stood out precisely 
because other memories of the Soviet past were so readily communicated. 
My acquaintances in Kokjangak talked with pride about the heydays of 
their mining town, about the work ethic that had existed, and of having 
been part of a civilization in the making, just as they talked (with less en-
thusiasm) about the human sacrifices that had been made to produce this 
civilization and the corruption that accompanied its decay (see chapter 2). 
In contrast, people were highly reluctant to speak about atheism and 
antireligious efforts. When I would ask questions about it, the most typical 
response resembled the following one: “We just pretended to be atheists, 
but in our hearts we always believed [in God].” This response devalued 
atheism in the present, while the insistence on pretense suggested that So-
viet atheism never had any value in the past either. Though this statement 
and similar ones confirm the failed interpellation of the previous section, 
it is important not to take them at face value. Pushing beyond people’s 
knee-jerk reaction, I encouraged several former teachers and activists of 
atheism to elaborate on their views.
As a former school director, Asel′ Kosobaeva was a respected inhabitant of 
Kokjangak. She had been schooled in scientific atheism but looked back 
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at it with distaste. “Scientific atheism,” she stressed, “is such a Soviet term, 
very vulgar [Russian, vul′garnoe] and coarse [gruboe], a simplistic distortion 
of religiosity.” We spoke in her house, while her daughter-in-law brought 
in tea and food. She elaborated:
Nowadays there is no one left who will say that they are atheist. But ac-
tually, we weren’t atheists during the Soviet period either—back then we 
were also believers. Our God, the God of the Soviet people, was Marxism, 
Leninism, we were believers in the ideas of Marx and Lenin. And you see 
this [confirmed] when you go to the university [in Bishkek]. They have this 
Department of Religious Studies now, but its professors used to teach scien-
tific atheism. That’s absurd, isn’t it?
Asel′ rationalized her own involvement by saying, “Yes, I was a Komsomol 
member, an activist, a communist. That was all—how should I say it? . . . 
They didn’t give us the possibility to think independently.” Asked to give 
examples of the antireligious activism she used to be involved in, Asel′ 
mentioned a trip with other activists to a village near Kokjangak:
When we arrived in Oktiabr′skoe [village] we were directed to this Kyrgyz 
family, about whom [local teachers] were exasperated: “We have no idea 
what to do with them.” The family turned out to be a young husband and 
wife, both in their twenties, Kyrgyz, who had become Baptists! So I asked 
them: “How can you be Baptists?! That is an entirely different faith! Are 
you not even thinking of your parents? This is a Muslim environment. It is 
fine that you are not Muslims, but you are Asians, so why . . . ?!” And then 
they answered. I didn’t know what to say, so I just remained silent. They 
talked about their lack of basic means [of living]. Their parents had been 
poor: the husband’s parents had died, the wife only had an elderly mother. 
And the Baptists had helped them, with money, with building a house. . . . 
You know, “Religion is the opium of the people.” That’s the basis, every-
thing follows from that.
Asel′s stories contain many interesting elements, ranging from the ways in 
which the relation between religion and culture was configured to the spe-
cifics of antireligious activism and the explicit suggestion about “opium of 
the people.” Such leads will be followed up after we look at a few more view-
points. What is worth emphasizing here is that during our conversation, 
88    Dynamics  o f  Convic t ion
Asel′ unreflectively shifted from a dismissal of atheism to a rejection of un-
orthodox forms of religiosity, such as in this case Russian Baptists, which 
culminated in her affirmation of the “opium of the people” dictum.
Olga Nikolaevna, a Russian woman in her sixties, used to teach En- 
glish in school number 1, the only school in Kokjangak still having a 
Russian-language curriculum. After her two children moved away to 
Bishkek and Russia, she and her husband thought about leaving as well, 
but they considered themselves too old, and anyway, they both still had 
work. She wasn’t entirely sure why I wanted to talk about atheism:
Atheism no longer exists, neither in the schools nor at the university. Those 
topics have disappeared, they are no longer propagated [bol′she ne propagan-
diruiut]. On the contrary, nowadays it is religion that is propagated in the 
schools. In school number 4 the imam teaches “morality” from the Koran, 
and if more Russians had stayed in town, surely the Bible would have been 
used as well.
Olga told me that she had not thought about atheism in decades. “The thing 
is,” she added, “we learned scientific atheism so-so, just to pass the exam, and 
that is why I don’t remember much about it.” She tried to find her old books 
on atheism to refresh her memory for our conversation, but the books had 
disappeared from the house. Although she had primarily taught English, she 
also used to teach several “class hours” each week that were devoted to Soviet 
citizenship. “We talked about the things that the plan stipulated: first was 
patriotism; second was moral upbringing; third was religious and atheist ed-
ucation, and so on.” When the focus was on atheist and antireligious topics 
(once or twice a month), she prepared by reading popular literature and ad-
justing it to the age group she was teaching.
For example, I would ask them: “One of the Ten Commandments is not 
to commit adultery—you really think that those priests stick to that rule?” 
That’s how I tried to convince my pupils. . . . And I contrasted the childish 
primitiveness of religion with the flourishing of science in our country. For 
example, I would talk about the conquest of space [kosmos], asking the chil-
dren: “If there was a God, surely the astronauts would have seen Him. But 
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did the astronauts see God? Is there at least one astronaut who did?” [Olga 
excused herself to go to the kitchen, and when she returned, she said:] I am 
surprised that I personally spoke those words in class. Now it turns out that 
some astronauts actually did see aliens, but that they were sent to mental in-
stitutions [psikhushki]. If they saw signs of an extraterrestrial civilization, 
they were too afraid to talk about it.
Olga’s story is significant for a number of reasons, one of which is that 
it showed her past commitment to teaching, including teaching atheism, 
going to some length to translate and adjust the abstract message to her 
particular audience. This resonates with Sonja Luehrmann’s observation 
about the effort and indeed sincerity of atheist teaching in the Autono-
mous Soviet Socialist Republic of Mari El, that through their engagement 
with atheist ideology, her informants fashioned themselves as Soviet 
teachers and practitioners (2011). While recollecting these memories Olga 
seemed almost surprised that she had held such strong views, a surprise 
that was probably related to her later flirtations with Orthodox and Pen-
tecostal Christianity.
Svetlana Iussupovna used to be head of the Bishkek branch of the Knowl-
edge Society (Znanie), the all-union society devoted to public lectures on 
scientific topics, and had been an active communist all her life.9 Through-
out our conversation she emphasized that the stories about the antireligious 
campaigns were all terribly exaggerated: “We never closed any churches 
or mosques, and we never imprisoned anyone because of his or her beliefs. 
Sure, I’m not denying that we fought [Russian, borolis′] against religion, 
but it was just a small part of everything else that we did. It came, maybe, 
on the tenth place.” This was true even in a literal sense, such as when 
taking part in educational programs designed for pastoralists. “I was part 
of a campaigning team [agitbrigada], and when we traveled to the moun-
tain pastures [Kyrgyz, jailoo], we would bring all kinds of things—about 
health, about agriculture, and also about atheism.” She then continued to 
speak about the antireligious activities she had taken part in:
We never went to the mosque or to the Orthodox church. Yes, we fought 
against religion, but mostly Jehovah’s Witnesses and Baptists. I was even at 
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their meetings. It was difficult to get there, because they constantly changed 
their location. But we received information of who is going where, et ce-
tera. Mind you, no one would be imprisoned for their beliefs. Imprison-
ment only happened when the law was broken. For example, we had a law 
that children under eighteen should not be drawn into the cult. . . . We ac-
tively campaigned [agitirovali], we told people that there is no God, that it 
is human morality that makes society, those kinds of things. And we asked 
them: “Why do you need this God? Don’t you know how detrimental [vred-
nyi] all of that is?” That is how we worked, but the thing is that at that time 
there was order. Everyone had work. This [chaos] is what we got with your 
ideology, when money comes first. Nowadays people only think about mak-
ing money, they don’t care if what they sell is bad for people’s health.
After the interview had ended we drank tea with cookies and talked about 
the changes in the city as well as her former colleagues. Many of them 
had started to teach about the history of religion instead of socialism. She 
looked dismissive, saying, “For me that doesn’t work. Life is short, and 
I don’t have time, I can’t simply change my ideology.” She then took a bot-
tle of vodka from the cupboard and announced, “Let’s conclude this meet-
ing the Soviet way” (po sovetskii).
These briefly presented views significantly overlap. They agreed that 
atheism had disappeared to the extent that it had become rare to find 
self-proclaimed atheists, and that religious voices were being propagated 
instead of atheist ones. They connected these trends to the collapse of So-
viet institutions and Soviet morality, but they disagreed as to whether this 
was a positive or negative development. Beyond these agreements and dis-
agreements the three women emphasized different aspects or dimensions 
of “really existing” Soviet atheism.
The Issue of Substance
Does atheism have substance? In other words, should we read it as merely 
the absence of religion—that is, as a-theism—or as an ideological stance in 
its own right, athe-ism? The examples above suggest that both interpreta-
tions need to be considered.
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The nonideology, or empty ideology, view came through most strongly 
in the comments of Olga, who had difficulty providing details when 
I prompted her to do so, suggesting that the topic never had any intrin-
sic value to her. This is not to say that she did not make an effort in her 
teaching. She filled the void of atheism by providing lively examples of the 
hypocrisy of religious leaders, and by emphasizing the progress of science. 
Along somewhat similar lines, Svetlana stressed that atheism was part of 
the larger project of socialism, and that as “the tenth thing,” it derived value 
from that connection. The emphasis on science and the larger socialist proj-
ect indicated that “atheism” did not have affective qualities in and of itself.
This “emptiness of atheism” creates a problem, because as long as it 
is centered on a void or absence it has trouble producing commitment. 
As atheist activist Madalyn Murray O’Hair said about atheism in North 
America, the problem is that “although [atheists are] numerous [they re-
main] unorganized and complacent” (cited in Martin 2007b, 220; Baggini 
2009). Similarly, the humanists in Britain tend to present themselves as 
an unrecognized avant-garde for a silent majority of like-minded others 
(Engelke 2014; Matthew Engelke, pers. comm.). The situation was differ-
ent in the state-socialist version of atheism. There, atheist organizations 
boasted huge membership, but especially toward the end of the Soviet 
period these were characterized by a weak internal structure behind a 
Potemkin-like facade (Peris 1998, 118–20). Officials and specialists were 
well aware of the indifference of both atheist activists and their audience. 
A telling example is provided by David Powell, citing a Soviet official who, 
in his speech at a conference of atheist specialists, exclaimed, in exaspera-
tion, “I repeat: it [religiosity] is a feeling, and you cannot fight it without 
instilling a counter feeling” (1967, 375).
The need to produce “counter feelings” may well be why atheisms the 
world over have a tendency to acquire “religious” characteristics. This is 
evident particularly in organized forms of atheism, where the original em-
phasis on reason and rationality or on “the absence of religion” is comple-
mented by the celebration of heroes and exemplary men and women, by 
“sacred” symbols, and utopian visions of society. As Grace Davie (2012, 4) 
has suggested, “Communities of unbelief in each country form mirror im-
ages of [the existing religious] institutions.” This “mirroring” works in two 
distinct ways, as can be seen in the Soviet case. On the one hand, there is 
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the tendency to define atheism as the opposite of how specific versions of 
religions are being seen, and thus to stress the features of “rationality,” 
“progress,” and being “for the masses,” all in contrast to the backward-
ness and oppressive nature of religion. On the other hand, though, there 
is a tendency for atheist organizations to manifest themselves, in Jesse 
Smith’s words, as the “functional equivalent of organized religion” (2013, 
92). Convenient Soviet examples are the Lenin and Stalin cults, the almost 
“religious” devotion that many Soviet citizens demonstrated to these lead-
ers, and the emphasis on creating secular rituals that engaged with the 
big questions of life and death (see especially Lane 1981). Ironically, these 
“functional equivalents” suggest that atheism only becomes affective at the 
moment that it negates itself, when it is no longer an “a-theism” but a 
pseudo religion. This pseudoreligious fervor fizzled out in the late Soviet 
period, although Asel′ still invoked it by saying, “We were also believ-
ers” back then—“Our God was Marxism, Leninism.”10 But although she 
spoke of Soviet atheism as a religion, in which communist prophets had 
taken over the place of Jesus and Muhammad, she also stressed that it was 
a vulgar and simplistic imitation of religion. Or as Tabyshalieva wrote, 
among the intelligentsia the cynical question emerged: “Did we have the 
pure atheism or did we perhaps [only] get its imitation?” (1993, 121).
Scientific atheism did not have an appeal in and of itself, but rather 
gained legitimacy, at least for some activists, by being part of a larger 
scheme. This came through most clearly in Svetlana’s suggestion that 
antireligious struggle was “maybe the tenth thing,” and her emphasis on 
the importance of the larger Soviet project. But when this larger scheme, 
the promised communist future, lost in credibility, there was very little to 
lean on. The resulting problem of indifference, of erosion from within, has 
been termed “a-atheism” by William van den Bercken, who suggested that 
this “fairly common phenomenon in Soviet society” was best described as 
“a form of secularization within the ideological monoculture, of removal 
of ideology from the personal sphere” (1985, 275).
The Issue of Difference
As mentioned earlier, atheism often reveals itself as an anti-theism. So-
viet atheism gained momentum through the fight against organized reli-
gion. Atheist and antireligious fervor was at its height in the early decades 
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of Soviet rule. Contested as these antireligious efforts were, the early mem-
bers of the bezbozhniki (the communist league of the godless), the female 
Uzbek communists involved in the hujum, or unveiling campaigns (Kamp 
2006), and the workers and peasants involved in the expropriation of reli-
gious buildings and properties across the USSR (Husband 2000) cannot be 
denied some measure of enthusiasm.11 That is, atheism was a motivating 
force when it faced a clear adversary, and could present itself as part of a 
forward-moving project directed at a modern future.
The idea that atheist fervor is produced through opposition also 
emerged from the stories people told me about their own involvement in 
anti religious efforts in the late Soviet period. Recall Svetlana Iussupovna’s 
insistence that she never went to fight against a mosque or Orthodox church 
but instead targeted the Jehovah’s Witnesses and Baptists. She elaborated 
on the detrimental effects these “sects,” as she called them, had on young 
children. A similar point was made, indirectly, by Asel′ Kosobaeva, who 
found herself outraged when talking to Kyrgyz who were no longer Mus-
lims but had become Baptists. The message speaking through this example 
was that certain forms of religiosity were too closely interwoven with the 
social and cultural fabric of late Soviet life to be seen as legitimate targets of 
antireligious interventions. Instead, the antireligious activists targeted un-
fitting elements such as Kyrgyz Baptists or the Jehovah’s Witnesses. The 
point is that the antireligious position gained legitimacy and fervor at those 
moments when it was directed at a clearly identifiable adversary.
It was thus through identifying the problematic “Other” that anti-
religious rhetoric was likely to find wider resonance even in the late 
Soviet period. At some point I discussed with several middle-aged men their 
views of the local “unregistered Baptist” community living in Kokjangak. 
The Soviet media, schoolteachers, and other official communications had 
always portrayed these Baptists in an extremely negative light, using the de-
risive terms sekta (sect) and fanatiki (fanatics). Talking about this, Nurbek, 
one of my self-avowed not-religious acquaintances, remarked: “I never be-
lieved the stories that the Baptists would sacrifice one of their children on 
a special holiday and would then eat the child, I never believed that. But 
I did believe the stories that once a year they would retreat to partake in 
a secret sexual orgy.” The anecdote was intentionally humorous, but also 
indicated that Nurbek used to perceive intense forms of self-avowed reli- 
giosity as being out of the ordinary—intriguing, abnormal—and, moreover, 
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that he had internalized those aspects of antireligious propaganda that 
were in line with already-held fears, desires, and perhaps especially his 
(teenage) fantasies.
By contrast, when it came to the fight against versions of religion that 
were deemed legitimate, things were different. It is not accidental that 
Svetlana stressed that they never went to the (Orthodox) church or the 
mosque. The difficulties atheist activists experienced with regard to affili-
ation with Islam were also due to the fact that a boundary between religion 
and culture cannot be easily drawn. Although during the 1930s and 1950s, 
in particular, the Soviet regime had waged extensive antireligious cam-
paigns in which imams were prosecuted and most mosques and madrassas 
were shut down, it had been far less successful in eradicating the many as-
pects of religious expression and identity that were part of everyday life. In 
fact, even while the Soviet regime successfully combated many public man-
ifestations of religion, it ironically also encoded religious identities through 
its nationality politics. As Kemal Karpat has shown for Soviet Central Asia 
more generally, the appeal of newly created national categories derived (in 
part) from “the incorporation of many elements of the religious culture in 
the emerging ‘national’ cultures [which gave] the adherents of the latter a 
sense of the historical continuity, strength, and durability of their cultures” 
(1993, 416). Vice versa, the incorporation of religious elements in conceptu-
alizations of ethnicity, nationality, and culture also enshrined the position 
of Islam. As a Soviet periodical noted, “The survivals of Islam often ap-
pear under the mask of national traditions” (Ro′i 1984, 34). Soviet authori-
ties bemoaned this intertwining of religious and national affiliation, as in 
the following complaint of the obkom (province committee) secretary of 
Osh Province (oblast) in southern Kyrgyzstan: “Some people suggest that 
a person who observes Islamic rites demonstrates thereby ‘respect’ for his 
nation, and in deviating from them insults it” (cited ibid., 36).
By the end of the Soviet period, national identity was intimately tied 
to Muslimness, but a Muslimness that had been stripped of much of its 
“spiritual” content and was thereby made compatible with Soviet ideals 
(Shahrani 1995). Conversely, the processes allowed for an environment where 
self-avowed atheists could actively claim to be Muslims. This overlap be-
tween religion and culture has continued to inspire interesting points of view 
among the “not religious,” such as the following statement of a middle-aged 
woman who used to be member of the Communist Party: “Look, we 
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are atheists, but of course we all believe in God.” She later elaborated: “We 
are atheists. Yes, we are Muslims, but let me explain. We are all Muslim 
people—Kazaks, Kyrgyz, Uzbeks, Turkmen, Tajiks. We were born Mus-
lims. That’s it” (quoted in McBrien and Pelkmans 2008, 87).
Disillusionment with the communist project is often—by and large 
correctly—attributed to the effect of a widening gap between the utopian 
communist vision and the reality of everyday Soviet life. But how does 
atheism fit into this picture? Soviet ideology was highly utopian, and the 
communist idea was accompanied by visions of healthy and affluent work-
ers who achieved self-realization through their involvement in collective 
labor, and a new and modern age of technological achievements. Atheism, 
in itself, did not inspire such visions. Soviet leaders never promised athe-
ism, and citizens did not desire atheism. The lack of a utopian dimension 
meant that it could not survive as a self-standing positive ideology. Its de-
pendence on an Other meant that atheism (as anti-theism) worked only 
for as long as an external religious adversary could be identified, while 
attempts to instill “counter-feelings” from within resulted in pseudoreli-
gious qualities that negated or compromised the atheist position. Sure, So-
viet atheism continued to exist as part of the ideological state apparatus, 
embedded in a range of institutions, but disinterest and skepticism had 
corroded it from within long before the Soviet Union collapsed.
New Resonances of Soviet Atheism
As he had done on previous occasions, Kadyr expressed his perplexity of 
what he saw as people’s gullibility, their propensity to buy into the “fairy 
tales” (skazki) of the imam and any of the new preachers. We were sitting, 
once again, on a grassy hill overlooking the town, this time accompanied 
by Bolot, one of Kadyr’s oldest friends. Each of us holding a bottle of Bal-
tika beer, we were sharing stories. “I am astonished that my neighbors 
believe this crap [erunda],” Kadyr repeated. Bolot agreed with him, but 
couldn’t refrain from mentioning that in the early 1990s he and Kadyr had 
once traveled all the way to the city of Kokand (located two hundred kilo-
meters to the southwest) to see a spiritual healer. We laughed, as one does 
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with beer in hand, about the various events in Kokand, including Bolot’s 
momentary belief that drinking some kind of magical potion was going to 
heal his chronic headaches. . . . After a short silence, half a cigarette long, 
Kadyr said, now in a pensive mood, “I know, but those were different 
times . . . everyone was confused back then.” Their visit to a famous spiri-
tual healer was remembered as having been about curiosity, experimenta-
tion, and momentary confusion, after which they had come to their senses. 
By contrast, people who had started to devote themselves to strict interpre-
tations of Islam or Christianity were in Kadyr’s view of a different sort; 
they had become “fanatics.”
Earlier I mentioned that Kadyr had never cared for scientific atheism, 
and had been happy to ridicule the predictable rhetoric of antireligious ac-
tivists. At the same time, though, his views expressed ambivalence. With 
the Soviet system no longer in existence, with religious leaders expressing 
their opinion without being challenged, and with religious symbolism be-
coming more conspicuous in the public sphere, the disappearance of athe-
ism was no longer a straightforwardly positive change. In other words, 
it seemed that the contextual changes led Kadyr and Bolot to reconsider 
their position. As Bolot put it: “Much of what the communists taught us 
was right, but at the time we didn’t appreciate it.” This idea resonates 
with the key analytical problem of this chapter: the problem of an empty 
ideology, which produced indifference as long as it was the dominant, of-
ficial narrative, yet started to be appreciated after its structures collapsed. 
The contrarian quality of atheism—deriving energy from its antagonistic 
counterpart religion—regained relevance after the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, with the ironic result that the “not religious” appeared to be de-
fending something that they had not desired when it existed. The ques-
tion that therefore needs to be answered is: How did the oppositional and 
relational dimensions of atheism become reconfigured after 1991?
One of the challenges faced by the “not religious” was that their conduct 
was no longer always sufficient to qualify as Muslim. During Soviet times 
it had been a sine qua non that Kyrgyz men would drink vodka (see also 
Khalid 2006, 1); alcohol consumption was an important ingredient in as-
sertions of masculinity and was closely entwined with ideas of hospital-
ity. Although most men continued these practices, they were increasingly 
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criticized for doing so. Women faced other challenges. When once visit-
ing school number 4 with my Kyrgyz colleague Himia, we briefly talked to 
some teenagers who were loitering in the school yard. One of these young 
men confronted Himia, telling her that she should not wear trousers and 
should wear a head scarf. It was an exceptional and very confronting occa-
sion to Himia, not only because her Muslimness was being questioned, but 
also because age hierarchies were publicly being violated.
There were other challenges to established patterns of engagement with 
Islam as well. If during the Soviet period it was generally assumed that 
only the very old would pray (and rarely in a mosque), by the mid-2000s 
not only larger numbers of old men but especially many young men and 
boys would come to the Friday prayers and the study sessions organized by 
Imam Talant. He also tried to convince middle-aged men to pray, but they 
turned out to be insensitive to his arguments. As the imam complained 
in a conversation with me: “The problem is that they still have an atheist 
mind-set. They always have excuses, and they always think that they know 
it better, telling me that the Kyrgyz had never prayed in mosques. But this 
is not about being Kyrgyz, this is about Islam. Islam is one and Kyrgyz is 
another.”
Imam Talant was not the only one who attempted to disentangle reli-
gion and culture, and thus to undo a connection that had been reinforced 
under Soviet rule. Local Tablighi circles became increasingly active in the 
2000s. They not only invited inhabitants to start praying, but also addressed 
false conceptions of Islam in their teachings, and criticized, for example, 
funerals and weddings, which were deemed un-Islamic. These issues were 
reported across the region. McBrien, for example, documents how newly 
pious Muslims started to transform life-cycle rituals into “religiously pure” 
events in the nearby town of Bazar-Korgon. By abolishing “traditional” 
wedding parties, prohibiting serving alcohol, reinforcing gender segre-
gation, and inviting wedding speakers, these newly pious Muslims chal-
lenged the formerly agreed-on notions of what was Islamic and what was 
not (McBrien 2006). Such innovations worked to disconnect being Muslim 
from being Kyrgyz, stressing the supranational character of Islam rather 
than its relation to culture and national identity. But although such newly 
pious assertions made significant headway in several settlements, in Kok-
jangak it was still a relatively marginal phenomenon. Residents explained 
this by referring to the town’s history as a mining town—a former beacon 
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of socialist modernity—and that therefore the mind-set of its inhabitants 
was more “cultured” and modern. For example, they pointed out that 
whereas they had been to “Islamic” funerals in other settlements, in Kok-
jangak such funerals had taken place only a couple of times, and these had 
been talked badly about.
One important legacy of “atheism” is that it provided citizens with a 
vocabulary to respond to religious authorities. My acquaintances drew on 
a repertoire of received wisdom, much of which had its roots in Soviet 
times. Kadyr, for example, several times quoted the Kyrgyz saying that 
“one should listen to what the mullah says, but not do as he does” as a way 
to underline that a lot of this self-avowed religiosity was simple pretense. 
At other times he pointed at one of the first post-Soviet imams, who had 
received money to build a mosque through a foreign charity, but instead 
used it to furnish his own house. This atheist vocabulary was also evident 
in the usage of terms such as “sects” and “fanatics” to refer to unhealthy 
forms of religiosity. In this way, they were trying to restore the boundary 
between the religious and the secular, which in their view had been tres-
passed by unwelcome assertions of religiosity in the public sphere.
Kadyr’s weariness about new religiosity was also informed by developments 
across the border in Uzbekistan. On more than one occasion he told me that 
in his opinion Uzbekistan’s president, Islom Karimov, was doing the right 
thing in repressing religion. “If Karimov would not repress the fanatics, then 
those Uzbeks would reinstate sharia in no time, and we would have an Is-
lamic state as a neighbor within no time.” Kadyr felt the situation was a bit 
better in Kyrgyzstan: “Of course, our people are less fanatic than Uzbeks . . . 
but still.” Such fears may have been informed by negative ethnic stereotyp-
ing, but the fear was real enough. Kadyr was convinced that religion should 
be controlled, and he opposed the idea of freedom of religion. “Maybe such 
freedom is a good thing in Western Europe, but here it is dangerous. Our 
people are not suited for it.” He continued by criticizing the presence of the 
small group of Tablighis in town, asserting that “they don’t work and they 
can only think about religion—they always tell you the same thing.”
Kadyr’s negative feelings about excessive religiosity intensified particu-
larly when his two sons (twins who were twelve years old in 2008) started 
to display interest in Islam, and secretly joined some of the other boys from 
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the neighborhood in meetings organized at the mosque by the imam and 
several Tablighis. When Kadyr found out about this, he gave his sons a stern 
lecture and forbade them to go again; but sensing this might not be sufficient 
(at least for the twin who was most intrigued), he made sure to keep his sons 
busy with domestic tasks when the Tablighi meetings were taking place.
Inhabitants like Kadyr who saw themselves as “not religious” were clearly 
disturbed by new assertions of devotion. In conversation they would often 
express opinions similar to those of Kadyr, and stereotype the Tablighis—as 
well as other new religious groups such as Pentecostals—as zombies, fanat-
ics, and extremists. It was also clear that the encounters with the imam and 
with Tablighis were discomforting precisely because “the truth” had become 
instable. With antireligious discourse having lost the institutional backing it 
had enjoyed during Soviet times, attempts to discredit the authoritative basis 
of newly active religious movements had become even more important. For 
example, “not religious” inhabitants insisted that leaders of new religious 
movements used brainwashing techniques and offered payments to attract 
followers. McBrien offers some valuable observations from the aforemen-
tioned town of Bazar-Korgon. Toward the end of Ramadan 2003, members 
of the Islamist group Hizb ut-Tahrir put up fliers around town that invited 
Muslims to follow the “true path.” McBrien discussed the episode with a 
fifty-year-old schoolteacher, who denounced the messages and aims of the 
group. “He called the group ‘bad’ and ‘dangerous,’ and labeled its members 
‘extremists.’ At the end of his diatribe [he] furiously remarked that those 
who had physically tacked the signs up around town must have been paid to 
do so. Why else would they have been involved in such activities, he mused 
aloud” (McBrien and Pelkmans 2008, 92). What is clear from these examples 
is that people who depicted themselves as “not religious” became infused 
with “atheist” energy when confronted with a new adversary.
Further Reflections
Atheism, to the extent it had existed during Soviet times, lost the institu-
tional backing it once enjoyed. Even the term itself tended to be avoided 
by those who defined themselves as “not religious.” But this does not mean 
that atheist ideas completely evaporated. Remnants of atheism continued 
to exist, and lent force to a contrarian position, either to discredit religious 
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groups or to doubt and ridicule religious claims. As I will discuss in sub-
sequent chapters, many of the faith-driven movements continued to wage 
discursive battles, not so much against atheism as an ideology, but against 
the notions that emerged in its wake.
In this chapter I focused on inhabitants who referred to themselves as 
being “not close to religion” or as “not religious” Muslims. On the one 
hand they denounced Soviet atheism, but this was accompanied by a fear 
of what was seen as excessive religiosity, something they identified in many 
of the “new” religious currents gaining ground in the country starting in 
the late 1990s. Their criticisms of “excessive religiosity” inadvertently 
linked back to Soviet atheist ideology, as was already evident in Svetlana’s, 
at least partly affirmative, allusion to “the opium of the people.”
In a previous cowritten publication (McBrien and Pelkmans 2008, 
98–99) I used an example that I still find telling. In 2002 Kyrgyzstan’s daily 
newspaper Vechernii Bishkek published a series of articles on the presumed 
detrimental effects of both Christian and Islamic “extremism.” One of 
these articles (March 19, 2002) incorrectly cited Marx: “Karl Marx was 
right after all when he announced: ‘Religion is the opium of the people! 
Sweet, intoxicating, and mysterious. In small quantities it is medicine. 
In large quantities it is poison.’ ” Clearly the newspaper’s editors viewed 
the success of new religious movements as an undesirable and dangerous 
development, one that poisoned the youth and turned them into spiri-
tual drug addicts. Marx of course never made a distinction between the 
curative small dose and the addictive large dose of religion. Instead he 
criticized the soothing quality of much institutionalized religion, while 
acknowledging the transformative potential of religious movements such 
as, for example, Lutheranism.12 Oblivious to such nuances, the newspaper 
twisted Marx’s views through their drug metaphor in order to defend 
what was called “folk” or “liberal” Islam, while depicting the new re-
ligious movements as dangerous and detrimental. The views presented 
in this chapter revealed a similar logic. Clearly, the “not religious” were 
afraid of the transformative potential of religion, and their responses were 
stark instances of the need to distance oneself from the new religiosity. 
Marx had returned with a twist.
In a further play on the drug metaphor one could even postulate that the 
“not religious” feared that these religions were in fact not a “downer” that 
relaxes and pacifies as opium does, but rather an “upper” that energizes 
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and emboldens; in essence, they worried that “religion is the cocaine of the 
people.” By contrast, Soviet “atheism” always had difficulties in becoming 
an upper, and lacked the energizing potential of cocaine. It was only in re-
sponse to an adversary that atheist thought gained momentum. This need 
for an adversary is, as we will see in later chapters, also present in other 
ideologies. But because it lacked a utopian dimension, the tendency was 
particularly pronounced in the case of scientific atheism.
To recall, Althusser argued that ideology obtains part of its strength 
from a double-mirror connection in which subjects are pulled in by the 
“voice of ideology” in a process of mutual recognition. But because this 
“voice” was compromised in the case of Soviet atheism, it started to dis-
integrate and erode while it was hegemonic, yet gained momentum when 
the mirror was directed not toward the (here nonexistent) unique Sub-
ject, but toward the external “Object,” a process not of identification but 
of differentiation. Using Yurchak’s terms, when the “hegemony of form” 
collapsed, elements of atheist content, parts of its constative meaning, reap-
peared. Or, as an earlier presented voice from Kokjangak suggested in less 
abstract terms: “Much of what the communists told us was right, but at the 
time we did not appreciate it.”
This suggests that the legacy of the atheist project and the continued 
existence of unbelief should not be brushed under the rug. The remnants 
of atheism continued to be found in the ways in which those who are “not 
religious” approached the world. But they did so hesitantly, as they were 
struggling to find a position between the extremes of Soviet atheism and 
new religiosity. For those who were “not religious,” uncertainty remained 
about what is true, about what is fact and what is fantasy.
4
Walking the Truth in Islam  
with the Tablighi Jamaat
In April 2009 I took part in a three-day dawat, or proselytizing tour, of 
the Tablighi Jamaat, a conservative Islamic piety movement, which has 
made significant inroads into Kyrgyzstan since the 1990s.1 One afternoon 
our fellowship (jamaat) was seated around a low table in the courtyard be-
hind the mosque, eating a warm lunch. We were talking about spiritual 
affairs when Maksat, who was on his third dawat asked, “Is it true what 
they say, that when you go to heaven there will be twelve hundred virgins 
waiting?” Nur-Islam, a middle-aged Dungan2 and the amir, or leader, of 
our fellowship, responded, “There will be many virgins, and what is more, 
every one of those virgins will be more beautiful than the most beauti-
ful woman you have ever seen in your life. And your own wife, she will 
be the most gorgeous one of all.” Around the table tongues were click-
ing. Some of the men expressed looks of affirmation, others of anticipa-
tion. Not wishing to confront what to me came across as sexism, yet unable 
to listen quietly, I interjected, “How is that even possible? I mean, which 
man would be able to satisfy so many women?” It turned out to be a naive 
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question. Nur-Islam responded in a serious demeanor, “Well, you should 
understand that in heaven your manly powers will be multiplied as well.”
Sex and women were recurrent topics of conversation among dawatchis 
(participants in dawat, or “travelers”), and this particular episode contin-
ues to stand out when I think of the three dawats in which I participated. 
One reason for its memorable nature is that the topic made me uncomfort-
able, as I was unable to join in the fascination. Another reason was the 
seriousness and detail with which the virgin story was discussed among 
the men. Indeed, what fascinated me most was that these ideas momen-
tarily attained a level of reality I had not expected. I was surprised, not 
only because of my own biases, but also because most of my acquaintances 
in Kyrgyzstan had only ever spoken of “the virgins” as a kind of joke, if at 
all.3 The fantasy did, however, connect with locally widespread ideas and 
practices. While for young unmarried women the ideal of chastity is val-
ued highly, it is commonly accepted and expected that married men have 
as many “girlfriends” as their financial and social position allows. The “re-
ality of the virgins” did not emerge out of thin air but was richly connected 
to ideas of masculinity, sexuality, and worldly success.
In this chapter I focus on Tablighi techniques to make and keep ideas 
relevant, believable, and embodied. Although we tend to think of ideolo-
gies as configurations of ideas, the ideas that make up ideologies do not 
necessarily travel as a package; they often move in fragments and bits. 
New ideologies are rarely accepted at once; their internalization can be 
a haphazard process, characterized by intensification, deflation, and (par-
tial) evaporation. That is, their trajectories are endowed with a pulsating 
quality. This tends to be particularly visible when ideologies are “new,” 
that is, when they are encountered “as new” in adulthood instead of being 
acquired through upbringing and socialization from an early age onward.
The external observer does not usually notice this pulsating quality; and 
especially when access is limited to one moment in time, this may result in 
depictions of belief and unbelief as fixed states.4 By contrast, movements 
such as the Tablighi Jamaat are cognizant of the pulsating quality of faith 
and have devised their own strategies to combat the dissipation of convic-
tion.5 Their central energizing practice is dawat, which can be provision-
ally translated as “proselytizing tour.” Ideally Tablighis go on dawat for 
one evening a week, three consecutive days each month, a forty-day dawat 
each year, and a four-month dawat once in a lifetime. On three-day dawats 
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(the most common form in Kyrgyzstan), participants travel to a mosque 
other than their own in groups of six to ten men. During these dawats 
the three aspects of traveling, male bonding, and storytelling produce an 
effect of intensification, which allows access to levels of experience that 
tend to remain untouched in everyday life. Hence, though the Urdu term 
dawat stems from the Arabic term da′wa, which means “invitation,” and 
in the Tablighi context can be translated as “proselytizing tour,” the spiri-
tual effect is foremost on the dawatchis themselves instead of the villagers 
and townspeople they encounter and invite to follow the same path. For 
the travelers, dawat offers an opportunity to learn, to translate loosely held 
ideas into an Islamic vocabulary, and to consolidate these in practice and 
routine. The embodied truth that is thus produced does not, however, nec-
essarily last long after the dawatchis return home.
Dawatchis in Kyrgyzstan
The historical trajectory of the Tablighi Jamaat has often been described, 
starting from its origins in northern India in the 1920s, to its increasingly 
transnational profile from the 1950s onward, culminating in the late twen-
tieth century in its recognition as one of the largest Islamic piety or renewal 
movements in the world(Metcalf 1993, 2002; Masud 2000a; Gaborieau 
2000). Close-up analyses of the Tablighi Jamaat tend to be frustrated by the 
movement’s public silence.6 The movement avoids making public state-
ments and discourages its adherents from talking to journalists. In Kyr-
gyzstan this low profile meant that many participants were unaware of the 
name Tablighi Jamaat when they first became involved. The term more 
commonly used by both insiders and outsiders was dawatchi, which re-
fers to people who go on dawat. Unawareness of the “official” name was 
even true for Kanat, who had become involved in Tablighi activities when 
studying abroad. He became a dawatchi after returning to Kyrgyzstan but 
only discovered that “dawat is the same thing as Tablighi Jamaat” when 
he asked an alim (scholar of Islam) about the connection. Ignorance of the 
name has nothing to do with secrecy but everything to do with organiza-
tional features. Because of the Tablighi’s decentralized structure and the 
emphasis on engagement rather than affiliation—there are no registered 
members—the “official” name is not all that relevant.
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Dawat first appeared in Kyrgyzstan in 1992, when Tablighis from Pak-
istan traveled to the country. According to the story, when they arrived 
at the central mosque in Bishkek, no one including the mufti understood 
their motives or background except for one Kyrgyz Muslim who had spent 
time in Pakistan. This man ended up taking the visiting Tablighis to his 
hometown of Balykchi, which subsequently became known as the birth-
place of dawat in Kyrgyzstan (Toktogulova 2014, 7). In the early years 
the movement remained small and was barely noticed, but this started to 
change around the turn of the millennium. The first time I met a small 
group of dawatchis was in 2003 in a mosque in Karakol (northeastern 
Kyrgyzstan) while doing research on conversion to Christianity. I asked 
them their opinion of evangelical missionaries and of Muslims convert-
ing to Christianity. Their answer was straightforward: those Kyrgyz had 
never been real Muslims; Christians had simply done more mission work 
than Muslims in the 1990s; this was changing now that Muslims such as 
themselves were becoming more active in calling people closer to Islam. As 
suggested by this answer, the rise of Tablighi activity in Kyrgyzstan was in 
part a response to Christian evangelization, just like in the 1920s the move-
ment sprang from its founder’s desire to counteract Christian and Hindi 
proselytizing in northwest India (Masud 2000a, xxvi; 2000b, 7).
Because of the absence of formal membership it is not possible to pro-
vide precise numbers, but by 2007 an estimated ten thousand people were 
involved in Tablighi activities.7 Several dawatchis claimed that in 2005, 
often mentioned as the movement’s heyday in Kyrgyzstan to date, some 
two hundred jamaats (“fellowships” of six to ten men) left Bishkek each 
Friday to start their three-day dawat. A former dawatchi said: “There was 
like a jamaat in every minibus leaving the capital.” Though these are prob-
ably overestimates, dawatchis certainly became a familiar sight throughout 
the country. Explaining this relative success is not my primary aim here. 
However, a discussion of the movement’s advance in the region will lay the 
groundwork for exploration of my central theme: how commitment and 
conviction are temporarily produced.
The Tablighi advance in Central Asia has been uneven, making sig-
nificant inroads into Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan but failing to do so in 
Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan (see Balci 2012). This may 
be unsurprising given that the Tablighi Jamaat is banned as an extremist 
group in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan (and more recently 
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Kazakhstan). However, the pattern is replicated within Kyrgyzstan in the 
sense that Uzbeks (who make up a sizable 12% of the population) hardly 
take part in Tablighi activities.8 This is counterintuitive because Uzbeks 
are locally depicted as more religious than Kyrgyz in that they more strictly 
observe the pillars of Islam.9 Success among the “less religious” is also geo-
graphically visible in Kyrgyzstan where the Tablighis have attracted more 
participants in the locally depicted “secular” north than the “Islamic” south 
of the country. A Tablighi alim (scholar) reflected on these patterns when 
I interviewed him:
Dawat used to be active in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan in the 1990s, but [the 
Tablighis there] made a mistake. They became involved in politics, while 
our position needs to be absolutely apolitical. So then Allah took [dawat] 
away from these countries. There is another thing. Uzbeks have tradition-
ally paid more attention to religious education, to going to the mosque, et 
cetera. And once you have gone down one path it is very difficult to return 
and start anew. The Kyrgyz were different. They were like a blank slate.
The point about the reverse correlation between doctrinal knowledge and 
the appeal of Tablighi methods resonated in the following condescend-
ing view of an Uzbek man living in Kyrgyzstan: “Why would I listen 
to those dawatchis who only know the basics of Islam?!”10 In short, the 
Tablighi’s uneven progress in Central Asia and the locally offered inter-
pretations suggest that the relative success in Kyrgyzstan is due not only to 
a favorable political environment but also to the focus on learning through 
participation, which makes it particularly attractive to people who are in-
terested yet unschooled in Islamic doctrine.11
Another geographic pattern is that the Tablighi Jamaat has a larger 
following in urban than in rural areas. A likely reason is that dawat offers 
a form of male bonding that fills a real need in post-Soviet urban contexts, 
and several dawatchis told me that through dawat they reconnected with 
former school friends. The kind of “outdoor” traveling of dawat is also 
more likely to attract urban than rural young men. Almost all urban trav-
elers (those aged thirty-plus) commented that dawat reminded them of the 
Soviet pioneer and Komsomol camps, when they would leave the city to 
spend time in nature, with only the most basic facilities available.
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If the Soviet legacy provides clues for why the Tablighis find resonance 
among Kyrgyz urban men, this legacy also clarifies why they fail to pro-
duce the same response among urban women. In fact, there are hardly 
any all-women jamaats that travel (accompanied by a related male) beyond 
their own settlement. Occasionally special dawats are organized for mar-
ried couples (called masturat dawat), but these are few and far between. 
First, as an organization the Tablighi Jamaat is less accessible to women, 
and most involved women are so through their husbands. Second, Tablighi 
ideas of proper gender behavior do not translate easily to the post-Soviet 
Kyrgyz context. The (university-educated) spouse of a dawatchi expressed 
her view of the Tablighi Jamaat to me in a dismissive and condescend-
ing tone of voice: “Never will I join them. Their idea of a woman is to be 
submissive, to serve her husband, and to stay at home with the children.” 
Such ideas clash, not only with seventy years of Soviet discourse on female 
emancipation, but also with the fact that most Kyrgyz urban women have 
jobs outside the domestic sphere. To self-declared modern women, the 
increasingly public presence of conservative Islamic movements is worri-
some (Heyat 2004).12 The perspective of my male Tablighi acquaintances 
on this issue was captured best in a joke that circulated among them: “The 
largest obstacle to dawat in Kyrgyzstan is Kyrgyz women.”
It is not only among educated women that negative opinions about 
Tablighis can be found. The same was true for many men and women 
who describe themselves as “not religious.” One of my acquaintances in 
Kokjangak told me: “They dress like fanatics [fanatiki], and, really, it is 
impossible to have a normal conversation with them. They only talk about 
religion, religion, religion [Kyrgyz, deen, deen, deen].” The director of the 
Kyrgyz Committee of Religious Affairs added his own personal view to 
his ready-made stump speech about respecting religious freedom when 
I interviewed him in the summer of 2011:
You know, Kyrgyz people are horse riders. When a boy is born, the first 
thing he learns is to ride a horse. And horse riders need to wear trousers. 
This is deeply ingrained in our culture. We were the ones who introduced 
trousers to Europe! [disapprovingly] Now these Tablighis import dressing 
codes from Pakistan, walking around in long robes! This is completely alien 
to our people.
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The emphasis on garments illustrates that the Tablighi advance is threat-
ening to notions of Kyrgyz culture precisely by reconfiguring “cultural” el-
ements into “religious” ones, as was also discussed in chapter 3.13
Although some of the practices are indeed of foreign origin, the Tab-
lighis are not a foreign-driven presence. In fact, the decentered nature of 
the movement means that notwithstanding its foreign roots, it is a local 
movement and one that, by the late 2000s, had established many connec-
tions with secular and religious authorities in Kyrgyzstan. Of these connec-
tions, those with the muftiate were especially valuable, because they lent 
security and legitimacy to Tablighi activities. The muftiate of Kyrgyzstan 
has a Dawat and Propagation Department that deals with different forms 
of da′wa, including Tablighi activities. The department issues permissions 
to dawatchis to go on a forty-day tour (after submitting several documents, 
including a written agreement from their spouse), which need to be shown 
to the imams of receiving mosques and to the police when requested to 
do so. The involvement of the muftiate does not mean, however, that all 
its clergy are favorably disposed to the Tablighi Jamaat. One of the four 
deputy muftis expressed to me the following critical view, meanwhile at-
tempting to reappropriate the term dawat by stressing its original meaning 
of “invitation”:
These Tablighis should remember that the foremost dawatchi is the mufti 
himself; I and my colleagues, we are the second-foremost dawatchis. To 
carry out dawat does not require traveling around. What kind of dawat is 
it anyway when you leave your family hungry? We are not against the Ta-
blighis, but there is no need to be overly protective of them. And some of 
their ways, such as their clothing, are harmful to the faith because it scares 
people away.14
Once again we encounter ambivalent attitudes toward the Tablighis. 
Their non-Kyrgyz appearance is thoroughly disliked, while as Muslims 
they are treated with respect; they encounter distrust among secular (and 
religious) authorities,15 but also have multiple connections within the es-
tablishment. Such ambivalence also characterizes the relationship between 
the Tablighis and the law. A 2009 law against proselytism implied that the 
Tablighi practice of gasht—in which dawatchis go from door to door to 
invite people to the mosque—would henceforth be illegal. However, the 
dawatchis with whom I discussed the issue were untroubled by this law, 
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or as one of them put it: “This law is intended [to restrict proselytization 
by] Jehovah’s Witnesses. But it is different for us, because this is a Mus-
lim country.” Again, this does not mean that people generally welcome the 
Tablighis, but rather that their activities are condoned. When asked, the 
deputy director of the State Committee of Religious Affairs admitted that 
the law is not enforced in the case of the Tablighis, and justified this by say-
ing that the population largely rejects them anyway: “When they knock on 
someone’s door, the usual response is ‘Be gone!’ [Russian, poshel ty].”
The Tablighis are, to borrow a famous phrase from Turner, “neither 
here nor there, they are betwixt and between the positions arrayed by law, 
custom, convention, and ceremonial” (1969, 95). They are Muslim but of a 
different kind. They look foreign, but most Tablighis are Kyrgyz. Their 
message is both attractive and repulsive: the emphasis on learning through 
doing and the sense of fraternity have appeal to a significant group; their 
mode of conduct and theology are reprehensible to many others. This lim-
inal position generates an aura of exclusivity and sense of purpose, lend-
ing their mission importance and uniqueness. It also contributes to the 
intensity of spiritual experience, as Turner intimated when he wrote about 
the blend of “lowliness and sacredness, of homogeneity and comradeship” 
that often arises in conditions of liminality (1969, 96). These characteristics 
are applicable to the movement as a whole, but the temporal dimension, 
the “moment in and out of time” (Turner 1969), reveals itself particularly 
clearly in the practice of dawat.
The Route There
After the Friday prayers in August 2009, approximately twenty-five men 
gathered at the mosque in a Bishkek neighborhood.16 It was one of four 
mosques in Bishkek serving as sending points for dawat. Several men 
were wearing the white robe that makes Tablighis instantly recognizable, 
though the majority were dressed in everyday clothes. Most of the men 
sported beards, or had started growing them, an indicator of prolonged 
involvement. Over the next few hours, more men arrived, until at 4:00 
p.m. the jamaats (fellowships) needed to be formed. This was first done in-
formally, after which two coordinators ensured that all fellowships had 
a proper composition. They moved several men around so as to obtain a 
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good spread of age and experience in each jamaat, and to ensure that the 
travelers would be able to communicate effectively with each other, either 
in Kyrgyz or Russian.
After this process was completed each jamaat needed to select its amir, 
or leader. This can be a delicate issue because potential leaders need to pre-
sent their experience while retaining a modest deportment. After all, Tab-
lighi etiquette says that “one must not expect nor insist on the acceptance of 
his suggestion” (Masud 2000b, 28). The procedure began with a round of 
introductions in which each traveler mentioned previous dawat participa-
tion. The more experienced travelers used the opportunity to comment on 
the values of dawat and thereby allow others to assess their suitability for 
leadership. Subsequently each traveler was asked to point to the person they 
deemed most suitable for the position of amir. In our group a young Kyrgyz 
man received the largest number of votes, only slightly beating a more senior 
Kyrgyz man. This slightly awkward situation was solved by splitting our 
jamaat of twelve into a Kyrgyz- and a Russian-language jamaat, and adding 
a few others from a third group. The Russian-language jamaat, of which 
I became part, was a heterogeneous mix of three Kyrgyz, two Tatars, one 
Uyghur, and me. The Kyrgyz-language groups were more ethnically ho-
mogeneous, with only one (Kyrgyz-speaking) Russian joining their ranks.
After the members of our jamaat had agreed to contribute 100 KGS (two 
dollars) each, our amir made a phone call to the rukh jamaat (head office), 
situated elsewhere in Bishkek, which coordinates the travel destinations. 
The groups’ destinations are decided on the basis of the collected sum of 
money, the availability of a vehicle, and the even distribution of Tablighi 
visits to all villages and urban neighborhoods. Our fellowship had a car at 
its disposal, and we found ourselves being sent to a village located thirty 
kilometers west of Bishkek. When getting ready to depart everyone turned 
off their mobile phones—dawatchis are expected to sever all contact with 
friends and relatives for the duration of dawat. From here on, the dawatchis 
submit themselves to the leadership of the amir (see also Tozy 2000, 168).17
Despite my initial skepticism, it turned out that a three-door Toyota 
seats seven grown men. Packed together, with one of us repeating zikr (re-
membrance of God), others exchanging stories and anecdotes from previ-
ous dawats, and me listening to it all with my cheek pressed against the 
window, we reached our destination one hour later. The mosque was a 
transformed Soviet House of Culture (Dom Kul′tury), an inversion of the 
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early Soviet practice to turn mosques into barns, sheds, and houses of cul-
ture. Both then and now the buildings continue to exude the atmosphere 
of their previous incarnations. If mosques-turned-sheds preserved an aura 
that invited respect and care, this House of Culture-turned-mosque had 
not entirely cast off its Soviet past either. Its dilapidated condition indi-
cated villagers’ indifference. Not long after our arrival the local imam ap-
peared. He agreed to us staying in the mosque and promised to lead the 
two evening prayers.
The “route there” set in motion a process of detachment and separation 
from everyday life that allows for the formation of what Victor Turner 
calls communitas: a “generalized social bond . . . of equal individuals who 
submit together to the general authority of ritual elders” (1969, 96). These 
liminal aspects are core features of dawat. To quote Muhammad Khalid 
Masud, dawat is travel in the sense of both migration and withdrawal in 
which “one temporarily migrates from dunya (worldly pursuits) to din (re-
ligious concerns)” (2000a, xvi). The temporal and social conventions that 
govern everyday life are suspended during this period.
During the three days of dawat the men are not supposed to leave the 
mosque and its courtyard, except when authorized to do so by the amir. 
The rhythm and pace of life are altered, with only the prayer times re-
maining the same. There are time slots for going on gasht to invite people 
to the mosque, for studying, for receiving instructions about proper con-
duct, and for preparing food. Most of these activities are loosely structured, 
and leave much time for individual prayer, conversation, and resting. The 
men clearly valued being able to rest from their demanding ordinary lives. 
They took naps during the day and carried out their assigned tasks at a 
relaxed pace. Several compared being on dawat to being on holidays.
The plan for the day is decided at a meeting, or council (mashvara), each 
morning, during which the amir assigns tasks and roles to the dawatchis.18 
Assignments take into consideration level of experience and religious 
knowledge. For example, the baian, or sermon, after the midday prayers19 
is given by the more experienced dawatchis, while novices are asked to re-
peat the zikr (remembrance of God) for the benefit of the entire dawat. 
All travelers, except those who are very old, take turns being kyzmat 
(helper), charged with preparing food during one of the three days, tasks 
that in everyday life are considered female ones. Another traveler acts 
as the treasurer, taking responsibility for the necessary purchases related 
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to transportation and food. During study sessions the more experienced 
dawatchis teach novices the pronunciation of suras and explain the six basic 
tenets of the Tabligh.20
These leveling techniques produce a sense of inclusion, equality, and 
companionship. The dawatchis cooperate in the basic activities of food 
preparation, engage as teachers and students, and learn intimate details 
about each other while sleeping together in one room and washing them-
selves side by side. Maksat stressed these aspects while we were smoking 
cigarettes just outside the mosque territory: “For me this is like the lager 
[camp]. When you arrive at the mosque you never know what to expect, 
you need to make do with the few available things. We buy some basic 
food and that is it. And yet nowhere does food taste as good as on dawat.”21
To stick with Turner’s vocabulary, the described egalitarian and pre-
structural bonds facilitated the production of commitment and the em-
bodiment of knowledge. But what gave it coherence and direction was the 
liminal experience. The temporal and spatial dimensions of dawat fenced 
it off from ordinary life, while the tensions with the outside world contrib-
uted to a sense of exclusivity and purpose. Beyond that, dawat, in its literal 
meaning of invitation, is all about straddling this boundary between in-
side and outside, which is revealed with particular clarity in the practice of 
gasht. Gasht refers to making rounds through the village in a small group 
consisting of a leader (amir), a speaker (mutakalim), and a guide from the 
locality (zahbar), going from door to door to invite men to come to the 
mosque. This practice of walking is aimed outwardly at drawing other 
people to Islam, but it is also an exercise in being a good Muslim.
Although Rashid Sultanovich had never been on dawat before, during 
his first gasht he was made speaker (mutakalim). At first he stumbled over 
his words, but using suggestions from the others he had his message more 
or less ready when approaching the fifth house:
Good afternoon. I am Rashid Sultanovich, and with me are my brothers 
from Bishkek. As you know, it is very important to pray regularly and 
to follow the Prophet’s way. Therefore we have come to invite you to the 
mosque to listen to the baian [sermon)].
Such encounters are often unsuccessful in the conventional sense. Only in 
a few of the encounters that I observed was the invitation accepted and 
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followed up by the invitee actually showing up at the mosque. The far 
more common response was for the addressee to wait until the speaker 
has finished, and then either briskly express disinterest or politely decline 
the invitation. Such negative and evasive responses were not seen as prob-
lematic by the dawatchis; according to the Tablighi code, “the duty of the 
preacher ends with the communication of the message” (Masud 2000a, xxi).
Moreover, unsuccessful attempts had their own significance for the 
dawatchis, as the following example shows. After leaving the mosque with 
our four-person gasht, we were walking through the lush village street. 
Rashid and the guide were in front, with me and amir Seyit following in a 
second row. Seyit was marveling at the trees, and explained how each tree, 
each twig, and even each of the thousands of leaves had been individually 
shaped by God. He explained, “Everything around us has its purpose, its 
meaning, all willed by Allah.” He continued by telling me and the others: 
“When you are on gasht, you are making traces through the village, which 
are like the footsteps of angels. . . . What we are doing is spinning a web of 
trails that have positive energy and can be picked up by those who come after 
us.” In this spiritually charged environment the footsteps and trails woven 
by the dawatchis were seen as having the potential to transform the place. In 
a world that is saturated with the visible and invisible signs of the sacred and 
that is brimming with divine purpose, failure as such does not exist.
I have suggested that the intensification effect partly derives from “in-
ternal sharing,” for which the ingredients are offered by dawat. This in-
tensity also relies on a sense of exclusivity, produced through an “external 
facing,” as illustrated by the negative and ambivalent encounters during 
the gasht, or village walks. The walks also show the importance of making 
the experiences meaningful, and storytelling plays an essential role in this. 
Indeed, what pervades all dawat activities are stories: anecdotes from pre-
vious dawats, religious messages, and interpretations of what is happening: 
the stories energize the dawatchis, invigorate their experience, and animate 
the landscape.
Enchanting Stories
A Tablighi acquaintance who accompanied me on several interviews told 
me with a laugh: “As you see, it is not easy to interview dawatchis; they talk 
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too much.”22 Most of my questions remained indeed unanswered, but lis-
tening to their stories was all the more revealing. So after I had joined this 
acquaintance on several dawats, he told others: “His approach to research is 
a bit unconventional. He rarely asks questions, he just listens to what peo-
ple have to say.”
Stories are essential for meaningful living. In his book about Serbia in 
the early 1990s, Mattijs van de Port writes that he was struck by “every-
one’s complete reliance on a story, a story that can give meaning, direc-
tion and purpose to (certain aspects of) life” (1998, 29). He refers to this as 
“narrated/narrating reality” (verhaalde werkelijkheid) a term that suggests 
the inseparability between the world and experience (1994, 50–56; 1998, 
50–52). In other words, stories do more than reflect and refract the world; 
they also shape lived reality, and do so by engaging the listener as well as 
the speaker. Rane Willerslev suggests that stories can be “a ‘magical’ tool 
for ‘humanizing’ hunters” (2007, 165), and according to Susan Harding 
(1987) it is through talking and telling stories that evangelical Baptists con-
vert others. Stories are an important part of what constitutes experience, 
and they are tools for convincing others and self of what is true, important, 
or right.
In the case of the Tablighis stories were important venues by which 
dawat success was produced. Marc Gaboriau writes that Tablighi litera-
ture “is always anxious to proclaim that the preaching tours obtained won-
derful results” (2000, 136). Or as amir Nur Islam put it to our fellowship, 
during dawat one should talk only about religion (deen) and focus on the 
positive, rather than allow Satan-inspired (shaitan) negativity. Metcalf 
stresses the centrality of stories for the Tablighi movement, which “engage 
the listener, . . . not only intellectually but emotionally” (1993, 593) and aim 
to achieve “experiential, not intellectual understanding” (1996, 110).
This section tries to understand how, through stories, such emotional 
connections and experiential understandings are produced. According to 
Geertz (1973, 100) “There are at least three points where chaos—a tumult 
of events which lack not just interpretations but interpretability—threatens 
to break in upon man.” His three points, or limits, are those pertaining 
to the mind, the body, and the soul, or in his words: “at the limits of his 
analytic capacities, at the limits of his powers of endurance, and at the lim-
its of his moral insight.” These limits, which are obviously intertwined, 
also surfaced in stories told by Tablighis. The “limits of analytic capacity” 
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resonated in stories that conveyed awe about the Creation and the occur-
rence of miracles. The “limits of power and endurance,” referring specifi-
cally to the body, were revealed in stories about addiction and sex. The key 
question about “moral insight” in 2010 concerned the episode of violence 
between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks that left everyone shocked. The stories re-
fract and shape reality, but ultimately point beyond “narrated reality,” to 
that which cannot be said, to the “really real” (van de Port 1998).
Awe
“Do you know that [Captain Jacques] Cousteau23 accepted Islam? [On his 
sea journeys] he discovered that salt and sweet water do not mix. When 
he found out that this is exactly how it is written in the Koran, he imme-
diately accepted Islam.” Maksat mentioned this during our dawat, but he 
was not the first to tell me the story. Many practicing Muslims in Kyrgyz-
stan (and in Georgia) had told me about Captain Cousteau’s instantaneous 
conversion on receiving proof of the scientific validity of the Koran. One 
reason for the captain to be mentioned in conversations was surely because 
the story of this respectable and famous European (television) scientist 
might also inspire me to convert. Beyond this, the fascination with Cous-
teau reflected the desire to bolster religious authority with scientific means. 
(A poignant detail—although irrelevant to the argument—is that Cous-
teau never publicly confirmed his alleged conversion to Islam and was bur-
ied according to the Roman Catholic funerary rites). In similar fashion, 
newly practicing Muslims in Kyrgyzstan regularly cited the health ben-
efits of regular prayer—as comparable to physical exercise—and talked 
about participating in Ramadan as a detox of sorts. For Muslims who had 
lived with the truths of scientific atheism such rationalizations had legiti-
mizing power, meanwhile demonstrating an elective affinity between the 
teachings of Soviet ethics and Islam (cf. Luehrmann 2011).24 In this post-
atheist environment, the discoveries of a Western television scientist had 
tremendous appeal.
If in these examples it appeared to be science rather than religion 
that held supreme authority, then this was only so because the involved 
dawatchis had not yet fully understood (or internalized) the Tablighi mes-
sage that science is ultimately powerless, as suggested not only by Cous-
teau’s conversion but also the following example. On the second day of 
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dawat, Kanat was assigned the task to give the baian after the afternoon 
prayers. He decided to speak about the universe and its perplexing com-
plexity. He was understandably nervous, but told me (and himself) that he 
shouldn’t be because those who deliver a baian receive divine assistance. 
Kanat’s speech was a soft-spoken whirlwind of information, in which he 
took his audience from the tiniest particles—atoms and electrons—to the 
galaxy of planets and stars. The lecture was effective because of Kanat’s 
calm and trust-inspiring manner of speaking and his known position as a 
doctor of science, which accentuated his claim that not even scientists un-
derstand the workings of the universe, and that they are equally fascinated 
by the fact that the universe displays such an amazing harmony. “Think 
about it,” he stressed, “everything in this world and beyond is willed by 
Allah, all is part of His plan.”
The references to science resonated with post-Soviet sensibilities and 
were meant to demonstrate Islam’s superiority. Kanat’s insistence that 
scientists are equally baffled by the complexity of the micro- and macro-
cosmos and the alleged conversion of television-scientist Cousteau exem-
plify this. They conform to the following logic: the limitations of science 
produce awe for the Creation, thereby demonstrating God’s omnipotence. 
This omnipotence manifests itself all around us, visible to those who pay 
attention, as the following example illustrates.
One afternoon we were seated in the central mosque of Bishkek with 
six dawatchis, listening to the consultations of one of the alims. He reached 
for his smartphone and showed a picture of clouds that formed the name 
Allah in Arabic. “You see, God makes himself known to us all the time, 
we just need to pay attention.” We spent the next thirty minutes watching 
a series of videos that demonstrated divine power, including one featuring 
a girl whose tears turned into crystals, and one of a snake that slithered 
out of a grave after the funeral had ended. The gathered men clicked their 
tongues in amazement at these proofs of divine power. An additional ex-
ample was a video of the central mosque in Mecca at night, when, at a cer-
tain point, the entire mosque lit up. The alim explained that this was due, 
not to artificial light, but the energy released by prayer, and he marveled 
at the possibilities of technology: “Sometimes we are not able to see clearly 
with our eyes, but the camera will nevertheless record it.” The videos pro-
duced a momentary awe factor, powerfully evoking divine power. And 
yet they could easily backfire. One dawatchi told me afterward, “There are 
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many fakes among these videos, but it wouldn’t have been right for me to 
challenge the alim.”
Desire
The invocation of science and its limitations was attractive, but remained 
at some distance from everyday concerns, and lacked the kind of emo-
tive energy evident in stories about sex, such as the following one that was 
shared during one of the dawats I took part in: “In paradise I will have a 
racing car and drive 500,000 kilometers an hour, and I won’t even have to 
fear an accident.” Amir Seyit was narrating not his own but his friend’s 
imaginations of paradise, which included one particularly poignant one: 
“[In paradise] the most beautiful virgins will desire to be with me. So you 
know what I will do? I will have them play football with each other and 
I will make love to the ones who score a goal.” These fantasies, even in this 
secondhand rendering, were able to captivate the audience of dawatchis. 
According to Seyit, whenever his friend would tell those stories, even the 
aksakals [Kyrgyz, old men] would all listen attentively.
To be sure, not all fantasies were as promiscuous as this one. During 
another dawat, amir Nur Islam explained to us that in paradise “the heart 
of your wife will exclaim your name with every beat.” This combination 
of pure devotion and loyalty was particularly attractive because, the amir 
continued, one’s wife “will be a thousand times more beautiful in paradise 
than she is in the world.”
It is impossible to determine with certainty the extent to which such 
stories were accepted as true by the dawatchi. Some appeared to take them 
for the truth, others may have hoped that they were true, or were simply 
intrigued by the thought of it all. But it was also clear that being on dawat 
intensified their experienced reality. The dawatchis were in male-only 
company where they had to improvise and fend for themselves, that is, 
where they were able to be men and feel like men. It is in that context that 
the stories and fantasies were narrated and listened to with a greater level 
of intensity than they would have been outside the dawat context.
An important question is why these stories were so attractive to these 
men, beyond the possibility that men in general are enticed by prospects 
of limitless sex and enhanced virility. What was significant was that my 
acquaintances’ experiences compared rather poorly with the presented 
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visions of sex and masculinity. In fact, many of the dawatchis in the jamaat 
had difficulties in their relationships with women. Rashid Sultanovich had 
been kicked out by his wife two years earlier (before he became involved 
in dawat), after which he had lived in a shell of a house at the outskirts of 
Bishkek without water or heating. My smoking buddy Maksat told me 
about the throbbing headaches his wife caused in him, and he repeatedly 
lamented her nagging and constant criticism of his inability to financially 
provide for his family. Amir Seyit, at thirty-two, had never been married 
and was still living with his mother. He admitted that it was time for him 
to find a wife, but since he was jobless this was not all that easy. And Kanat 
commented that dawat had complicated his marriage, and he talked about 
his dream to marry a “real Muslim girl,” instead of having an independent 
wife with her own career.
It is against this background that the significance of stories about women 
and sex becomes evident. The stories expressed the hope that through 
dawat the men would solve some of their relational and marital problems. 
Success stories were actively shared, such as the following one: “My wife 
would always scold me . . . but once I started to go on dawat regularly, she 
became much softer. One time when I returned from dawat, I entered the 
house and she asked me: ‘Are you hungry my dear? Just sit down, I will 
prepare food for you.’ ” Often, when we were having such conversations 
one of the experienced dawatchis would say that this was all very well, but 
that ultimately our experiences in this world are insignificant in compari-
son to the next. As amir Seyit put it: “Everyone creates his own heaven, but 
the real heaven will be much better, it is beyond any imagination. When 
you approach heaven and you see its entrance, you will look at it in awe for 
forty thousand years.”
Justice
In late June 2010, a week after the three-day conflict between Kyrgyz and 
Uzbeks had left its deadly and destructive traces in southern Kyrgyz-
stan, people were trying to grasp what had happened. Dawatchis in Bish-
kek were no different. Like others, they wanted to understand why these 
events were happening. Seated in the mosque, alim Muhammad was asked 
by one of the men gathered there: “How is it possible that this is happening 
in Kyrgyzstan, given that dawat is more active here [than in neighboring 
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countries]?” The question was troubling because it seemed to contradict 
the shared notion that when you give to Allah, you will receive back man-
ifold. Alim Muhammad had his answer ready: “Think of how we relate to 
children. Imagine that you are watching children at a playground. If some-
one else’s child misbehaves, you won’t be concerned; you will think: that’s 
their problem, not mine. But surely you won’t be that complacent when 
one of your own children is misbehaving. You will reprimand and pun-
ish them.” He paused, looked around as if to make sure that everyone had 
understood the message, and then added: “There is more to it. You know, 
the places where dawat is strong, those are also the places where Satan tries 
to fight back.”
Judging from the responses, this explanation managed to convince. 
And yet the logic could be bent in multiple directions. A few days before 
listening to alim Muhammad, I overheard another experienced dawatchi 
(addressed with the title kudama) who offered a radically different inter-
pretation. He was talking about Uzgen, a town that was infamous for the 
eruption of ethnic violence in 1990, but where, contrary to expectations, 
everything remained calm in 2010 when violence ravaged nearby cities.25 
This miraculous absence of violence, he explained, was because dawat had 
been more active in Uzgen than in other towns in the south. It was proof 
that Allah protects those who go on dawat.
While the alim interpreted the violence as reflecting a father punish-
ing his beloved children or because of Satan’s countermoves, this other 
explanation suggested that Allah’s children were spared because they had 
been more active in dawat. Because of the flexibility of Tablighi (or other 
religious) logic, it is a useful vehicle for making crises understandable and 
digestible. Any event could be interpreted as either gift or punishment by 
Allah, or alternatively as the work of Satan.26 Simultaneously, this flex-
ibility also constituted the weakness of the logic, and it was dependent on 
not asking too many questions. As Seyit put it: “It is wrong to question 
everything—what counts is how you act, how many zikrs (remembrances 
of God) you say, and how regularly you pray—that’s much more impor-
tant than knowing the answers. Reading suras is good, but if you start add-
ing up and comparing all the interpretations, your head starts spinning.” 
For Seyit the response to “heads that are spinning” would be acceptance, 
which is accomplished during dawat and contributes to the intensity of 
experience. But it is not necessarily of a permanent nature.
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The Route Back
After three nights and days the dawat fellowships return to their sending 
mosque. This final part of dawat is meant to provide further spiritual food 
that will sustain the travelers until their next three-day dawat, in principle 
one month later. It is also the moment when inquiries are made about in-
tentions to go on a forty-day dawat. On two occasions at which I was present 
this final “briefing” had an energizing, or at least a consolidating, effect: the 
travelers narrated how dawat had strengthened their relationship with God 
and how it had provided them with new knowledge. Several of the travel-
ers expressed an intention to go on a forty-day dawat, and travelers who had 
befriended each other agreed on the date for their next three-day dawat.
The August dawat that has formed the basis of my earlier descrip-
tions, however, had an ending that I had not anticipated. We arrived at 
the mosque exactly at 4:00 p.m. and sat down on the carpets outside in 
the open air. The coordinators who debriefed our fellowships asked each 
of us to reflect on our experiences. The first one to respond was Kanat. 
He stayed in line with etiquette when commenting that this dawat had 
strengthened his commitment. He mentioned that during the previous 
three days he had witnessed the power of dawat. To sustain this claim he 
mentioned that after we had made a request (dua) for food, the villagers 
had come out to give us food, and that our prayers for making the gasht 
successful had resulted in several villagers coming to listen to the sermon 
(baian). In response, Kanat received the straightforward advice to improve 
his regularity in prayer and dawat. The next traveler up (named Bolot) 
echoed this advice by saying that he was still struggling to achieve regu-
larity, and nodded when the coordinator stressed that in comparison to 
eternity we are asked to sacrifice only a very small amount of time. Several 
others followed, but then the positive flow was interrupted by Edil, who 
reported, “I understand everything, but my heart remains closed. It is as if 
it is blocked. Something just doesn’t allow it to change.” Perhaps his hon-
esty was unexpected, because the coordinator struggled to give satisfac-
tory advice. The last person to speak said that he was confused more than 
anything else. While on dawat he had felt “something,” but now all that 
remained was ambivalence. Possibly his nonchalant voice provoked the 
coordinator to emphasize sternly: “It is not that we go on dawat for three 
days and then have the rest of the month off!”
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When leaving the mosque Bolot asked if Kanat would lend him money. 
Knowing Kanat as a generous and economically well-off person, I was sur-
prised that he refused to lend his fellow dawatchi the small sum requested. 
Instead he offered to buy groceries, which Bolot politely declined. After-
ward, Kanat explained that Bolot was an alcoholic, and several times had 
come to dawat while still drunk: “When he is on dawat it is fine, but in be-
tween he loses it.” Kanat had asked the elders at the mosque, who advised 
against lending money, but to try and support him otherwise.
In 2010 I met up again with five of the dawatchis I had traveled with 
the previous year. Edil, who at the time had been struggling with com-
mitment, managed to sideline his doubts. He divorced his wife and mar-
ried a practicing Muslim from a religious family. Amir Nur Islam similarly 
continued to be actively involved. But for Ruslan, Rashid Sultanowich, 
and Kanat it was different. Ruslan had stopped going on dawat, but em-
phasized that dawat had helped him overcome the chronic backaches that 
doctors had been unable to cure. Rashid Sultanowich was still involved, 
but no longer maintained the regularity of the previous year. Kanat had 
been unable to go on dawat for the last four months. He explained that the 
worldview of the Tablighis had become too restrictive for him:
As long as you are inside it, it all makes perfect sense, but from the outside 
it looks differently. There are those who give up their jobs, who lose their 
families. And to be honest, this started to happen to me too. My job suffered 
as I spent all my time and energy on dawat. And then one day I came home 
and found my wife crying. It was her birthday, she had bought tickets for 
the movies, and I had been too busy with dawat. That is when I decided to 
shift my focus. I think that there is a time when you need to be actively in-
volved, and then there is a time when you need to find a balance again.
The logic of the Tablighi method is precisely to ensure that a balance is 
found between dawat and everyday life. But for many dawatchis this was 
difficult to achieve. The dawat experience was so intense because the men 
felt a release from their everyday commitments, and yet this was also why 
it tended to remain a “bracketed reality.” Finding a balance depended on 
the strength of the Tablighi network as it continued to exist in between the 
periods of traveling. Such a network was certainly developing, and Kanat 
often made a point of helping out his acquaintances from dawat, for exam-
ple, by making sure that he bought from their stores. But for the moment, 
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the gap between life among Tablighi brothers and life at home continued 
to loom large for many of the travelers.
The Pulsation of Dawat
The Tablighi Jamaat, like some Christian missions, is acutely aware of the 
need to provide regular boosts of energy lest people’s conviction and devo-
tion dissipate. In the movement’s literature this is known as the “dry-dock 
parable” in which man is compared to a ship that is constantly being rocked 
by rough waves that damage the ship and steer it off course. In order to 
deal with these distracting and troubling worldly forces, Muslims need to 
have regular access to a space of refuge (or dry dock) in the form of the 
mosque or a jamaat (fellowship), where they can be spiritually nourished 
and replenished.27
This pulsating quality of conviction resonated in many stories told by 
dawatchis: Nur Islam compared dawat to food, of which the body always 
desires more. “When you go back to the world, you are faced with constant 
demands. It is always about money. You find yourself sitting at the table 
not wanting to listen anymore.” It was for this reason, he said, that he 
avoided speaking about nonreligious topics during dawat. The stories also 
revealed that the distinction between everyday life and life during dawat 
consisted of several dimensions. On the one hand, dawat was, as in the 
parable, a space of refuge from the turmoil of everyday life. Maksat, for 
example, told me: “You know, this feels like a holiday. Just being here, 
no problems, no stress.” Dawat provided relaxation by offering a place of 
withdrawal from everyday difficulties, and a space to fantasize about dif-
ferent realities. But this experience of relaxation was complemented by an 
experience of intensification that was rooted in the joint activities of the 
men and their exposure to the reactions of the villagers (and officials) they 
encountered en route. This tension between relaxation and intensification 
generated affective energies from within.28 Indeed, it was in relation to 
both these aspects that the constant circulation of stories created an atmo-
sphere in which one was able to come closer to Allah, and in which signs 
of God’s presence became more credible. However, we have seen that the 
elation can dissipate quickly. As a former dawatchi told me: “When you 
are on dawat, everything makes perfect sense. But afterward it appears too 
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simplistic.” The logic that is so powerful when part of a fellowship looks 
different when the social surrounding is made up of people who are not 
connected to the Tablighis.
The immediate and the longer-lasting effects of the dawat experience 
depended on the temporal and social contexts in which they unfolded, as 
illustrated by the comments of Kyrgyz and Pakistani dawatchis about each 
other during a joint dawat. The differences between them were a frequent 
topic of conversation, with the Kyrgyz saying that the most significant dif-
ference was that the Pakistani had been born and raised in Islam. They 
admired the Pakistani for their certainty, and stability in matters of faith. 
And they complained about their own difficulties of having grown up dur-
ing atheist times and living in a largely secular society. By contrast, the 
Pakistani expressed amazement about the intensity with which Kyrgyz 
were able to live their faith, and they repeatedly commented on their fer-
vor and energy.
What we seem to have here, then, are two different modalities of reli-
gious experience. For the Pakistani, Islam was part of their habitus, of the 
world with which they had been familiar since their youth. To them, dawat 
was important to sustain their commitment, and to ensure that their belief 
(yiman) would not turn into indifference. For the Kyrgyz, dawat was about 
something different: it was about overcoming doubt, and hence the cycles 
of believing and disbelieving were much more intense. Interestingly, this 
pattern could be observed, not only among individual dawatchi, but with 
reference to the Tablighi movement in Kyrgyzstan more generally. As 
one Kyrgyz scholar who associates himself with the Tablighi Jamaat told 
me: “In the 2000s, the number of three-day jamaats traveling in the north-
ern regions on weekends was nearing a thousand. This was the period of 
highest popularity reaching levels of fashion. Since then the numbers have 
dropped significantly, but [now] there is more regularity, experience, and 
formalization/legalization of the practice.” The trade-off between inten-
sity and regularity, between charisma and routine, are there for everyone 
to see. The particularities of this trade-off, in a post-Soviet context where 
Islam returned to the public sphere, help us understand both the power 
and the fragility of conviction.
5
Pentecostal Miracle Truth  
on the Frontier
The miracle occurred on a cold Sunday morning in March 2004, in a 
poorly lit basement, actually a restaurant, which doubled as church hall 
for a chapter of the Church of Jesus Christ.1 The service had started with 
the usual worship songs, but soon everyone’s attention rested on one of the 
congregants. Venera, a Kyrgyz woman in her twenties, had not spoken a 
single word in her life, and was about to be cured of her speech impediment. 
The prayers of the approximately seventy congregants waxed and waned, 
their sound joined outcries for divine intervention, producing a rhythm 
that made the air heavy with anticipation and full of energy. This was the 
kind of atmosphere in which one would expect the Holy Spirit to descend. 
Pastor Kadyrjan stood right in front of Venera and pressed his hand on her 
forehead. The tension in the air was palpable, and anticipation peaked. The 
phrase “Help her, Jesus” came from everywhere. Still nothing happened. 
Venera stood trembling in the middle. Then, when some started to give up 
hope, the Holy Spirit descended on Venera, and she started to speak. She 
spoke hesitantly and barely audibly to most congregants, but those who 
stood closest reported that the first word she uttered in her life was “Jesus” 
(Russian, Iisus).
The miracle left me wondering about how to position myself in relation to 
the truth of miracles. If I accepted the miracle’s divine nature, would that 
not indicate I had lost the critical distance deemed indispensable for anal-
ysis? But if I denied the possibility of divine intervention, would that not 
amount to positivistic reductionism and reveal atheist bias? If the former 
were the case, I might marvel at God’s inscrutable ways and suggest that 
the miracle demonstrated the power of prayer. That view is what Bakyt, 
one of the congregants, expressed to me after the service had ended and 
we were having lunch in a nearby chaikhana (tea house). If, by contrast, 
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I adopted a secular perspective, then I might analyze how the buildup of 
momentum produced merely the illusion of a miracle. To prove this point 
I could have stressed that those who had suggested that Venera called out 
“Jesus” later mentioned that they were not sure and that perhaps it had 
only been a grunt. In fact, this is what Bakyt—the same Bakyt—told me a 
couple of weeks after the events, when it turned out that Venera had not 
made further progress in learning to speak.
Despite their centrality in Pentecostal churches, miracles have rarely 
featured as an analytical theme in studies of Pentecostalism. This is partly 
due to the awkwardness of the truth question; so even when the scholarly 
gaze has rested on miracles, it has tended to evade the issue of truth. Thus, 
one prominent writer has argued that “analytically there is no observable 
difference between true and false miracles” (de Vries 2001, 27). Bruce Kap-
ferer, moreover, suggests there is no need to engage with the truth ques-
tion because the significance of magic and miracles is in their effect and 
affect (2003, 23–24; see also Ewing 1994). Such approaches rightfully reject 
positivistic reductionism, but in this rejection they risk excluding more 
productive engagements with the truth question. That is, by not examin-
ing how truth is produced, they leave important analytical opportunities 
untouched. As Charles Hirschkind argues, attention needs to be paid to 
how people distinguish between true and false miracles (2011, 94). Indeed, 
effect and affect cannot be understood without addressing the truth ques-
tion, especially when the reality of miracles—their truth—is not taken for 
granted by the involved, as was often the case in Kyrgyzstan. Bakyt’s shift-
ing perception regarding the miracle’s truthfulness profoundly influenced 
how he spoke about the event and potentially affected his relationship with 
the church. This underlines the importance of analyzing the trajectories of 
miracle truth.
I maintain that a focus on miracles is intellectually productive precisely 
because the mysterious and unstable qualities of miracles (and their truth) 
resonate with the unstable nature of conviction. This resonance can be il-
lustrated with reference to the term “charisma.” Charisma is a quality of 
the present, revealed in the here and now, which cannot easily be durably 
transposed across time or space. Charisma as divine gift is what makes 
Pentecostalism both effervescent and transient. But understood in a secu-
lar Weberian sense, charisma is also the key source of authority “at times 
of distress,” when legal structures have collapsed and tradition has been 
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uprooted, as was the case in post-Soviet Kyrgyzstan.2 That is, the sociopo-
litical context in which the miracle occurred was itself unstable.
Pastor Kadyrjan often made comments about the economic and social 
environment, seeing his church as being involved in a larger battle be-
tween the forces of good and evil. He and his wife had moved from Bish-
kek to Jalalabad in 1999 to “plant” a church branch. It had taken several 
years of hardship to build a sizable and reasonably stable congregation. 
The problem at the time was, according to Kadyrjan, that Jalalabad city 
had been covered in the “spirit of death” (dukh smerta). He and his strug-
gling congregation had been thrown out of the venues they had rented 
several times. But they fought back. Thanks to the collective prayers of 
his church the city had been (partially) transformed: the “spirit of death” 
dissolved, resulting in inhabitants becoming more energetic and inno-
vative; there was a decrease in crime, proper shops (rather than market 
stalls) appeared, and hygiene in the streets improved. Moreover, in early 
2004 Kadyrjan was able to purchase a large, if dilapidated, warehouse 
that was being transformed into a church hall. This was a real victory 
because it meant the congregation finally had a stable location they could 
call their own.
In these same four years Kadyrjan had overseen the “planting” of five 
new congregations in the province. Some of these new congregations were 
growing steadily, but not the congregation in Kokjangak, which therefore 
frequently occupied his mind. In fact there had been several attempts to 
establish a congregation in Kokjangak, but each attempt, he explained, 
had been sabotaged. His most recent endeavors seemed initially success-
ful when approximately sixty people attended services for several months, 
but by early 2004 the majority of these attendants stopped coming. Instead 
of being disillusioned, Kadyrjan was convinced that these difficulties con-
tained an important sign: “It means that [Kokjangak] is under the spell of 
Satan, and, if that is so, it must mean that Kokjangak is somehow a strate-
gic place.” In Kadyrjan’s view, the establishment of a vibrant congregation 
in Kokjangak would deliver a serious blow to Satan’s powers, and thereby 
ease the advance of Christianity in other locations as well. For the time 
being Kadyrjan instructed Gulbarchyn, whom he had sent to the town as 
a missionary and local church leader, to intensify the collective praying on 
top of a hill overlooking Kokjangak in an effort to change the atmosphere 
in the town.
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We may not want to follow Kadyrjan in attributing success and fail-
ure to a larger cosmic battle, while still appreciating that the concept of 
struggle shaped and defined this Pentecostal church, and that the effects 
of this struggle could be counterintuitive. As Pastor Kadyrjan once told 
me: “We pray for [local government] officials to stop hindering us. But 
this may not be God’s way. Our faith thrives when it is being repressed.” 
For Kadyrjan, it was essential to remain on the offensive and to confront 
the “dark forces” that surrounded his church. As I will go on to argue, it is 
this “frontier mentality”3 that is at the core of the production of conviction. 
And yet, as we will see, the forward-moving drive eventually reaches its 
limits, with the forces that produced conviction ultimately responsible for 
its demise. It is at this intersection that the convergence between conviction 
and “miracle truth” is clearest. Both are produced on the edge, under the 
strain of forces that can propel as well as crush them. The truth of miracles 
becomes simultaneously more pertinent and less stable as we move into 
the frontier, not least because the “power of prayer” is more difficult to 
sustain in contexts where success stories are few and congregations are 
fragile. The unstable Pentecostal mission carried out on the “postatheist” 
Muslim-Christian frontier offers a stark illustration of the effervescent as 
well as fragile qualities of Pentecostal conviction.
The Post-Soviet Pentecostal Frontier
With approximately forty thousand church members in 2004, the suc-
cess of Evangelical-Pentecostal Christianity in post-Soviet Kyrgyzstan has 
been remarkable. This is not to say that Pentecostal Christianity was com-
pletely new to the region. In Soviet Kyrgyzstan several underground Pen-
tecostal churches had been active, including one in Kokjangak, but my 
Kyrgyz Pentecostal acquaintances referred to these somewhat dismissively 
as “traditional” and “legalistic,” which anyway only catered to a narrow 
circle of Russians. It was only after the collapse of the USSR that Pente-
costal churches started to attract larger numbers, including people of Mus-
lim background. By 2004 approximately twenty-five thousand Kyrgyz 
had converted to Evangelical-Pentecostal Christianity (ethnic Kyrgyz 
made up approximately 60 percent of these churches, alongside Russians, 
Koreans, Tatars, and others). Boasting ten thousand tithe-paying members 
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and forty-five congregations throughout Kyrgyzstan, the Church of Jesus 
Christ was the largest Evangelical-Pentecostal Church in the country.
This section discusses the advance of the Church of Jesus Christ and 
asks how Pentecostalism, with its characteristics of rupture, charisma, and 
intensity, resonated with the post-Soviet Muslim geography in which it 
advanced. Given that conversion from Islam to Christianity is exceptional 
and rare, it is relevant to ask how and why conversion became an option 
for some Kyrgyz, that is, how the conditions that made conversion possi-
ble had emerged historically. This is particularly significant because in the 
pre-Soviet period the idea of conversion to Christianity was inconceivable 
to the Kyrgyz. Missionary activities, such as those of German Mennonites 
in Talas Province in the first decade of the twentieth century, had instead 
reinforced the notion that Christianity was a religion of alien Europeans 
and that Kyrgyz were Muslim by definition (Pelkmans 2009a, 3–4). How-
ever, seventy years of antireligious campaigning and Soviet modernization 
profoundly altered the playing field.
From the late 1920s onward, Soviet antireligious policies destroyed 
Islamic institutions, curtailed the circulation of religious knowledge, and 
“domesticated” Islamic practices (see Khalid 2006 for a good discussion). 
This did not mean that Islam was completely eradicated. Ironically, in 
fact, Soviet rule affirmed the connection of ethnic and religious identities. 
The implicit contradiction in the Soviet attempt to repress religion while 
promoting culture, when in fact the two cannot be easily disentangled, re-
sulted in the incorporation of many “religious” practices into a standard-
ized “cultural” or Kyrgyz repertoire. This also meant that adherence to an 
ethno-national group automatically conjured up a specific religious tradi-
tion. Even when not professed, religion continued to be a key marker of 
difference. Thus, Kyrgyz members of the Communist Party, even those 
who held an atheist worldview, would still claim to be Muslims, as this 
indicated their cultural background. Indeed, as we saw in chapter 3, the 
notion of “atheist Muslim” was not perceived as an oxymoron. The re-
sulting “cultural Islam” was largely devoid of Islamic knowledge and re-
ligious effervescence, and therefore vulnerable to subsequent post-Soviet 
challenges.
Such “national” forms of religion flourished in the initial phases of the 
post-Soviet period. But the “nationalization” of religion also produced dis-
content from within, and excluded those who fell outside the bounds of the 
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(imagined) nation. In addition, “nationalized” religions became increas-
ingly vulnerable when, as in the case of Kyrgyzstan, the newly indepen-
dent states failed to deliver on promises of affluence, stability, and security. 
These tensions between national and religious categories produced vari-
ous outcomes. Discontent with “official” Islamic structures reinforced 
the attractiveness of decentralized Islamic networks such as those of the 
Tablighi Jamaat that voiced frustration with the outcome of postsocialist 
“transition” and offered their own versions of “true Islam.” However, as 
we saw in the previous chapter, the views of such new Muslim movements 
were not always compatible with the ideas of post-Soviet citizens, espe-
cially those of urban women. The tensions thus produced rendered these 
women’s original Muslim identity increasingly problematic, creating a 
space in which many women—especially those in marginal positions—felt 
drawn to Evangelical and Pentecostal communities.
In short, Soviet secularism had relegated religious expression to the do-
mestic sphere while contributing to the objectification of religion, which 
enabled Kyrgyz actors to consider their position vis-à-vis Islam. This 
condition of possibility coincided with the Kyrgyz government adopt-
ing the most liberal religious policies of all post-Soviet Central Asian 
countries, which in practice meant that missions and churches faced few 
state-imposed obstacles (in the period between 1991 and 2008). The de-
stabilization of Islam and the liberal policies of the Kyrgyz government 
created an environment in which Evangelical-Pentecostal churches could 
be active and relatively successful. Although this background sketch sug-
gests why conversion was conceivable, we now need to look at the appeal 
of Pentecostalism in the post-Soviet context.
The attractiveness of Evangelical-Pentecostal churches was partly con-
stituted through the general appeal that the West had in the wake of the 
Soviet collapse. They represented “the modern,” understood here as the 
promise “to reorder society by applying strategies that have produced 
wealth, power, or knowledge elsewhere in the world” (Donham 1999, 
xviii). But while the association with the “modern West” proved advanta-
geous to the position of Pentecostalism, it is important to note that the most 
successful churches in Kyrgyzstan were not foreign missionary churches 
but rather those run by Kyrgyzstani citizens of various ethnic back-
grounds (see Wanner 2007 for a similar observation regarding Ukraine). 
The Church of Jesus Christ is a case in point. It boasted its connections to 
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international Christian networks such as Calvary International, the Rus-
sian Union of Christians of Evangelical Faith, and Derek Prince Inter-
national. But the church was not founded or run by foreign missionaries. 
Ever since its foundation in the early 1990s it had been led by local pas-
tors, with the senior pastor being an ethnic Russian (born in Kyrgyzstan), 
and Pastor Kadyrjan in Jalalabad (like most pastors outside the capital) an 
ethnic Kyrgyz. The combination of transnational involvement and local 
organization allowed the church to present a transnational image and to 
muster international support when necessary, while its home-grown lead-
ership ensured that it was plugged into the realities of Kyrgyzstani society.
The Church of Jesus Christ grew rapidly. In the mid-1990s it “planted” 
church branches in the major cities and some district centers in the north; 
around the turn of the millennium the church expanded its activities in the 
south of the country. This implied a move from a region with a strong Rus-
sian presence and that was locally seen as secularized to a region that was 
seen as more Islamic. As mentioned above, Pastor Kadyrjan established 
his congregation in Jalalabad 1999, and over the next four years oversaw 
the planting of five additional branches in the Jalalabad region. These geo-
graphical shifts were paralleled by changes in the ethnic makeup of the 
congregations. While in Bishkek a (slight) majority of church members 
was Russian, in Jalalabad 75 percent of the approximately two hundred 
tithe-paying members were Kyrgyz.
Important aspects of the church’s attractiveness and success were its or-
ganization and message. The church offered not only salvation, but access 
to prosperity, health, and success by faithful prayer. Moreover, it did so by 
integrating its members into a tightly organized community of “believ-
ers.” Apart from the weekly service, all members were expected to take 
part in “home-church” meetings (domashnaia tserkov′) that would gather 
at least once a week. During home-church meetings, the congregants col-
lectively pray, study the Bible, discuss their efforts in combating addictions 
and poverty, and testify about the ways in which God changes their lives, 
thus reinforcing the church’s theology in an intimate setting.
It is easy to see the attractions of this Pentecostal message and organiza-
tion to people living in a state of “post-Soviet chaos” (Nazpary 2002), who 
are struggling with the effects of an unraveling welfare state in which life 
became more difficult and less predictable, especially for those who found 
themselves at the margins of society. These factors were reflected in the 
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overrepresentation of marginalized groups in the church’s demography. 
The Jalalabad congregation consisted of 75 percent women, slightly more 
than half of whom had lost a husband through divorce or death. Moreover, 
the vast majority of church members (71%) were migrants to the city, the 
majority of which had migrated there after the Soviet collapse (based on 
a survey among 121 congregants; see Pelkmans 2009b, 152–53 for details). 
Although I cannot provide percentages, it was quite common for congre-
gants to have suffered from addictions before they came to the church.
The church acknowledged such patterns, and in the capital proactively 
engaged with it, for example, through its elaborate outreach programs to 
prisoners and the homeless. When asked, church representatives explained 
overrepresentation of marginalized people with reference to Jesus’s teach-
ing that “the last will be first and the first will be last” (Matt. 20:16). Pente-
costalism offers hope and direction to shattered lives, and concrete answers 
for dealing with the multifaceted existential uncertainty of post-Soviet 
life. Moreover, the idea that divine intervention can be invoked by prayer 
pushes people to assert their agency in dealing with an unruly world, that 
is, to tame the unpredictable forces of the post-Soviet chaos (see also Wan-
ner 2007).
As is typical for Pentecostal conversion, church members reported an 
experience of radical discontinuity (cf. Robbins 2007). They presented their 
conversion as having plunged into their new belief, pushing aside hesita-
tions and apparently overcoming their initial confusion.4 But these radical 
conversions were not necessarily of a permanent nature. Possibly because 
the speed of conversion meant that their worries and confusions were 
never fully resolved, possibly also because life in the late Soviet period had 
taught people to be reticent about official proclamations of truth, it meant 
that these new truths did not always become permanently internalized and 
that their suppressed doubts could easily resurface. The destabilization of 
fields of meaning and practice created an environment in which every-
thing was potentially true and possibly a lie, which also meant that new re-
ligions were not always very firmly, or very permanently, embraced. Two 
kinds of uncertainty converge here: epistemological uncertainty (referring 
to knowledge) and existential uncertainty (referring to conditions of life). 
The centrality of miracles reflects this uncertainty, both in the sense that 
miracles work to overcome such existential uncertainty and in the sense 
that their epistemological status remained unstable.
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Producing Pentecostal Truth
Zamira had moved to Jalalabad city a couple of years before we met in the 
autumn of 2003. Her marriage had ended, which meant that she had had 
to leave her in-laws’ village home and move with her two daughters to the 
city. She was lucky to find a new job as a teacher, but surviving on an inad-
equate salary in a city where she had no direct relatives was an uphill bat-
tle. The battle became an imminent crisis when her five-year-old daughter 
fell seriously ill.
I didn’t have any options left. I had taken my daughter everywhere—to 
the mullah [here: Islamic healer], the hospital—but all they did was take 
my money. That’s when I accepted [my colleague’s] offer to take me to her 
church. For a whole night I didn’t sleep; I stayed up and prayed. I gave 
myself over to God, asked Jesus for forgiveness. And by the next day my 
daughter started to feel better!
Zamira joined the church’s home group meetings straightaway, mean-
while keeping her conversion hidden from her relatives. When they found 
out several months later, they were shocked. Her brothers, one of whom 
had been involved in an Islamic piety movement, accused her not only of 
apostasy but also of betraying her Kyrgyz-ness (kyrgyzchylyk). Her parents 
also responded negatively, but they increasingly “took it for what it was. 
They knew how I had suffered from the sickness of my daughter,” Zamira 
said. She stressed that since then she had continuously witnessed to others 
“about the healing of my daughter through Jesus Christ, and that He has 
completely transformed my life. I have witnessed to my acquaintances, my 
relatives, my colleagues.”
This story is one of many that I collected among members of the Church 
of Jesus Christ, in Bishkek, Jalalabad, and Kokjangak. Zamira’s account 
has many parallels with Pentecostal conversion stories from other parts 
of the world. The swiftness of conversion, the discourse of discontinuity 
(Meyer 1998; Robbins 2007), and the importance of witnessing (Coleman 
2003) are elements that feature prominently in Pentecostal discourse and 
practice worldwide. As one would expect to be the case in any Muslim 
context, Zamira’s conversion to Christianity was controversial and drew 
hostile responses from relatives, but Zamira’s actions also illustrate how 
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seventy years of Soviet antireligious modernization had eroded the posi-
tion of Islam to the extent that conversion was a distinct possibility.
The central feature in the story, however, was healing through divine 
intervention. Numerous converts told me that they first became interested 
in the Church of Jesus Christ after hearing of the healing powers ascribed 
to Pastor Kadyrjan. As in the case of Zamira, who came into contact with 
the church during her search for medical aid, many approached the church 
with the hope of being cured of illness or addiction. And like Zamira, 
they often had previously visited the hospital or local spiritual healers or 
both, without obtaining the desired effect. As one male congregant said, 
“I thought that they [Kadyrjan and his wife] were a kind of shaman [Kyr-
gyz, shamandar], especially when I heard them speak in tongues” during 
a service. Healing was not just the point of first contact, but an important 
element in conversion experiences. A former alcoholic mentioned that one 
night she went into the street and cried out: “Jesus, if you are the living 
God, please help me.” After that, she collapsed, later waking up in the 
house of a church leader, having lost the desire to drink alcohol. Another 
common theme was how God helped combat poverty. Almaz, a young 
man, told me, “For a long time I didn’t have work. Then, on January 19, 
2004, I prayed to God and asked for work. The following day, when I was 
having lunch in town, I was invited to work. I understood that God had 
heard me.”
As will have become clear, my acquaintances in the church saw evi-
dence of divine power in many corners of life. It was detected in the slow 
and creeping changes in the cityscape as suggested by Pastor Kadyrjan in 
the introduction of this chapter, and was just as likely to be witnessed in 
fleeting events, as when during a service the worship leader ascribed the 
return of electricity (after a power outage that had lasted for an hour) to the 
Holy Spirit. Divine power was seen to be at work when people recovered 
from their illnesses, got rid of other physical problems, or were liberated 
from their addictions. It was evident when they received unexpected help 
from a neighbor, enjoyed an economic windfall, or received a job after 
praying, as Almaz experienced.
An important aspect of these examples of divine intervention is their 
narration. It is through their circulation that happenings may gain status 
as miracles. To put it differently, central to the miracle business was the 
process by which people become cognizant of them, and start to recognize 
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miracles in their own lives and in the world around them. Indeed, the 
church actively encouraged interpreting positive events as gifts of God 
and as examples demonstrating the effectiveness of prayer. In services and 
home-church meetings, new converts learned—often literally—to inter-
pret their experiences in terms of Pentecostal thought.
For a happening to be a miracle, the decisive factor is that it is caused 
by divine intervention. But for such a happening to be recognized and ac-
knowledged as having been caused by divine intervention, several ingredi-
ents need to be present. First of all, of course, there needs to be a favorable 
outcome: an addicted person who is liberated, an ill person recovered, a 
jobless person who receives a job, or indeed an electricity outage that is re-
stored. Second, this outcome should be unexpected: the addicted person had 
tried many times to quit drinking; medical doctors had given up hope of 
recovery; the jobless person had been jobless for a long time; the electricity 
returned at exactly the right moment. Two additional features are not in-
dispensable but are conducive to miracle status: the absence of an alterna-
tive explanation, and the happening having occurred after (i.e., in response 
to) the prayers of congregants. Certain phenomena fit these criteria better 
than others, but the fit is always dependent on interpretation, influenced by 
presentation, and open to contestation.
The specificities of miracle truth production in the Church of Jesus 
Christ can be illustrated by a brief contrast with the institutionalized pro-
cess of miracle validation in the Roman Catholic Church. There, puta-
tive miracles are painstakingly documented and registered, examined by 
experts belonging to a “college of physicians,” and tested against the al-
ternative explanations of an official “devil’s advocate,” before the validity 
of the miracle can be (hesitantly) acknowledged (Duffin 2007). By con-
trast miracles were never formally tested in the Church of Jesus Christ. 
Instead there were powerful informal mechanisms by which miracle truth 
was produced and generalized. The reality of miracles was affirmed in 
sermons, shared and communicated informally between congregants, and 
staged in public encounters.
There was clearly no deficit of miracles in the Church of Jesus Christ. 
A seemingly paradoxical way of phrasing this would be to say that the 
miraculous was rather mundane—in the sense that the occurrence of 
miracles was routine and commonplace. Such an attitude was encouraged 
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within the church. Sermons often focused on the occurrence of miracles, 
and congregants were encouraged to share their own experiences with di-
vine intervention. Stories of healing through prayer also filled its news-
paper Tvoi Put′ (Russian, Your Way) and was a recurring theme in the 
book series published by the church, seen in titles like Power in the Name 
Jesus Christ, Breaking the Chains of Slavery, and Lord, Help Us to Pray. The 
pastors often referred to the power of prayer and the need for committed 
prayer. Miracles were not to be questioned or scrutinized, but rather re-
peated and embellished.
Acceptance of miracle truth was facilitated by the links with existing 
cultural repertoires, and the flexible adjustment to local realities. For ex-
ample, the senior pastor Kuzin in Bishkek would regularly invoke the 
dangers of immorality in the city and talk about the spirit of slavery (Rus-
sian, dukh rabstva) as evident in alcoholism and drug addiction, but I never 
heard him preach about the evil residing in local forms of spiritual heal-
ing. By contrast, in Jalalabad and Kokjangak, references to “occultism” 
(okkul′tizm) were common, as in the following excerpt from a sermon by 
Pastor Kadyrjan. The preceding week he had been invited to the house 
of an ailing Kyrgyz girl in Kokjangak. He immediately felt “the ice-cold 
atmosphere” that indicated the presence of evil. He explained:
There were pieces of paper with Arabic phrases everywhere: above the door, 
on the wall, next to her bed. Such a piece of paper floated even in her water 
jug. The girl had received medicine and had been treated by a közü-achyk 
[Kyrgyz, clairvoyant] and a moldo [mullah], but nothing had helped. . . . She 
feared that if she closed her eyes she would die instantly. Then I told her 
about Jesus. She didn’t understand at first. But when I started to pray, she 
started to understand, and protested that she was a Muslim. Nevertheless, 
she agreed to talk about [faith] and she started to feel better. Later I took 
her out of the house into the sun and she really felt better. When I left she 
asked me if I could visit her again. I promised her that I definitely would! 
Praise the Lord!
Following Kadyrjan’s example, the local church leader in Kokjangak, 
Gulbarchyn, tried to identify the evil spirits present in Kokjangak. In her 
analysis the main types of evil were “witchcraft” or “sorcery” (Russian, 
koldovstvo), the “spirit of destruction” (dukh razrusheniia), and the “spirit 
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of poverty” (dukh nishchety). But she was open to suggestions that would 
improve her analysis. She explained that she asked all visiting “believers” 
about their opinion concerning the evil spirits that needed to be confronted 
and defeated.
This vocabulary demonstrated the manner in which the church ad-
justed to different contexts to address locally relevant problems. In fact, 
there were remarkable similarities between the worldview promoted by 
Pentecostal churches and local notions about spirits, as well as between 
Pentecostal faith healing and traditional “Muslim” healing. Kadyrjan once 
inadvertently commented on this when recollecting that he and his wife 
had initially often been mistaken for közü-achyklar (Kyrgyz, clairvoyants). 
Or as one of the congregants who had previously been active as a (Muslim) 
spiritual healer told me: “I saw many miracles of Jesus. I believe that he 
is savior and healer because when I put my hands with the name of Jesus 
on ill people they recover.” At least two messages can be taken away from 
these examples: they demonstrated the insistence on adjusting church doc-
trine to local realities thereby ensuring relevance, and they took seriously 
previously existing ideas about the spiritual world (see also chapter 6). 
In contrast to atheist activists and Tablighi Muslims, Pentecostal church 
leaders did not dismiss “occultism” or “shamanism” as ineffective supersti-
tion, but rather incorporated these practices and ideas into their theories of 
spiritual warfare.
Ideas about miracles, propagated in sermons, made meaningful through 
their semiotic connections, achieved realness in the domashka (Russian, 
home church). Here, congregants exchange ideas and experiences, and 
thereby become experienced in recognizing divine influence on events in 
their lives. Or that’s what supposedly happens according to stories told by 
congregants. They referred to the domashka as a space of learning, where 
the confusing and mysterious aspects of the Pentecostal emphasis on the 
Holy Spirit became meaningful and understandable. A woman told one 
such story: “My husband accompanied me to the domashka at the pastor’s 
house. The atmosphere was cozy, everyone was uninhibited. They treated 
me as if they had known me for a long time. Then the pastor and his wife 
prayed for me. . . . I accepted [Jesus] in my heart, and that same day I was 
blessed with the Holy Spirit.” But it was not just about recognizing God’s 
ways. Inclusion in the domashka often facilitated positive transformations 
in people’s lives, also because it provided the mutual support necessary to 
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overcome addictions or to deal with social and economic problems. Zamira 
commented extensively on this point:
How shall I put it? The quality of interaction is different. When you meet 
new people outside [the church] you always need to be cautious. They have 
their interests, want something from you. They may steer you in the wrong 
direction. But among believers it is not like that. We call each other brother 
and sister. And it really feels like that. We watch over each other, help each 
other not to go the wrong path. During our meetings I feel energized. It 
feels like, “Yeah, I’m ready for this life.”
The surge of Pentecostalism across the post-Soviet landscape resembles in 
some ways the proliferation of magic. As Galina Lindquist has argued: 
“Magic deals with uncertainty, . . . neutralizing its destructive potential, 
and making hope, as a mode of existential orientation, once again possible” 
(2006, 21). Like magic, Pentecostalism is able to provide direction to agen-
tive power within contexts that are uncertain and appear chaotic.5 An im-
portant difference, though, is that it does so not in a dialogue between two 
individuals (healer and client) but while embedding people in new solidar-
ity networks. Moreover, these networks are not only about support and 
guidance, but about jointly facing a hostile external world.
The miracles presented in sermons and embellished in more informal 
settings had the potential to transform lives: incurable diseases could be 
cured, long-term addictions overcome, personal flaws repaired, jobs pro-
vided. For this potential to be realized, miracles need to be recognized as 
miracles. This point implies that they need to be seen as not only posi-
tive and relevant but also meaningful. They need to be, on the one hand, 
“miraculous,” while on the other, believable. There are several tensions at 
work here. First, miracles were craved most when and where they were 
least likely to occur. Second, while the church’s mundane approach to mir-
acles allowed them to play a central role in everyday life, it also meant that 
miracles could easily lose their enchantment.
Truth Decay
I asked Aikan if she had experienced any doubts when she became in-
volved with the church three years previously in 2001: “No, not at all! 
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With me it was rather the other way around. I was proud to be a be-
liever, to go to this church. . . . I didn’t doubt anything. I simply—well, 
I quickly adopted that belief.” Not only in this instance but also on other 
occasions Aikan described her conversion as straightforward and com-
plete. She and her husband had been living in Jalalabad at the time, and 
like so many others, she had converted through healing. After having vis-
ited bakshis (Kyrgyz, shamans) without any positive result, her son had 
been healed by Pastor Kadyrjan. She became an active congregant im-
mediately after her conversion, went out on evangelization trips, and was 
convinced that her prayers had not only cured her son but also given her 
a job. Aikan insisted that the church even had a positive influence on her 
marriage, because after his conversion her husband started to take his role 
as provider more seriously.
I liked it when they said that at home the husband needs to command, that 
the husband should be the one who works, and that women should be able 
to ask their husbands for household money. . . . When my husband forbade 
me to go, I told him: “What they say over there is good. They say that at 
home the husband should be in command, whereas with us it is usually me 
who scolds you.” So then he agreed that I would attend church, and a few 
months later he also started to go. After that, we both had well-paying jobs 
and we had a lot of money.
Two years later, for reasons not entirely clear to me, Aikan’s husband 
moved to Bishkek, leaving his wife and children behind. Because they had 
been living in an apartment that belonged to his relatives, Aikan returned 
to her native Kokjangak in 2003. After getting by on poor-paying tempo-
rary jobs, she began praying fervently for a real job. “I prayed for a job that 
could be combined with taking care of my children. And then I was given 
[a job at the city administration]. I didn’t search for it; they just came to me 
and offered me the job.” What struck me, however, was that she spoke of 
this fulfilled wish without emotion, which indicated that she did not per-
ceive it (any longer?) as a miracle. Given the harsh realities of life, this was 
not so surprising. Her salary was barely sufficient to buy flour, potatoes, 
and cabbage for herself and her three children. Perhaps it was also because 
her prayers did not deliver her most intense wish. Aikan had prayed often 
and intensely for her husband to return.
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Finally, after two years, he visited her house: “He stayed here for fifteen 
minutes, and then left again, saying he had to go back to Bishkek the very 
same night.”
In the months thereafter Aikan became more irregular in her church 
attendance, no longer participated in evangelization, and failed to contrib-
ute the tithe (church contribution) for several months. Pastor Kadyrjan 
admonished her to return to the church, but judging from Aikan’s words 
this was unlikely to happen. “I am still interested, that is not the thing. 
Simply, how can I tell you? I am simply tired of this life. I find it interest-
ing when they talk about God. . . . As long as they sit in my house [during 
home-church meetings], I listen intensely and then I think ‘I should proba-
bly do as before.’ But it doesn’t work out. And I can’t pull myself together.”
When Aikan described to me the first years of her involvement in the 
church, she sketched a life of being on a high, an emotional intensity that 
was somewhat reminiscent of what Venera must have experienced when 
Aikan (second from right) and some of her friends on a picnic in the hills outside Kokjangak, 
May 2004
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congregants collectively prayed to cure her speech impediment: a trem-
bling pressure with a clear focal point that produced a momentary out-
burst of energy. What both stories indicate is that although the church’s 
mechanisms for generating miracle truth were effective in the short term, 
they faced difficulties in the long run. The example of Venera, who after 
two weeks was still unable to produce more than just a few sounds (and 
had she not been able to do that before anyway?), showed that miracles 
may stop being seen as miraculous. Meanwhile, Aikan’s story illustrated 
that miracles involving healing or employment may lose their gloss or may 
even cease to be seen as miraculous.
The problem can be referred to as the “charisma paradox.” While es-
sential for generating temporary conviction, charisma is inherently unsta-
ble. The amazement, the temporary fascination will necessarily wear off. 
If the charisma is not to evaporate completely, either new miracles need to 
occur or the charismatic needs to be connected to more permanent struc-
tures (i.e., institutionalization).6 But in neither case will charisma remain 
what it used to be in the beginning. Whereas new miracles will produce 
problems of credibility, more permanent structures are likely to result in a 
loss of effervescence. Aikan’s story is illuminating not only because it offers 
an example of this charisma paradox, but also because it shows that this 
paradox needs to be understood in relation to the socioeconomic environ-
ment in which the miraculous is asserted.
It is decidedly more than a coincidence that Aikan maintained her re-
ligious fervor while living in Jalalabad, only to lose it relatively soon after 
moving back to Kokjangak. In fact, her experiences dovetailed with the 
trajectories of the Pentecostal congregations in these two locations. As 
mentioned previously, after a few difficult years the church in Jalalabad 
began to flourish, boasting 250 tithe-paying members in 2004, most of 
whom had been with the church for over a year. Although the congre-
gation in Jalalabad certainly fluctuated, the ups and downs were far less 
dramatic than they were in Kokjangak. When Kadyrjan first started ac-
tivities there in 2001, he cooperated with locally residing Russian Pentecos-
tals. After attracting a sizable crowd of sixty to eighty Russian and Kyrgyz 
attendants for a few months, the congregation shrank considerably amid 
internal bickering. Kadyrjan made a second attempt in fall 2002, when 
he sent Gulbarchyn, a female Kyrgyz church member, to live as a mis-
sionary and church leader in Kokjangak. This time the prospects seemed 
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promising, and for about a year the church services and prayer meetings 
were well attended, mostly by Kyrgyz women. But by spring 2004 inter-
est had dwindled, and Kadyrjan was worried that his efforts would once 
again fail to produce the desired results.
On the face of it, Kokjangak would appear to be the perfect environment 
for the “prosperity gospel.” Not only were living conditions miserable, in-
habitants believed that a better life should be possible. They had expe-
rienced better in the past, and the neoliberal “gospel” trumpeted by the 
Akaev government (1991–2005) had promised the “second coming” of an 
earthly paradise. Personally, I had experienced how a (temporary) surge of 
hope and anticipation was generated when a UNDP development project 
announced the start of its poverty alleviation program (see chapter 2). The 
Pentecostal Church, with its promise that earthly success and health were 
attainable through faithful prayer, was perfectly placed to stimulate the 
same needs and desires. Indeed, the quick surge of church attendance ex-
perienced by the Church of Jesus Christ testified to that very fact.
Pastor Kadyrjan remembered how in the early weeks dozens of people 
had been baptized in Kokjanagak: “People just came forward by them-
selves, pushed along by the Spirit.” The skeptic might argue that many of 
these conversions were about experimentation rather than full commit-
ment, but in any case a core was formed of twenty to thirty women (and 
a few men), who became deeply involved with the church in 2003. But 
even among them, many ended up being disappointed when the prom-
ised prosperity and health failed to arrive. Congregants prayed for an 
end to poverty, for new jobs, and for success in small business. Although 
Kadyrjan and other church leaders stressed that the reason their prayers 
remained unanswered was a lack of faith or lack of devotion in prayer, this 
type of explanation worked only to a degree. Ultimately, the credibility of 
prosperity teaching depended on the perceived success of prayer, and the 
failure to deliver tangible results was therefore a problem that could lead 
to disillusionment.7
Aikan’s experiences are particularly instructive in this regard. She had 
been an experienced church member when she moved to Kokjangak, and 
was expected to uphold the church view on failure. Church members would 
argue with her, saying that “if God is alive, then Kokjangak wouldn’t have 
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fallen apart and people wouldn’t live in such poverty.” Aikan’s reply to such 
comments had been that “only the old things are being taken apart. After 
this, everything will be built up again—and better than before.” The ques-
tion was, however, to what extent she continued to believe these things her-
self. One evening she told me: “Sometimes I sit by myself and I think, ‘What 
has God given me?’ OK, he gave me an apartment, he gave me work, but 
I prayed for my husband for so long. And what happened? He came and 
said, ‘No, I won’t live with you.’ So where did my prayers go to then?”
The problem of disillusionment was more pronounced in Kokjangak 
than it was in Jalalabad. The destitute condition in the former mining 
town, the lack of stable jobs, and the risk and low pay of others, meant 
that economic success was a rare exception. Moreover, the patterns of mi-
gration and the abundant alcoholism meant that prayers for stable family 
life and reliable husbands were unlikely to be fulfilled, as Aikan’s story 
illustrated. Even though life in Jalalabad was also hard, its more vibrant 
economy made success stories more common. Many of the Jalalabad con-
gregants were recent rural-urban migrants who had felt lost in the city and 
struggled to survive, but once plugged into the congregation’s close-knit 
network, they quite conceivably would find their way upward.
Although conversion to Pentecostalism can be seen as an emancipatory 
strategy for those involved, the act of conversion complicates relations with 
the wider society. In the mentioned survey of 121 congregants, more than 
60 percent of Kyrgyz respondents reported negative reactions to their con-
version, including heated arguments, prohibitions (by parents, husbands, 
and brothers) on visiting the church again, and (temporarily) deteriorating 
relations with relatives. Another 10 percent characterized reactions as very 
negative, including violence, expulsion from home or the family circle, 
and prolonged attempts at bringing them back to Islam.8 As the percent-
ages suggest, these challenges were very common, but their effects were 
far from straightforward. They could both contribute to and detract from 
commitment to the church.
Ainura, who lived in Jalalabad and was part of a vibrant congrega-
tion, told me that her relatives, especially those on her husband’s side, 
had strongly disapproved of her conversion: “They told him to divorce 
me, they called him to the mosque, and an ajy [woman knowledgeable in 
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Islam] visited me, but I told her that I wouldn’t leave God.” In fact, the agi-
tation with which she told me her story suggested that these challenges had 
strengthened her in her faith. Aikan’s recollections of her time in Jalalabad 
were similar. She did have ample negative encounters with “nonbeliev-
ers.” People used to ask, for example, if they had orgies on special Sundays 
(replaying Soviet propaganda about the Baptists) and how much she was 
being paid to show up at the church. Reactions were also often negative 
on evangelization trips, with people calling her “a traitor” and blaming 
her for having “sold her religion.” But when she lived in Jalalabad these 
negative encounters failed to erode her faith. As a counterbalance to such 
negative reactions, there was the church and a relatively large community 
of “believers” on whom she could lean.
This balance was disrupted after she moved back to Kokjangak. For 
one, the negative confrontations became more direct, and they were no 
longer restricted to encounters during evangelization activities. Several 
times Muslim men came to Aikan’s door in the apartment building. Al-
though she insisted that she did not care about such visits, and gave de-
tailed reports of how she replied to their accusations, she still said that 
one of the hardest things about living in Kokjangak was that everyone 
knew her as a Christian. On top of the negative reactions she had to face, 
it turned out that an increasing number of people in her immediate sur-
roundings turned their backs on the Church of Jesus Christ. Home-church 
meetings that were held in Aikan’s apartment used to be well attended, 
but more and more people “became afraid and stayed away. The moldo 
[mullah] had visited them, or their parents did not agree.” Likewise, her 
brother, who had converted not long after Aikan, visited her one day and 
said: “Aikan, it turns out that it is a Russian God and not our God. Ugh! 
I won’t go there anymore.”
In Jalalabad city negative encounters did not necessarily have a negative 
impact on the church’s prospects. On the contrary, such encounters con-
firmed the ideas of church members about the corrupt nature of Kyrgyz 
society and as such increased the cohesiveness of the church. Moreover, 
negative reactions provided valuable material for testimonies, thus add-
ing to the heroism of “true believers.” Another reason why this invigorat-
ing dimension existed in Jalalabad was that the church offered a space of 
refuge for congregants, often rural-urban migrants, who struggled to get 
by in the relatively anonymous space of the city. In Kokjangak, however, 
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there were far fewer possibilities for retreat. Inhabitants, including mem-
bers of the church, were in contact with their relatives on a daily basis and 
depended more heavily on the (non-Christian) social networks that had 
formed over their lifetime. As such, it appeared that any further growth 
of the Church of Jesus Christ hinged on both the emergence of a socioeco-
nomic environment that would lend credence to the “power of prayer,” 
and on the stability of the congregation such that it could serve as a vi-
able alternative community capable of neutralizing the hostile reactions of 
Islamic leaders and others.
By analyzing the relationship between the ideas of the Church of Jesus 
Christ and the social fabric within which they obtained their experiential 
reality, we begin to understand the complex dynamics of (temporary) con-
viction. These dynamics were influenced by the ideology and structure of 
the church, the motivations and actions of its members, and the responses 
from (predominantly) Muslim relatives, neighbors, and community lead-
ers. This set of conditions led not only to the creation of Christian niches in 
a predominantly Muslim environment, but also to the appearance of new 
dynamics of inclusion and exclusion, which in turn influenced conversion 
trajectories.
The attraction of Pentecostalism was linked to the destabilization of 
Muslim and socialist contexts, but its prolonged impact depended on the 
possibility of demonstrating the fruits of prayer through the achievements 
of its members, and was thus interrelated with the socioeconomic dynamics 
of the locality in which it operated. The ethnographic materials contained 
in this chapter show that the popular idea that the messages of Pentecostal-
ism thrive on social, economic, and political collapse risks ignoring that 
Pentecostalism needs an environment that offers (at least limited) social 
and economic opportunities to its members. In other words, the sustain-
ability of new communities of faith also depended on the extent to which 
the church’s promises—of health and wealth—continued to be convinc-
ing. This was contingent both on the strength of the congregation within 
which success stories circulated and on actual possibilities of success. While 
economic destitution quite straightforwardly limited the reach of the pros-
perity gospel, the negative responses triggered by the Pentecostal presence 
in a Muslim-majority situation had more unpredictable results. In the case 
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of Aikan, once the enthusiasm wore off and the experienced miracles lost 
their gloss, the confrontation with Muslim neighbors resulted in gradual 
disengagement from the church. But the confrontation with disapproving 
neighbors and relatives could just as well have the opposite effect, such as 
in the case of Zamira, contributing to a sense of being uniquely chosen.
It is impossible to establish exactly whether these different outcomes 
were the result of personal characteristics, the deliverance of the fruits of 
prayer, or the strength of the congregations. But what is clear is that the 
dynamics of inclusion and exclusion can contribute to, as well as erode, 
the structures of faith. As was mentioned in the introduction to this chap-
ter, Pentecostal effervescence needed challenges to produce a sense of ex-
clusivity, of belonging to a chosen group. However, when such external 
challenges worked on an already weakened congregational structure and 
when prayer failed to produce success stories, they could easily lead to the 
erosion of conviction, and to disengagement from the church.
Permanent Struggle
[Church membership in Jalalabad city] rose to 250 and then it fell again, then 
it rose again, it is a process we go through. If you would add up all the people 
who converted in our church, you would probably get to eight hundred 
people. It happens all the time. People join the church, and then suddenly 
they say that they no longer have time. And that’s the end of it. What 
happens is that the “open” people come to our church, but then relatives and 
others start to put pressure on this person, trying to convince them that they 
should not go to the church, offer money so that they won’t go, and if that 
doesn’t help, they will ostracize them. It is the usual thing; persecution is part 
of Christianity. We pray for [local government] officials to stop hindering us. 
But this may not be God’s way. Our faith thrives when it is being repressed.
Pastor Kadyrjan
Engaging with the question of miracle truth does not necessarily lead to ei-
ther positivistic reductionism or a collapse of critical distance. Rather, by tak-
ing seriously the empirical observation that miracle truth is unstable, and by 
analyzing how truth status is ascribed to and removed from specific incidents, 
important aspects of the working of Pentecostal conviction are revealed.
With its emphasis on prayer and divine intervention, Pentecostalism 
encountered fertile ground in Kyrgyzstan. The dislocation of society, and 
the unraveling of the welfare state, produced an environment receptive to 
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Pentecostal promises. But it was also an unstable one. This instability was 
reflected in the miracle business. Miracle status was fragile partly because 
of the unstable characteristics of the post-Soviet condition, highlighting 
the way in which truth is often less about evidence than about the orga-
nization of information (cf. Hastrup 2004, 456). The specific manner in 
which this information was organized, and how it related to the wider 
social field, made miraculous happenings momentarily convincing. How-
ever, the invocation of the divine could fail to deliver results, and miracu-
lous happenings could lose their charismatic gloss or run up against rival 
interpretations. The congregants’ assessment of miracles depended not 
only on their epistemological underpinnings but also on the social rela-
tions that surrounded these miracles. The encouragement, repetition, and 
explication of unexpected happenings enabled the production of efferves-
cence. But when these social relations would break down, and on top of 
this a non-Pentecostal network asserted itself, the truth of miracles started 
to unravel. The risk of failure was largest in contexts where the need for 
miracles was greatest, because these were also the situations in which it 
was most difficult to produce success in the form of jobs, regained health, 
and reliable husbands. And when effervescence decreased, when doubt set 
in, the challenge posed by rival epistemological and existential points of 
reference loomed particularly large. Such processes not only underlined 
the effervescence of Pentecostal truth, but also highlighted the tension be-
tween Pentecostal Christianity and Islam, and the active steps undertaken 
by relatives and neighbors to dissuade Kyrgyz congregants from engage-
ment with the church.
What needs to be stressed is that people actively engaged with the epis-
temological and social dimensions of different bodies of knowledge. As 
I have argued, Pentecostal truth was about gaining a hold over elusive 
forces, about asserting one’s own agency. The notion that divine interven-
tion can be invoked through prayer was empowering in and of itself. It 
gave people the motivation to try to overcome their addictions, the confi-
dence to search for a job. It provided direction in a context of post-Soviet 
chaos, in a situation of ideological excess. This logic also holds true for the 
ascent of Pentecostal Christianity in Kyrgyzstan more generally. It was 
asserting its own presence by claiming to make an impact on society, by 
seeking challenges. The Church of Jesus Christ was a forward-pushing 
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movement, and could survive only by staying on the offensive. Numerous 
people fell by the wayside, but that was only to be expected because not 
everyone is chosen to be saved. In a sense, failure was part of the struggle 
between good and evil in this world, and it was through this struggle that 
a fragile conviction could be maintained.
6
The Tenacity of Spiritual Healing  
and Seeing
My friend Nurgul and I were seated on tyshyks (Kyrgyz, cotton mats) that 
were arranged along three walls of a small room, while Dinara prepared 
the low table in the middle for the séance. Nurgul had visited Dinara on 
earlier occasions, most recently when needing advice about the health 
problems of her cow, and she considered Dinara to be one of the stronger 
spiritual practitioners in Kokjangak. Dinara was a middle-aged woman 
of mixed Tatar and Russian descent and a self-declared ekstra-sens 
(someone with extrasensory perception). She was not surprised that a 
foreigner had come to consult her, because, she told us, many of her cli-
ents traveled from afar. Dinara took out prayer beads (mishbaba) and 
several stones, which she then moved slowly across the low table in cir-
cles and ellipses.
While performing her trade, Dinara described several of my personal 
characteristics quite accurately. However, when she declared that I was 
jobless and wanted to have my confirmation for this, I had no option but 
to object. A short but tense silence filled the room. Dinara turned toward 
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Nurgul, pointed to the stones, and said, “Here it clearly says that he does 
not have a job!” Luckily Nurgul offered her own insights, saying, “Well, 
you know, he doesn’t get paid, he is like a volunteer; what he is doing is 
more like a hobby.”1 Dinara seemed relieved and replied, still somewhat 
grudgingly, “That must be it, because I clearly see that he doesn’t have a 
real job.”
Approximately half an hour later we left the house. Nurgul reflected on 
why Dinara might have been wrong.2 She pondered that perhaps because 
I was a foreigner Dinara had been unable to connect with my psyche in 
the way she connected with other clients. “Anyway,” she added, “you can 
never be certain. A year ago she healed my mother’s eye disease, but per-
haps she has lost her powers since.” This was not the end of speculations. 
A week later Nurgul reported that she had run into Dinara, who had told 
Nurgul that she had sensed that I had “powers,” and suspected that I had 
used those to obstruct her supernatural gifts. She advised Nurgul to be 
careful around me.
Why did the misinterpretation matter so much to both Nurgul and Di-
nara? Much was at stake in detecting the truth about spiritual forces in 
Kokjangak because, I will argue, the position of spiritual practitioners 
was anything but secure, and belief in spiritual power was anything but 
self-evident and stable. Moreover, these uncertainties resonated with the 
unpredictability that characterizes the spiritual forces concerned.
The foundation of spiritual healing and seeing in Kokjangak was un-
stable for three basic reasons. First, Dinara’s troubled response to the failed 
vision and her attempt to influence Nurgul’s interpretation of it illustrate 
the insecure position of individual practitioners. They did not occupy a 
formal office, and hence their reputation was dependent on interactions 
with clients as well as on talk about them among (potential) clients. For 
this reason practitioners needed to be constantly attentive to the signals 
they gave and the information that circulated about them in the commu-
nity. Uncertainty regarding the qualities of individual practitioners was of 
direct concern to clients, especially to those who made significant payments 
or depended on spiritual practitioners for medical treatment or for guid-
ance about important decisions. This was all the more critical because, as 
was common knowledge, there were many charlatans among the healers, 
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who were in it for the money but did not actually have any extrasensory 
powers. Through interaction with clients, spiritual practitioners achieved, 
failed to achieve, or lost their reputation among their clients and the popu-
lation more generally. The result of this was a dance around the notions of 
authenticity, rationality, and mystery, in which mediums tried to project, 
and clients detect, truth. And yet complete certainty always remained out 
of reach.
Another source of spiritual practitioners’ instability concerns the phe-
nomenon of “shamanic ideas and practices” more generally. The very 
reason for asking Nurgul to accompany me to Dinara was that as an 
educated foreigner I would have raised too many suspicions if not prop-
erly introduced.3 Even if these two women did not question the reality of 
spiritual powers, their efforts to explain the failure implicitly conjured the 
skepticism about such powers among many others, especially members of 
the “intelligentsia.” Dismissive attitudes may have been particularly pro-
nounced in mining towns such as Kokjangak where the Soviet discourses 
of modernity and rationality had previously found strong resonance. But 
these dismissive attitudes were not just a legacy of the Soviet past. Spiri-
tual practices were also condemned by representatives of new Islamic and 
Christian movements who saw the practices respectively as ineffective su-
perstition or as satanic in origin. We will review these challenges in more 
detail below; for now it suffices to say that the field of spiritual healing and 
seeing was undergoing significant changes itself.
Third, the actions of jinns (ghosts or spirits) and the effects of me-
diation were themselves unpredictable. Spiritual practitioners such 
as Dinara acknowledged that they did not fully understand or control 
these forces. As alluded to above, I personally could well have brought 
new forces to Kokjangak, thereby altering the spiritual field. Moreover, 
because much of the spiritual world escapes our direct senses, and be-
cause spirits are capricious beings that do not act rationally but can be 
consumed by feelings of revenge, envy, and love, assessments made by 
spiritual practitioners were by definition tentative. Practitioners were 
but modest individuals acting within an overwhelming and capricious 
spiritual world that did not have a centered logic. Ironically, this form of 
instability actually strengthened the claims of practitioners (by making 
them less vulnerable to falsification) and thereby somewhat stabilized the 
spiritual field as a whole.
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When these observations are applied to this book’s overarching theme 
of the power of ideas, it becomes apparent that with these forms of spiritual 
healing and seeing we have entered terrain whose dynamics differ signifi-
cantly from those discussed in previous chapters. In contrast to organized 
forms of religion and nonreligion, the spiritual practices discussed in this 
chapter lacked these obvious forms of institutionalization. While this made 
spiritual practitioners easy targets for the critiques of atheist activists, pas-
tors, and imams, it also meant that such critiques had only limited effect.
Equally important is to point out that the spiritual practitioners were no 
missionaries or activists attempting to convince others of an absolute truth. 
Nor should their clients be seen as strong believers who reached (tem-
porary) collective conviction. Rather, everyone involved moved within a 
space characterized by multilayered uncertainty: practitioners gained and 
lost status, clients became more and less convinced, specific ideas were eas-
ily taken up and discarded. Instead of assuming that belief in spirits simply 
exists, the relation between subjects and ideas is a dynamic one, and inter-
dependent with the actions of multiple actors. Focusing on these actions 
and interactions will not provide direct access to people’s “belief,” but it 
will show how “believability” is produced. In this chapter, therefore, I ana-
lyze the discourses and actions of spiritual healers, their clientele, and other 
actors, to show how the believability of spiritual healers and clairvoyants is 
socially mediated and experientially constituted.4
Proliferation of Spiritual Practices
A wide range of terms was used to describe spiritual practitioners and their 
practices, often without much consistency. This terminological opacity 
was itself reflective of the uncertainty of the times and the range of influ-
ences that informed the practices. In offhand references, the most common 
general term for “spiritual practitioner” was bakshi. This term bakshi has 
its roots in the Chinese Empire where it referred to scribes, wizards, and 
Buddhist priests. From there it traveled first north to Siberia where it be-
came a term for shaman, and then to Central Asia where it came to denote 
an Islamized shaman (Zarcone 2013, xxv). The Central Asian bakshis, in 
contrast to Siberian shamans, do not perform intercession on behalf of the 
community, nor do they travel to the other world. Instead they negotiate 
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or fight with the spirits that roam in this world (Garrone 2013, 18, 27; Zar-
cone 2013, xxv). When I asked ordinary people in Kokjangak about the 
term, they would explain that bakshis are part of kyrgyzchylyk (the Kyrgyz 
way), that they lean toward shamanism, and that their practices involve 
fire and dark magic.
Interestingly, the healers and seers who were involved in such practices 
tended to shy away from the term bakshi. One reason for their reluctance 
was similar to what Johan Rasanayagam (2006, 383) observed in nearby 
Andijan (across the border in Uzbekistan), where the negative connota-
tions of the term from a reformist Islamic point of view formed an im-
portant reason for avoiding the term. But often reluctance to use the term 
was for the opposite reason, namely that the bakshi was an awe-inspiring 
figure.5 From this perspective, referring to oneself as bakshi would be pre-
sumptuous, implying that a practitioner considered his or her powers to 
match those of the great bakshis of the past.
The labels that practitioners used more readily included moldo, tavyp, 
emchi, közü-achyk, and ekstra-sens. In part this formed a spectrum ranging 
from practitioners who fully identified with Islam to those who employed 
unconventional sources of spirituality, such as science fiction images. The 
term moldo is also a general term for “mullah,” or person knowledgeable 
about Islam, but used in this context it referred to a healer who treats pa-
tients by reciting the Koran, a process by which relevant passages of the 
holy text make a connection with the patient’s body and thereby cleanse it 
of evil. The terms tavyp and emchi both mean “healer”: tavyp stems from 
the Arabic tabib, or doctor, while emchi stems from the Kyrgyz em, to 
cure.6 Their healing practices sometimes involved recitations of the Koran, 
but more often involved blowing, spitting, and whipping to cast out evil 
spirits. Közü-achyk literally means “with opened eyes” and has its Rus-
sian variant in gadalka (fortune-teller), though közü-achyks often did more 
than forecast the future. They also used their visionary capabilities to di-
agnose the causes of specific problems (including health-related ones), and 
combined this with prayers or other healing acts that “opened the way” 
for their clients. Ekstra-sens refers literally to the extrasensory perception 
of the practitioners involved, and was used by both Russian and Kyrgyz 
practitioners.
The various terms were used to evoke different traditions. Thus, emchi 
and tavyp connoted Islamic tradition, közü-achyk and bakshi evoked a sense 
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of Kyrgyzness, and ekstra-sens and gadalka were associated with Russians. 
However, many practitioners used more than one term to describe them-
selves, which illustrates that the terms did not indicate fixed professional 
traditions but rather overlapping and changing fields of spiritual practice.7
My initial interest in practices of spiritual healing and seeing derived 
from the negative attention they received from Christian pastors and Is-
lamic leaders, just as previously these activities had been condemned by 
Soviet atheist modernists. Imam Talant (see also chapter 3) talked dismis-
sively about the local bakshis. In his view these bakshis were to be consid-
ered swindlers (aferisty) who had placed themselves outside of Islam by 
going against the Koran. The problem, from his perspective, was that dur-
ing Soviet times many people had failed to differentiate between “what 
the mullah says and what the bakshi says.” He attributed this to their lack 
of knowledge, a result of Soviet repression, because of which “they think 
that it is all Islam.” It was one of the factors that had motivated the imam 
to start teaching yiman (Kyrgyz, belief, also connotes “morality”) classes in 
the schools. Equally negative, but from a different perspective, was Pastor 
Kadyrjan’s view (see chapter 5) on spiritual activities. He saw Kokjangak 
as a place replete with dark occult forces, which to him indicated that the 
town was a satanic stronghold. His aim was to defeat Satan in his home 
territory, something that would constitute a major blow to his might, and 
thereby initiate a domino effect in the region.
Whether or not these religious leaders would ever succeed in their 
struggles against what they denounced as “occultism” or “shamanism,” the 
lamented practices were definitely thriving in the 1990s and early 2000s. 
As others have noted, this was a period in which there was a “ ‘new wave’ 
of bakshi activity” throughout Central Asia (Vuillemenot 2013, 60; Som-
fai Kara 2013, 55). Kokjangak had at least twenty spiritual practitioners 
who regularly received clients. Of the eight healers I got to know, only one 
had been active during Soviet times; all others had taken up this trade in 
the 1990s. As one male acquaintance told me: “During the Soviet period 
there were far fewer [practitioners] than now. We were hardly aware of 
them, but perhaps in the villages [people] knew about them.” Moreover, he 
added, “Back then they did it secretly, not like now.”
The theme of post-Soviet proliferation often surfaced in conversations 
with residents of Kokjangak. Right after the collapse of the Soviet Union 
interest in spiritual healing and seeing had surged. One middle-aged 
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woman voiced the general idea as follows: “These bakshis sprang up like 
mushrooms after the Union fell. There was so much talk about them at 
the time. We were constantly hearing, ‘Here they heal, there they heal.’ ” 
In the early 1990s there had been several occasions when bus trips were 
organized to cities in Uzbekistan’s part of the Fergana Valley to enable 
inhabitants to attend the healing sessions of famous spiritual healers. And 
when traveling visionaries came to Kokjangak, many residents took the 
chance to speak with their ancestral spirits.
The way people spoke about these events suggested that at the time 
they were approached as the next “new” thing. But ten years later, these 
same ideas and practices were often met with cynicism; the power of heal-
ers and clairvoyants was definitely not accepted by all. This was partic-
ularly the case among my “not religious” acquaintances who tended to 
describe all spiritual healers as charlatans. As one of them mused during 
a conversation:
[In the early 1990s] the number of clairvoyants [ekstra-sens] and fortune-tellers 
[gadalki] was rising strongly because it was the transition period [perekhod-
nyi period]. For most people this was a very difficult time. They got sick and 
started to speak with spirits. If you look here in town, it was mostly poor 
people [who started to consult spiritual healers], the reason being that life 
was difficult and their psyches couldn’t handle it. Second, it was a way to 
earn money.
However, even those who were adamant that it was all deception insisted 
that it had been different in the past. Several skeptics recollected that in 
their youth (in the 1950s or 1960s) they had witnessed the performances 
of bakshis who “had real power.”8 For example, my acquaintance Nurbek 
remembered that in his childhood (in the 1960s) he had seen the last real 
female bakshi (or bübü) who was active in the region. This woman lived 
in a nearby village and had been called on to cure a baby who had previ-
ously been taken to the doctors, but in vain. Nurbek: “We gave money and 
a chicken. She started to walk in circles, first slowly, then gaining speed. 
As if in ecstasy she jumped up and down meanwhile hitting everyone re-
ally hard [with a whip (kamchy)] . . . reciting certain phrases while she 
was jumping and beating.” Nurbek ascribed real powers to this bakshi, but 
added that nowadays no one possessed similar abilities. In short, there ap-
peared to be a shared acknowledgment of the possibility of extrasensory 
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powers, though people disagreed on whether contemporary healers and 
seers could mobilize them.
The correlation between socioeconomic disruption and spiritual activ-
ity was also reflected by the fact that many practitioners lived in the center 
of town, that is, in the part that had transformed most abruptly into an 
industrial wasteland. The rise of spiritual activities thus mirrored the in-
version of social space. While in Soviet times the greatest density of spiri-
tual practitioners had been in “backward” rural settings, now they resided 
primarily in the “chaotic” center of town. This is similar to Humphrey’s 
argument that shamans were particularly important in the chaotic and im-
personal post-Soviet urban environment, valued for their ability to reinte-
grate individuals in space and time (1999, 5).
Encounters between Healers and Clients
With the “real bakshis” perhaps no longer around, yet with the possibility 
of spiritual power looming large, it would be problematic to speak about 
belief as if it were a stable quality. Once again we are confronted with 
questions about truth and falsity. Such questions are discomforting for an-
thropologists because they easily result in either reductionist (positivistic) 
logic or in the collapse of critical distance. Yet the truth question needs 
to be engaged precisely because it was so relevant on the ground. It was 
well known that some self-proclaimed healers were in fact charlatans and 
imposters, and thus the claims of individual practitioners had to be scru-
tinized for possible fraud. Moreover, the existence of spirits and the possi-
bility of their mediation were not taken for granted by many inhabitants, 
adding an additional layer of uncertainty to any truth quest. However, and 
somewhat counterintuitively, it was precisely this “doubtful” engagement 
with the possibility of truth that gave people’s engagement with the world 
of spirits momentum.9
In looking at how truth is produced in spiritual healing and seeing, my 
approach was to accompany several acquaintances on their visits to spiri-
tual healers. The advantage of this approach was that I could follow the 
process of motivation and deliberation, and document how authenticity 
and authority (or lack thereof) were created in interaction—both between 
client and practitioner and among clients. This approach offers only a 
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partial view into the dynamics of belief, but it does generate important in-
sight into how the conditions of belief—that is, believability—comes into 
being and disappears out of sight.
A revealing encounter was between Chinara and Marzia. Chinara, a 
thirty-eight-year-old Kyrgyz woman, worked for a local NGO in Kokjan-
gak and held a degree from the University of Osh. She told me that as an 
educated woman she was skeptical about spiritual healing, especially be-
cause there were so many charlatans (aferisty). Nevertheless, she would oc-
casionally visit a bakshi, which she justified by explaining that “still, they 
have a special kind of energy with which they can relieve you of stress.” 
Chinara had known Marzia for a long time because the latter was a mem-
ber of a credit and savings group she monitored as part of her job. In the 
past Marzia had offered to treat Chinara’s headaches, and this occasion 
seemed a proper moment to accept the invitation. Before we arrived at 
Marzia’s house Chinara told me some bits of information about Marzia’s 
life that she considered particularly important: Marzia had been married 
three times and was raising two orphans in her home. To Chinara these 
two feats already indicated that Marzia was a special woman:10
Women who become bübü or bakshi usually have some signs [Russian, 
priznaki]. Because they cannot find their place in life, they are not always 
able to find a reliable spouse, so they often end up being divorced. And with 
Marzia too, this is her third husband. . . . That is a general problem for all 
[spiritually gifted people], since there is an extra pressure on their psyche.
After we entered Marzia’s house and were served tea, Marzia told me that 
her grandfather had been an important tavyp (healer) and that she had re-
ceived powers through him. She had not known about these powers until, 
one day, she had become very ill. Friends suggested that she should see a 
moldo, but she didn’t see the point and went to the hospital instead. She be-
came paralyzed and could not leave her bed for a year, until a moldo started 
treating her. This moldo, for his part, insisted that Marzia should accept 
the powers he had detected in her, because otherwise she would become 
paralyzed again.11
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We were seated in the living room. In the middle was a shyrdak (felt 
carpet) with a white cloth on top. Displayed on the white cloth were a 
whip and a bead chain. At the edge stood several cups with salt, others 
with tea leaves, and a few plastic bottles filled with water, which had been 
left there by some clients to absorb good powers.12 The women sat down on 
the white cloth. Marzia instructed Chinara to relax and started her treat-
ment. Marzia rhythmically hit Chinara with a whip, once in a while burp-
ing to release the bad energy she extracted from Chinara. She murmured 
words that were only occasionally audible enough to understand: “I am 
not God, I am not a prophet, but let the powers that I have support me in 
my actions,” and “Let my actions serve the purpose to heal.”13 After the 
session or séance (seans) was finished, Marzia took her bead chain to read 
Chinara’s state of being. I present here Chinara’s rendering of what she 
had been told:
It turns out that I am being protected by [a spirit in the guise of] a young 
man. He is jealous, and because of that my relationships with men fail to 
work out, that is why they won’t stay around. I first have to ask [this young 
man] permission to marry; only then will it be possible for me to find some-
one, to fall in love, and to marry. And really, it is always with me like that. 
First, something happens, and then it won’t work out. Maybe it is really true.
[As I told you before] my grandmother from father’s side . . . is related 
to water spirits, and now [Marzia] tells me that I have water spirits. She told 
me that I need to have this treatment more often; otherwise I will pass [the 
problems] on to my children. She also told me: “In the near future you will 
get a paper that will make you happy, and will increase your money.” . . .  
That I have these people-spirits and that I need to prevent it from being 
passed on to my children—those are the things that I hear constantly. But 
what really surprised me was what she said about water spirits.
When we got back to Chinara’s office, her assistant told her that the pro-
vincial government (Kyrgyz, akimiat) had called—they had received a fax 
from Bishkek saying that President Akaev was about to visit the province 
and that Chinara was expected to give a talk about her organization’s work. 
Naturally, Chinara saw this as a confirmation of the forecasting powers of 
Marzia.14 But more than this, it was the link that Marzia had made be-
tween her and her grandmother that she saw as significant. Although on 
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an earlier occasion Chinara had dismissed the stories of her grandmother 
as fairy tales, through this encounter and Marzia’s explanations these sto-
ries appeared to gain in significance.
My friend Nurgul has already been mentioned at the beginning of this 
chapter. A Kazakh woman of twenty-four, she had moved back in with 
her parents the year before when her short-lived marriage unraveled be-
cause of the increasingly abusive behavior of the man who was still offi-
cially her husband. The parental home was a modest house on the edge 
of the town center, surrounded by a small apple orchard. This was where 
she took care of her daughter while doing the housework, which was quite 
a burden because her mother had moved back to her natal village in Ka-
zakhstan, at least for the time being. She often consulted clairvoyants and 
told me that she, her sister, and her daughter had all been healed by a 
Catholic ekstra-sens of Polish background (who did not agree to meet me). 
Together we decided to visit Gulnara, about whose powers Nurgul had 
heard positive stories, although she had never visited Gulnara before.
Gulnara’s house showed few visual signs indicating she was a spiritual 
healer—there were, for example, no items left by clients or religiously 
inspired pictures. When I asked Gulnara what she would call herself, 
she pondered the question for a second and then replied that she was an 
ekstra-sens, because she not only saw things but also healed, took away 
spells, and “opened” people’s future. She said that even when she was a 
schoolgirl, she had already cured people: “They would come with a little 
child. I simply washed [these little children], and within three days, they 
would be better.” At the time she didn’t recognize her gift, and for the rest 
of her youth and early adulthood she did not actively engage in spiritual 
practices.
When she turned fifty, however, she experienced a change in her phy-
sique. For days on end she felt as if she was engulfed by waves, during 
which she started to see people no one else could see. She found out that 
these people—she described them as humans—were from outer space and 
wanted to teach her how to perform medical treatments. Gulnara had to 
remain indoors for forty days, during which she was taught the alien phy-
sicians’ skills. Among the skills she had thus acquired she counted giving 
injections from her fingertips as well as more complex treatments such as 
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transfusing blood and other substances in order to replace polluted body 
liquids. While treating her patients she often consulted these alien physi-
cians and sometimes left it to them to perform the surgery, especially when 
the risks of complications were high.
Nurgul volunteered to be examined. She had to lie down on the carpet 
(shyrdak) in the middle of the room and close her eyes. Gulnara moved 
her hands up and down Nurgul’s body, following her curves, sometimes 
halting and pressing her hands onto the skin to examine more closely. The 
examination lasted about fifteen minutes. Nurgul was declared healthy, 
apart from a backache and an excessive level of stress. Gulnara explained 
that although during the examination she had already taken away some 
of the accumulated stress, Nurgul would have to come back for a series of 
treatments if she wanted to get rid of it completely.
After we left the house, Nurgul mentioned that she had felt shivers of 
coldness when Gulnara touched her. She felt this energy also in the room, 
and these experiences convinced her that Gulnara had real powers and was 
not a charlatan. I asked her what she thought about the physicians from 
the other planet. She said:
For me this is nothing new. I have discussed these things often with my 
neighbor [who also was an ekstra-sens]. You know, Americans have a lot of 
movies, fantasy movies, and these are about energy, about mutants, phan-
toms. Someone must put it in the heads of the movie directors, right? It is 
not simply that they make it up. For example, no matter how much fantasy 
you have, you won’t come up with a movie like The Matrix.
The Believability of Spiritual Practices
Both cases illustrate how the believability of spiritual healers and seers 
is mediated by the experiences, memories, hopes, and fears of their cli-
ents. Being reminded of what Grandmother once said, receiving a sign 
of impending prosperity, being confronted with the possibility of future 
loneliness—these all provided strong incentives for being favorably dis-
posed to the messages of the practitioners. The practitioners made personal 
experiences such as divorce or poverty understandable by embedding them 
in larger fields of power, even if the features of the forces involved could 
not be fully understood. Further reflections on these issues provide insight 
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into why people sought advice or treatment, and how the efficacy of partic-
ular healing and seeing practices was dialogically produced.
Reasons for Seeking Treatment
There were many reasons why residents sought the services of spiritual 
healers and clairvoyants. They were rooted in the uncertainties of exis-
tence, based on an awareness or at least an inkling that spirits actively 
influence daily life, and on the possibility that these spirits could be manip-
ulated for good and bad.
Unsurprisingly, health problems were the most common reason for 
seeing a clairvoyant or spiritual healer. In some cases the client had re-
ceived biomedical treatment at the hospital without obtaining the desired 
effect and visited a spiritual healer as a last resort. Financial considerations 
clearly played a role. As one woman said: “When I go to the hospital, they 
just ask for money—money, money, money. You need to pay for every-
thing: for registration, for seeing the doctor, for treatment.”15 Deteriora-
tion of health services was also mentioned. One middle-aged man told me: 
“You know, during the Soviet period we had excellent health care. But 
they sold all the equipment, so what kind of treatment do you expect?” 
The message, apparently, was that spiritual healing provided better value 
for money (which is not to say that choosing one or another form of treat-
ment was based on explicit calculations).
Aside from the monetary aspect, an important consideration in decid-
ing which treatment to seek was the cause of a health problem. Whenever 
the problem was obviously caused by an accident or was a known medi-
cal condition, most people would first go to the hospital or medical point. 
Other problems, such as rashes, backaches, headaches, impotency, and in-
fertility, were thought to be more effectively treated by spiritual healers. 
However, it was often difficult to determine the cause of a health problem. 
In fact, numerous physical problems—but also social ones such as jobless-
ness, bad luck in business, and so on—could have been caused by someone 
having cast a spell on you, or by spirits who had latched on to you, as was 
the case with Chinara.
A Russian healer explained to me how to find out if a spell has been cast 
on you as follows: “When you have a feeling that things do not work out 
as they should, but you don’t understand the reason—then it is koldovstvo 
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[sorcery].” She added that you can detect it inside yourself as something 
that feels unsettled and out of place. In some instances people were con-
fronted with concrete evidence of the casting of such a spell, as in the case 
of a young woman whose mother-in-law cursed her in public after she 
had decided to divorce her husband. Other examples included the follow-
ing: a woman explained that she knew a spell had been cast on her when 
she found dry sand in front of her door; another told me she had found 
thin black threads tied into knots under her desk at work. This type of dry 
sand and the black knots were known to have been prepared by bakshis 
or other practitioners who engaged in dark magic (chernoe koldovstvo). 
Though such literal proofs of koldovstvo were not uncommon, the sug-
gestion that magic was involved often came from a third person (a friend 
or relative) who had witnessed changes in the behavior, appearance, or 
mood of the victim. In a way, then, the significance of spiritual healing 
was produced by social communication on the nature and causes of spe-
cific problems. A general awareness of the potential of spiritual powers 
was constantly being regenerated, and even skeptics were not immune to 
the ideas.
This backdrop is important for understanding the popularity of spiri-
tual healing in general, but it does not explain the values that people at-
tached to the concrete treatments of individual healers. In fact, everyone 
knew there were some imposters, and hence there was no certainty con-
cerning the actual powers of individual healers. This brings us to the ques-
tion of how healers tried to establish their authority.
Appeals to Authority
In her discussion of spiritual healing in contemporary Russia, 
Lindquist (2001) refers to Weber’s typology of the three main sources of 
authority—rational-legal, traditional, and charismatic—and their adapta-
tion by Carol MacCormack to the medical field, in order to arrive at a ty-
pology that makes sense for understanding the legitimizing strategies of 
spiritual healers in Moscow. These are (1) rational-legal, based on diplo-
mas, documents, and formal education; (2) traditional, based on ties to the 
past and the invocation of tradition; and (3) alterity, or otherness, in which 
healers “draw on their own versions of globality” and are seen as mediators 
between the local and the global.
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Appeals to rational-legal or bureaucratic authority were of minor 
consequence in Kokjangak. Whereas Lindquist (2001) has shown how 
in Moscow newspaper advertisements were used to foster an image of 
efficiency—by showing healers in a suit and tie or by mentioning degrees 
from official medical schools—such images would not have counted for 
much in Kokjangak. In fact, the town once received a visit from two men 
who called themselves representatives of a medical school in Bishkek and 
claimed they were designated to register the spiritual healers, offering 
them official certificates in exchange for money. Although one of the local 
healers told me that she had been impressed by the appearance of these 
men, neither she nor anyone else had bothered to obtain the “official cer-
tificates.” It seemed that the dilapidated condition of official institutions in 
the region—among which were educational and medical structures—led 
to a situation in which spiritual healers distanced themselves from of-
ficial biomedical medicine and certainly did not want to pay money for 
certificates.
Appeals to traditional authority did play an important role in the way 
healers and clairvoyants presented themselves. This was evident from 
Marzia’s mention that her grandfather had been an important healer, in-
voking the term tavyp that signified an acknowledged position within the 
Islamic community. In other instances this invocation of tradition was vis-
ible in the display of posters of Mecca or, in the case of a Russian healer, 
icons, paintings of Jesus, and postcards showing the Virgin Mary. The con-
nection with “tradition” also surfaced when Chinara evaluated the spiri-
tual powers of Marzia. The way people described Marzia reminded her 
of the stories told by her grandmother in her youth, which, although her 
educational background urged her to regard them as fantasy, continued 
to be more than just “fairy tales.” Likewise, many people skeptical of con-
temporary spiritual healers made a differentiation between the powerful 
bakshis of the past and the charlatans of today. Claims of genealogical links 
to such recognized healers of the past and displays of traditional healing 
elements such as knucklebones, horse whips, or blessed water (see also 
Penkala-Gawęcka 2013, 41) were common, even if not always successful, 
ways of addressing such skepticisms.
In order to claim special powers for dealing with spirits, healers also 
appealed to registers of otherness, or alterity. Almost all spiritual healers 
presented their biography as exceptional, thereby describing themselves as 
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partial outsiders to the local community. The idea here was that only peo-
ple who were born with special gifts, and had gone through extraordinary 
episodes of suffering, were able to engage effectively with the spirits, and to 
mediate between different worlds. These claims to alterity were often cast 
within the framework of tradition. Thus, Marzia’s story of having become 
paralyzed, of initially resisting her spiritual gifts, and finally accepting 
them together with the consequence of remaining unmarried, consisted 
of narrative elements that circulate widely among healers.16 Apart from 
making use of traditional elements, the displays of alterity could also make 
use of other registers. Gulnara’s stories were a case in point. Although her 
recounting of illness was a familiar trope, most of the elements in her pre-
sentation were novel ones, including spaceships, UFOs, and alien doctors. 
To some of my acquaintances this proved she was a nutter, but to Nurgul 
and presumably most of Gulnara’s clients it demonstrated that she was a 
powerful mediator between different worlds.
Ascribing and Contesting Believability
The described practices and self-portrayals illustrated how healers tapped 
into several registers of authority and incorporated elements from contem-
porary consumer culture. But while these self-portrayals were certainly 
commented on when clients assessed the worth of various healers, they 
were not decisive in such assessments. Although both Chinara and Nur-
gul included images of tradition and otherness in their evaluation of the 
healers’ spiritual powers, this is not to say that they were always convinced 
by the appeals to those registers of authority. The risk of forgery or decep-
tion was simply too high. Moreover, because Kokjangak was a small town 
where word-of-mouth information about individuals spread quickly, the 
self-presentations of healers were perhaps less important than the way they 
were talked about among friends, neighbors, and colleagues. Ultimately, 
the practitioners’ believability depended on how their effectiveness in fore-
casting and healing was communicated by members of the community.
The practitioners themselves tried to demonstrate their efficacy by 
telling stories of the number of people they had healed, by stressing the 
severity of diseases, and by mentioning that they attracted clientele from 
faraway places. However, they were well aware that their forecasts and 
treatments would not always live up to expectations. When confronted 
164    Dynamics  o f  Convic t ion
with such cases they pointed out various reasons for failure. The most 
common explanation was that the client had not followed instructions 
properly. Another was that a new spell had been cast on the client, de-
manding further and more intensive treatment. Interestingly enough, such 
spells could also affect the practitioner’s powers (as in the example at the 
beginning of this chapter), so that their visionary and healing capacities 
were temporarily blocked by the spell of another healer or clairvoyant. 
Nurgul told me once how amazed she was that the healers “constantly 
try to obstruct each other’s powers.” She recalled a story of her ekstra-sens 
neighbor who complained that other healers had extracted her energy and 
that after one particular encounter she had been sick for two days. Nurgul 
laughed when telling me this story and said that she was happy not to be 
a healer herself.
Even among those who consult healers and seers there was a constant 
pondering over whether to believe the forecasting and healing powers of 
the practitioners. For instance, Asia, a woman in her late thirties, told me 
that although some people had real powers, there was a lot of forgery in-
volved. She explained:
About a year ago I went with a friend to this healer [Marzia]. She said: “It 
turns out that your road is blocked, they obstructed your road. That is why 
you won’t marry.” And then she said: “I will open your road. You should 
bring a new lock, a chicken, three meters of good cloth, and three bars of 
soap—actually it should be seven but I will ask only three.” When we were 
outside my friend said that she wouldn’t go to her again because [Marzia] 
was obviously trying to pull her leg. We went to another one [for a second 
opinion] and were told: “Don’t worry. Although there was koldovtsvo, it is 
already leaving you.”
In this case, the vision provided by the first clairvoyant (Marzia) was “fal-
sified” by alleging greediness, which to Asia and her friend indicated that 
she was concerned only with her own material needs. Asia later suggested 
that Marzia had probably invented the story of the friend’s obstructed road 
so that she could offer expensive treatment. Likewise, Nurgul, who fig-
ured earlier in this chapter, told me that she often tested the analyses of 
particular clairvoyants. Whenever there was a discrepancy she would ba-
sically choose the most plausible one. Since such stories about healing ef-
fectiveness were communicated among friends and neighbors, a very loose 
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and shifting differentiation emerged in the powers attributed to individ-
ual healers.
Animating the Urban Wasteland
One of Nurgul’s neighbors had been trying to sell her house for over half 
a year. She needed to sell badly because the whole family was moving to 
the north, so she had made a large sign saying “for sale.” The house was 
in a good location, at the edge of the center, in reasonable condition, with 
a sizable orchard and a small barn. In her view, it was logical to expect 
an interested party to come forward soon. But not a single person had 
made inquiries. Through consultation with a közü-achyk she discovered 
that someone had been blocking the path to her house, diverting poten-
tial buyers from even noticing the “for sale” sign. She was hoping that the 
közü-achyk’s efforts to remove the blockage were strong enough, and that 
the person who had blocked the road would not create new obstacles.
The proliferation of spiritual activity was rooted in disruption, linked 
to socioeconomic destabilizations and the effects these had on people’s 
everyday life. Healers did more than heal and clairvoyants offered more 
than glimpses of what the future might hold. They also made the postin-
dustrial urban environment meaningful or comprehensible, explaining 
why one might fail to sell a house, for instance. The cityscape was not just 
background for the spiritual practices; the two were closely interwoven. 
As Caroline Humphrey has argued in her paper “Shamans in the City,” 
the practitioners “themselves ‘actualize space’ . . . and thereby create new 
contexts of the city” (2002, 203–4). By displaying their visions, the clairvoy-
ants provided livable explanations for the hardship that people in Kok-
jangak experienced. Whereas an outsider might ascribe these difficulties 
simply to the asymmetries and destabilizing effects of the new economy, 
the clairvoyants managed to translate such abstract forces to more immedi-
ate causes that explained individual stories of success and failure.
Thus, the fact that someone did not manage to sell her house was at-
tributed to the spiritual obstruction of the road leading to that house, while 
other visions explained why a suitable marriage partner was unavailable 
(in a place where labor migration had produced a deficit of men). Al-
though these visions provided meaning and hope to individuals who were 
suffering, the clairvoyants’ visions for the city as a whole were often far 
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from rosy. Two of the clairvoyants with whom I was acquainted took their 
visions to a more prophetic level. For them, observations of UFOs, perva-
sive corruption, and the general decline of Kokjangak signaled that the 
end of times was nigh.
Tenacity
In the beginning of this chapter I proposed to differentiate between three 
levels of instability, each of which affect the ideas and practices related to 
spiritual healing and seeing in Kokjangak. One level of instability con-
cerns suspicion of the claims of individual bakshis and the possibility of 
fraud, which resulted in a dance around ideas of truth and authenticity. 
Another level concerned the capricious behavior of spirits, the complex re-
lationships among spirits and among bakshis, making the relationship be-
tween the world of the spirits and the human world an unpredictable one. 
Ironically, the unpredictability and complexity somewhat stabilized the 
Mother and son, August 2009
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position of the practitioners, because failures of vision or cure could have 
been caused as much by the inabilities of the practitioners as by the unpre-
dictability of the world of spirits. As we saw, the latter possibility was ac-
tively pursued by some of the practitioners as well as some of the clients. 
This resulted in a flexible space in which there was no complete certainty 
about any position—a space of ambiguity in which ideas of self and society 
emerged and were actively discussed (see also Louw 2010).
The question that was left somewhat hanging in the air was how these 
two levels of instability intersect with the second level of instability, related 
to external challenges to spiritual practices. During Soviet times the prac-
tices of clairvoyants, shamans, and other spiritual practitioners had been 
denounced as backward superstition. Obviously not everyone had bought 
into Soviet modernist logic, and the bakshi remained a known figure, part 
of “Kyrgyz tradition” (kyrgyzchylyk). But in urban contexts their position 
had become marginal and unimportant, as the recollections of inhabitants 
testified. Secularization was not just a myth: the image of modernity that 
had been so consciously cultivated in Soviet Kokjangak fostered skepti-
cism about spiritual practitioners. Moreover, the Soviet welfare system 
made life trajectories more predictable and secure, which, together with 
the availability of free biomedical health services, meant there was less de-
mand for the consultations and treatments of spiritual practitioners. The 
Soviet experiment had marginalized and destabilized spiritual practices 
but did not eradicate them.
The popularity of healers and clairvoyants partly stemmed from the 
severe socioeconomic crisis and the resulting uncertainties for individuals. 
Furthermore, their authority was enhanced by the loss of credibility that 
secular ideologies faced after the collapse of socialism. Certainly, “not reli-
gious” and self-proclaimed “modern” inhabitants continued to denounce 
what they saw as superstitious practices. The physicians and head nurses at 
the hospital were most explicit in their criticism and in stressing detrimen-
tal health consequences of reliance on spiritual healers. But their credibility 
was limited because the hospital was in disarray and, realistically speaking, 
hardly offered better medical care than some of the spiritual healers. More-
over, the “secular” critiques of spiritual healers were often undermined by 
the ambivalence of the secularists themselves, who valued the “spiritual” 
images of Kyrgyz history and admitted that among the charlatans and im-
postors were those with real powers.
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The more imminent challenges to the described ideas of spirituality 
came increasingly not from secular voices but from religious ones. This 
trend has been reported across Central Asia. Thus, David Somfai Kara 
writes about Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan that “in recent years fundamen-
talist Muslims have begun to put forward the idea that all these traditions 
should be excluded from religious practices, because they are not part of 
‘real’ Islam” (2013, 53; see also Louw 2010). And speaking about Central 
Asia as a whole, Thierry Zarcone writes that “shamans are fiercely fought 
by orthodox Islam and especially by its radical wing, Wahhabism” (2013, 
xxvi). The situation was not different in Kokjangak, where the imam was 
one of the active agitators against what he described as “national customs.” 
The imam presented his view in the mosque as well as in the classes on 
religious history and morality (Kyrgyz, yiman sabak) that he taught at one 
of the schools. He knew that members of the older generation were often 
skeptical about his views, but he had success among a growing group of 
young men and women who were attracted to a purer and more pious 
form of Islam than what they had experienced at home.
And then there was the Pentecostal church headed by Pastor Kadyrjan, 
who had decided that “occultism” was the biggest obstacle to establishing 
a viable church in Kokjangak. The church did not dismiss local healing 
practices as ineffective superstition (as atheism did, and to some extent re-
formist Islam). Rather, “occult” practices were interpreted as being linked 
to Satan and thus part of a larger spiritual warfare in which Pentecostal 
Christians were fighting on the side of God. This also suggests that there 
were remarkable similarities between the worldview promoted by Pente-
costals and indigenous notions about spirits, as well as between Christian 
faith healing (as discussed in chapter 5) and the healing practices described 
in this chapter. The rapid growth of Pentecostalism in the early 2000s can 
be partly ascribed to its affinities with existing notions about the world of 
spirits, and partly to its more centralized forms of communication. Why 
indeed did the converts of chapter 5 feel that through Jesus they were more 
likely to achieve their goals than through spiritual healers? One answer is 
that the Pentecostals were better organized and more effective in promot-
ing their success stories than spiritual healers were. The church actively 
encouraged interpreting positive events as gifts of God and as examples 
demonstrating the effectiveness of prayer. Moreover, in church services 
and home-church meetings people were literally taught to interpret their 
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experiences in terms of Pentecostal thought. The Pentecostal Church, just 
like reformist Islam, was able to rely on institutional structures in the com-
munication of truths.17 By contrast, the spiritual practitioners were on their 
own, and in fact actively undermined each other’s claims to authority.
Both reformist Islam and Pentecostal Christianity were gaining influ-
ence, in part because they could rely on institutional structures in deliver-
ing their messages, and also because of their more rigid denunciations of 
corruption and immorality. Moreover, whereas for many spiritual healers 
the economic and social crises in Kokjangak signaled the end of times, the 
new Islamic and Pentecostal visions had a more hopeful message. In their 
view, the crisis resulted from old corruptions (spiritual and social) to which 
their religions claimed to provide effective answers.
However, the fact that spiritual practitioners could not and did not ad-
vance “grand and hopeful promises” may also indicate their strength. The 
status of such practitioners depended on individual claims to legitimacy, 
and on informal channels that alternately stressed or challenged their ef-
fectiveness. This unstable basis of authority was in part their strength be-
cause it provided room for the negotiation of meaning and allowed for a 
flexible hierarchy among clairvoyants and healers. The healers may not 
have had the institutional mechanisms to advance a master narrative, but 
neither were they the prisoners of such grand narratives. In a society where 
the narrative of socialism had vanished and the rhetoric of capitalism, mo-
dernity, and transition turned out to be hollow, new grand ideologies or 
doctrines seemed to be destined to lead to disillusionment as well. That is, 
the smaller stories, the contextualized messages that relate the present to 
the past, give meaning to locality, and root individuals in their world, may 
prove more believable than the grand narratives. And if not, then they can 
easily be adjusted.
Conclusion
Pulsation and the Dynamics of Conviction
pulsation noun | pul·sa·tion | \ˌpəl-ˈsā-shən\ 1: rhythmical throbbing or 
vibrating (as of an artery); also: a single beat or throb 2: a periodically 
recurring alternate increase and decrease of a quantity (as pressure, volume, 
or voltage)
The relationship between power and collective ideas is riddled with con-
tradictions. The ideas that are most conspicuously present, that are most 
aggressively pushed, are also the most likely to collapse under their own 
weight. Seen from the opposite angle, ideas that form an integral part of 
society tend to be taken for granted, and as such lack the ability to stir peo-
ple’s feelings, to motivate inspired action. Collective ideas can be motiva-
tional only when there is a tension—due to a discrepancy with reality or 
caused by challenges to their integrity—which makes them worthy and in 
need of propagation or defense. It is due to this dynamic that conviction 
thrives in contexts of instability. In other words, the potency of ideology is 
rooted in its fragility.
In this book we have explored the relationship between sociopolitical 
instability and conviction through an examination of how secular and reli-
gious collective ideas fared in conditions of existential uncertainty, paying 
attention to the hopes they instilled and the actions they inspired among 
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residents of a destitute former mining town, as well as to the suspicions, 
skepticisms, and disillusions these same ideas evoked. I have described the 
precarious attempts of “secularists” to position themselves between fad-
ing Soviet atheism and assertions of new forms of religiosity; the successes 
and failures in the activities of Tablighi Muslims as they moved into “un-
charted” territory, and of a Pentecostal church on the religious frontier; 
and how spiritual practitioners who were sometimes labeled “shamans” 
operated in unpredictable spiritual fields. With the ethnographic engage-
ments behind us it will be worthwhile to provide further reflections on the 
dynamics of conviction, to outline a conceptual framework that is capable 
of illuminating how collective ideas gain and lose force.
The term “pulsation” is such a productive metaphor for talking about 
conviction because it highlights that impermanence and fluctuation are 
key characteristics of ideational power. As in the above definition from 
Merriam-Webster’s, it is possible to distinguish between at least three as-
pects. Pulsation begins with the “single beat or throb,” that is, with the 
impulse that sets things in motion. In the realm of ideas this translates to 
a reaching out, a “voicing of hope” that is simultaneously a yearning for 
and a conceptualization of a utopian horizon. Second, the impulse needs 
to gain traction (or find pressure points to push against) if it is to produce 
an increase of “pressure or voltage.” This tends to happen when ideas are 
seen as relevant and important, which means that they should be neither 
completely taken for granted nor completely outrageous. Finally, even if 
one beat released in the right environment may produce a ripple, for col-
lective ideas to be characterized by a “rhythmical throbbing or vibrating” 
the impulses or beats need to arrive in appropriate intervals or reverberate 
within a group of people.
Together these three aspects make up the process by which mean-
ingful ideas attain affective and effervescent qualities, that is, by which 
ideas are endowed with a sense of not only truth, but also of imminence, 
importance, and justice. But while these dynamics should be seen as 
working in an ensemble, it should also be noted that they are never in 
complete harmony. The production of conviction is a delicate undertak-
ing with distinctive temporal characteristics and limits. At each of the 
points—the voicing, the responding, the reverberating—things can and 
do go wrong.
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Voicing Hope on the Frontier
The frontier was not the end (“tail”) but rather the beginning (“forehead”) . . .  
it was the spearhead of light and knowledge expanding into the realm of 
darkness and the unknown . . . pioneer settlements of a forward moving 
culture bent on occupying the whole area.
Ladis K. D. Kristof (1959, 270)
Kristof’s historical definition of the frontier powerfully conveys the per-
spective of the settler, the pioneer, and the missionary as they look out over 
what to them appears as barren land, an expanse into which they can ven-
ture, and which they set out to appropriate by transforming it, a process 
through which they are themselves rejuvenated.1
This perspective reflects well how the various “ideologues” in this book 
talked about Kyrgyzstan and especially Kokjangak. International devel-
opment specialists had seen Kyrgyzstan as a testing ground for neoliberal 
policies, with a population in need of being trained in the workings of the 
free market. An example that comes to my mind is from a day in Kok-
jangak back in 1999 when a visiting German UNDP colleague (who, like 
me, was in his twenties) was vigorously drawing business plans on a flip 
chart. He solicited ideas from his mostly female and visibly impoverished 
audience—to make and sell pastry, for example—then drew boxes and ar-
rows to which he attached numbers and words, which together purported 
to demonstrate how the women’s ideas could be turned into successful busi-
nesses. What his performance conveyed was the certainty that his approach 
was right and the conviction that it would bring prosperity to the poor.
This self-righteous attitude, which was based on a perceived contrast 
between the “spearhead of light” and the “realm of darkness,” shone 
through even more strongly in my conversations with Pastor Kadyrjan. As 
the representative of a Pentecostal church that placed great emphasis on 
evangelism, he talked about Kokjangak as if it was the ultimate frontier, 
and elaborated in his sermons on the various evil spirits that still kept the 
town in their “ice cold” grip.2 Conquering this town (in the sense of estab-
lishing a thriving congregation) would deliver a decisive blow to Satan, 
and thus not only save the lives of the converted but achieve an important 
victory for Jesus in the whole region.
On the frontier the differentials between perceived superiority and in-
feriority are simultaneously very pronounced and at risk of collapsing or 
inverting. The sense of superiority was reflected in the comportment of the 
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“pioneers”: the soft-spoken certainty of amir Nur Islam, the unreflective 
enthusiasm of my UNDP colleague, and the unwavering exclamations of 
Pastor Kadyrjan. This sense of superiority tends to grow, as it were, with 
each step deeper into the frontier as this reveals ever-larger contrasts with 
the pioneer’s “civilization.” And yet each step will make the pioneer more 
vulnerable, until he or she is either reduced to a voice in the desert or falls 
over to the other side. These dangers are recognized by the pioneers them-
selves, which makes reflecting on them all the more interesting.
The risk of failing to find an audience—of becoming a lone voice in 
the desert—is one that probably troubles most secular and religious mis-
sionaries as they set out on their missions. In light of this Simon Coleman 
has written that even when the missionary fails to convince others, they 
still “have an audience of at least one, given that the evangelical speaker is 
also perforce a listener, attending to a message that achieves an important 
part of its purpose merely by being powerfully and passionately projected 
out into the world” (2003, 24). Coleman’s is a valuable observation, as it 
emphasizes the invigorating effect of doing missionary work, whether re-
ligious or political. But although an “audience of one” may be sufficient 
for some preachers, it is definitely not for all. During my last encounter 
with Gulbarchyn (the church leader who was sent by Pastor Kadyrjan to 
live and work in Kokjangak), we talked about the difficulty of living in 
a place whose residents were either hostile or indifferent to her presence, 
and about how her difficulties were confounded by the partial disintegra-
tion of the local congregation. To me she appeared despondent, and thus 
I was not surprised when the following year I was informed that Gulbar-
chyn had left Kokjangak to rejoin her family in Jalalabad city.
The other risk—of falling over to the other side—is one that perhaps 
speaks even more directly to the imagination. Just as anthropologists talk 
with a mix of intrigue and contempt about (former?) colleagues who 
ended up “going native,” so do Christian and development missionaries 
about theirs. An evangelical example from Kyrgyzstan concerned Risbek, 
a US missionary who had fallen in love with Kyrgyz culture and become 
convinced that the Kyrgyz were one of the lost tribes of Israel. As proof for 
this idea he embarked on a lengthy study of the Manas epic, ultimately con-
cluding that the epic was rooted in the Bible.3 Risbek was controversial in 
evangelical circles because his ideas demonstrated to some that “contextu-
alization” had turned into “syncretism,” meaning that efforts to make the 
biblical message meaningful to a local population had ended up corrupting 
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the message, which therefore was no longer biblical. A very different ex-
ample is from my first days as a United Nations Volunteer (UNV), when 
I and several other new recruits were told the story of a colleague who had 
just been dismissed. This colleague had been working for several years 
in Kyrgyzstan’s remote Batken area when, during an unannounced visit, 
UNDP officials found him spending his workday, accompanied by two 
young women, in a sauna illegally built with development money.
Even if they were not always successful, the movements discussed in 
this book had their own strategies for dealing with the dangers of the 
frontier. The Tablighi approach is particularly useful for illustrating ad-
aptations to frontier conditions. Their dawatchis, or travelers, would never 
venture into the unknown alone and risk being swallowed up by the fron-
tier. All their activities—traveling to new places, inviting people to the 
mosque, eating and sleeping—were carried out in the company of fellow 
travelers, which allowed the “voice of ideology” to resonate within the fel-
lowship even when there was no external audience. When in 2010 I con-
versed with visiting dawatchis in the former mining town of Ak-Tiuz, they 
mentioned that two days into their dawat I was the first person to come 
to their makeshift mosque. To them this did not indicate that their mis-
sion was a failure, because even their mere presence would leave behind 
“spiritual footprints” and thereby prepare the ground for a future spiritual 
awakening.4 Meanwhile, the dawatchis’ own commitment to the true path 
was being strengthened by the confrontation with the horrors of life in a 
God-deserted place.
It is important to reemphasize that mining towns such as Kokjangak 
and Ak-Tiuz had not always been a “realm of darkness.” In fact, until 
recently Kokjangak had been an outpost of Soviet modernity—its own 
“spearhead of light and knowledge” (to use Kristof’s [1959] vocabulary 
once more). It used to be a well-off industrial town inhabited by people 
who considered themselves educated and cultured, some of whom would 
venture into the “backward” surrounding villages to battle the vestiges of 
religious traditions (chapter 3). The memories of this glorious past made 
the downfall into chaos all the more painful. But perhaps it is hardly sur-
prising that the pioneers of Soviet modernity had become the post-Soviet 
targets of new civilizing missions. Painful as it was, the inversion is a re-
minder that frontiers are human constructs in which the dominant per-
spective gets to define “wildness,” something that had radically altered 
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with the collapse of the Soviet Union and its socialist and militantly secular 
ideology.5 The town’s modernist past also meant that Kokjangak inhab-
itants often saw themselves as more civilized than the missionaries who 
targeted them, with the result that while residents were on the one hand 
reaching out to new horizons, on the other they were often skeptical of 
new assertions of truth.
But I am getting ahead of myself. Let’s first summarize some key points. 
Pulsation starts with a clear ideological “voice”—the impulse—which is 
a necessary precondition for having an effect. The frontier, which to the 
pioneer and ideologue contained the promise of expansion and transfor-
mation, triggered such clear voices. And yet the same frontier conditions 
challenged ideological clarity, with the voice of ideology running the risk 
of either cracking or being deafened out by its surroundings. In that sense 
the frontier is also a frontier between conviction and doubt.
Responding: Productive Tensions
Friction is not just about slowing things down. Friction is required to keep 
global power in motion. . . . The effects of encounters across difference can be 
compromising or empowering.
Anna Tsing (2005, 6)
Anna Tsing’s statement about the need for friction to keep things mov-
ing applies not only to global power but has much broader applicability, 
as can be seen in the works of various thinkers. Not that they always use 
the word “friction” when talking about specific productive tensions. Slavoj 
Žižek speaks of the vital importance of “the obstacle,” which, on the one 
hand, prevents the full deployment of productive forces but, on the other, 
is simultaneously the “condition of possibility” because a complete realiza-
tion (of love, for example) would remove the mystery and thereby deflate 
interest (Žižek 2001, 18). Ernesto Laclau writes (2005, 85) about a broken 
space that separates the people from power, a gap or lack in the sociopo-
litical field that is a necessary condition for the formation of genuine pop-
ulist movements. Arjun Appadurai speaks about the tension between the 
national ideal of homogeneity and the messy reality of a globalizing world, 
which produces an “anxiety of incompleteness” (2006). To return to the 
term “friction,” Anna Tsing argues that notwithstanding popular talk of 
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a borderless world of flows, globalization “can only be charged and en-
acted in the sticky materiality of practical encounters” (2005, 1).6 It would 
not be difficult to expand this rather eclectic list, but the point is that “fric-
tion” is also a key dimension in the trajectory of ideas. Ideas only come 
to matter—they “gain traction,” as I formulated it above—when they are 
not completely taken for granted, that is, when they are challenged, either 
from within or from without.
Friction is ultimately about “encounters across difference” (Tsing 2005, 3), 
which, applied to this book, concerns the tensions between people’s dreams, 
values, and ideas and the terrain onto which these are projected. Tsing 
rightly argues that friction can be enabling as much as it can be compromis-
ing. Too much friction slows things down, while the lack of friction means 
the loss of any grip.7 In the pages below, I will draw on the ethnographic 
evidence from this book to make tentative claims about the enabling and 
disabling role of friction. Starting with tensions in the properties of the 
advanced ideas themselves, attention will then move to discrepancies be-
tween these ideas and the realities of life as they are experienced.
Pascal Boyer’s theory of “minimal counter-intuitiveness” posits that 
concepts, images, and ideas are particularly appealing when they conform 
to certain intuitive assumptions about a class of objects, while simulta-
neously violating some of those assumptions (1994, 3–5; see also Sperber 
1985). In other words, for ideas to gain traction they should be neither 
self-evident nor outlandish, but rather “thought provoking.” There is no 
need to enter the sterile debate as to whether or not “counter-intuitiveness” 
reflects “non-cultural properties of the human mind-brain” as Boyer has 
it (1994, 3) to recognize the relevance of the general principle for the study 
of conviction. It suffices here to say that newly introduced ideas on the one 
hand need to make sense, while on the other they need to “stand out.” And 
maintaining this balance is particularly important when the advanced ideas 
cannot fall back on dominant social conventions or institutional structures.
The balance between uniqueness and familiarity has been a recurrent 
theme in this book, coming across particularly vividly in the self-portrayals of 
spiritual healers who, while presenting themselves as novel and exceptional, 
simultaneously drew on established ideas of how spiritual healers are sup-
posed to act. The example of Gulnara (chapter 6) is a good one to recall. Her 
invocation of alien doctors and her use of invisible needles and other surgical 
instruments were confounding to some of her patients, but she made these 
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digestible through her conventional story of becoming a “shaman,” which 
explained how she had been inaugurated into the profession after a pro-
tracted illness and with the blessing of her spiritual teachers. The discussion 
of the liminal position of the Tablighi Jamaat pointed in the same direction. 
Here it was a trade-off between their unusual and foreign appearance and 
their connection with Soviet and Kyrgyz “nomadic” practices that produced 
a “minimal counter-intuitiveness” that proved attractive to many men.8
“Counterintuitiveness” refers to principles of classification and the di-
lemma of what to do with elements that do not fit classificatory schemes. 
It is important to emphasize that such schemes cannot be understood sepa-
rately from the context in which they arise and are employed. As Mary 
Douglas pointed out quite a few decades ago, classificatory schemes are 
ultimately expressions of existing patterns of social relations, such that 
anomalies in those schemes tend to be understood as violations of the social 
order (1975, 249). While initially arguing that such violations are generally 
considered dangerous “dirt” that as “matter out of place” require removal 
(1966), in one of her later essays Douglas (1975) refined this idea, saying 
that the evaluation of anomalies in classificatory schemes correlates with 
the evaluation of the relations between a community and the surrounding 
world. When these external relations are negative, anomalies tend to be 
seen as problematic and dangerous. When relations with the outside are 
positive, anomalies tend to be imbued with positive or even sacred value. 
This then brings us to the question of how the tension between the ideal 
and the real can spark desire as well as anxiety.
Ghassan Hage (2003) has argued that the shrinking of the state—in 
his case the Australian state under neoliberal reform—undermines the 
capacity to generate and distribute hope among its population, a process 
in which citizens develop a “worrying attachment” to society that reveals 
itself in xenophobic sentiments and more generally a “paranoid national-
ism” (3). The disarray of the state system in post-Soviet Kyrgyzstan simi-
larly produced “worrying attachments” among citizens. This flared up 
with particular intensity in 2010, when the country’s sovereignty was felt 
to be under threat, resulting in mass violence against the Uzbek minority. 
The positive revaluation of Soviet atheism made by “secularists” and their 
negative response to assertions of religiosity could similarly be interpreted 
as projecting fears stemming from their own marginalization onto “every-
thing classified as alien” (21).
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However, these worrying or defensive attitudes coexisted with much 
more hopeful responses. Indeed, as suggested in writings about the “hope-in-
hopelessness” of people who face extinction (Crapanzano 2004, 111) 
or who have been cut off from leading religiously and morally worth-
while lives (Naumescu 2013), the spark of hope appears especially bright 
in “hopeless” situations. Moreover, it is in such destabilized contexts that 
hope has transformative potential by reorienting people to new horizons. 
In a way, the collapse of the state in Kyrgyzstan also “freed” people from 
their attachment to the state and the nation, and pushed them to redirect 
their hopes to new points of reference. As was illustrated throughout this 
book, the promises of health and wealth made by Pentecostal Christianity, 
the futures of affluence laid out by development workers, and the route to 
fulfillment suggested by Tablighi teachings proved to be very attractive to 
marginalized inhabitants.
These redirections of hope entailed more than mere projection. En-
gagement with new utopian points of reference was a productive process 
in which vague hope gained concreteness and agency. As Jarrett Zigon 
(2009, 256) has pointed out, rather than seeing hope as either passive or ac-
tive, it is important to see how these aspects feed into and give way to each 
other over time.9 People’s engagement with religious and secular ideologi-
cal movements allowed them to act on their hopes, “rendering hope—now 
recontextualized—into efficacious desire” as Crapanzano (2004, 120) 
formulates it. Hope was concretized through acts of praying and heal-
ing, by joining protests against the president, indeed, even by writing up 
a business plan for a United Nations development project. This is what 
Miyazaki (2004) refers to as the “method of hope,” a process by which 
people attach themselves to this world and actively orient themselves to-
ward the future.
The productive tensions between hope, desire, and reality were more 
than evident in the stories shared by Tablighi Muslims during their pros-
elytizing trips (dawats), which focused on the inexplicable workings of the 
world, on frightening political events, and on relationships with women. 
To take the example of stories about sexual and caring relationships with 
women, these triggered the imagination precisely because such (idealized) 
relationships were wanting in the men’s own lives. By sharing such stories 
within an all-male companionship and connecting them to the teachings 
of the Prophet, the desires became even more intense and tangible while 
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remaining just out of reach, thereby keeping the tension alive. The tension 
remains productive as long as the object of desire remains unfulfilled yet 
within reach.
This last point is crucial because while the discrepancy between the ideal 
and the real keeps people motivated, the optimal distance between desire 
and its fulfillment is rarely maintained for a long period of time. Certainly, as 
we have seen, spiritual practitioners, Pentecostal preachers, Tablighi schol-
ars, and development specialists worked hard to account for treatments that 
didn’t cure and prayers that remained unanswered, and to explain why for-
eign investments did not materialize or why unexpected violence did occur. 
But such attempts could not always prevent the gap between desire and its 
realization from widening, potentially even become seen as unbridgeable. 
To understand these issues better, it is essential to explore how collective 
ideas reverberate within groups of like-minded people and are related to the 
temporal and spatial dynamics of ideological movements.
Reverberating: Effervescence and Its Aftermath
It is certain my Conviction gains infinitely the moment another soul will 
believe in it.
Novalis (1772–1801), quoted in Joseph Conrad, Lord Jim  (1900)
Susan Buck-Morss has argued that “to define the enemy is, simultaneously, 
to define the collective. Indeed, defining the enemy is the act that brings 
the collective into being” (2000, 9). Analogously, challenges to the integrity 
of ideas can be powerful stimulants in the production of shared conviction. 
This logic surfaced in the discussion of the Tablighis, for whom challenges 
in the form of police detention and negative public preconceptions added 
to a sense of heroism, of belonging to a group of chosen people. Especially 
when congregating during their three-day mission trips, the collective fac-
ing of a hostile external world was exhilarating. Arguably, though, the 
logic of this principle was best phrased by Pastor Kadyrjan when he shared 
with me his thoughts on the matter: “We pray for [local government] offi-
cials to stop hindering us. But this may not be God’s way. Our faith thrives 
when it is being repressed.” It suggests, very concretely, that it is difference 
as such that keeps these movements alive, even in cases where difference 
takes the form of repression.10
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The fervor produced through confrontation was also detected in the 
more long-term fluctuations of ideological movements. “Scientific athe-
ism” reached its maximum momentum at times when its religious adver-
saries were, or were seen as, posing a real threat to modern society. As 
an ideological project, “scientific atheism” turned into a hollow shell once 
the battle against religion seemed to have been won. To retain some le-
gitimacy, antireligious activists focused on “extreme forms” of religiosity, 
those that could continue to be seen as credibly dangerous adversaries. It 
is because of this that, ironically, atheism regained some of its attractions 
after it had been discarded. When the threat of excessive religiosity rose, 
some people realized that, after all, “what the communists taught us was 
right.”
It will be useful to step back to reflect on how these points about differ-
ence relate to the arguments presented in the previous two sections, to then 
see how to move forward. The “voicing of hope” on the frontier was about 
the conceptualization and projection of new and different possibilities—a 
utopian horizon—and its hopeful and invigorating dimensions. Subse-
quently, the theme of difference was elaborated by discussing how ten-
sions within constellations of ideas, as well as between these ideas and the 
prevalent social reality, contributed to collective ideas gaining traction. 
Moreover, these frictions or “encounters across difference” gained particu-
lar momentum when they were challenged, hence the role attributed to 
defining or being defined as an enemy.
What happens, concretely, is that in such instances the outward-oriented 
experience of difference recoils, thereby intensifying the inward-oriented 
experience of recognition or sameness.11 Becoming aware of this mutual-
ity, recognizing one’s experiences in others, has an exhilarating effect. Let 
me repeat the epigraph of Conrad’s Lord Jim, “It is certain my Convic-
tion gains infinitely the moment another soul will believe in it.”12 This line 
is revealing because it emphasizes the moment of becoming aware of this 
mutuality, which is simultaneously a moment of distinction from all those 
others who do not share in the belief. Here, the push of distinction and the 
pull of sameness join forces to produce the effervescent quality of shared 
conviction.13
In this book, I have presented an ethnographic commentary on these 
points, demonstrating that the clarity and intensity of conviction is a dy-
namic and deeply social process. Using Weber’s insights on charisma 
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(1968), I showed how the disruption of stable structures of rational-legal 
and traditional authority in Kyrgyzstan paved the way not only for charis-
matic authority but for “divinely given” experiences more generally. As in 
Bakhtin, it was with the falling away, or the suspension, of ordinary power 
structures that the “utopian ideal and the realistic merged,” paving the way 
for festivals of the real ([1965] 1984). With Victor Turner I illustrated how 
in such situations the high and the low temporarily merge, allowing for in-
spired fellowship, an “intense comradeship and egalitarianism,” to emerge 
(1969, 95). Crucially, the affective potential was never fully realized, thus 
partially preserving a state of anticipation, a process energized by its own 
internal contradictions.
The sense of clarity and conviction has momentary highs, as during 
miracle occurrences in the Pentecostal Church that lighten up as an epiph-
any, to then sink back into ambiguity and insignificance. There are mo-
ments when specific messages resonate within the body, affecting a person 
deeply, such as when a spiritual healer repeats something that a grand-
mother had said in one’s childhood, or when a neophyte is overwhelmed 
by the kindness of the “brothers” and “sisters” in a congregation, or when 
young men are about to set fire to the houses belonging to people they had 
“always known was something wrong with.” These flashes have creative, 
transformative, and destructive potential: fellow Pentecostal congregants 
did become like relatives who help each other in battling everyday prob-
lems; in the two Kyrgyz revolutionary situations not only did everything 
seem possible but the despised leaders were in fact removed from power; 
when simmering anxieties became projected on the Uzbek minority, hun-
dreds of people were killed and thousands of houses burned.
The classic accounts of “antistructure” have argued that the emotive 
intensities associated with effervescence, charisma, and communitas “can 
seldom be maintained for very long” and that it is their fate to undergo 
“a ‘decline and fall’ into structure and law” (Turner 1969, 132). To an 
extent this principle has been borne out by the examples presented in this 
book. When in a state of conviction, people say and do things that in hind-
sight they are often surprised by. “It was me who spoke these words,” 
exclaimed a previously committed antireligious teacher in surprise about 
what she had later come to see as vulgar materialist distortions. And a 
man who was still sympathetic to, but no longer deeply involved with, the 
Tablighi Jamaat told me, “When you are inside everything seems clear, 
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everything connects, but afterward, when you have gained distance, it 
turns out to be more complicated.” He was referring to the need to pay 
more attention to his family, and to no longer single-mindedly follow 
the tenets of his faith.
However, the ethnographic examples also suggested that the trajecto-
ries of conviction show important variation. The instable fervor becomes 
differently embedded in legal, customary, and hierarchical structures. The 
Church of Jesus Christ integrated miracle occurrences into a generalized 
discourse within the congregation; the intense experiences of the Tablighis 
were supposed to be repeated in a regular and predictable pattern. To an 
extent this was a trade-off, a balancing act that risked tipping over into 
indifference and disinterest. Still, in the unstable environment of Kyrgyz-
stan, complete routinization (and naturalization) of ideas rarely happened, 
and thus ideological currents were able to retain their potency.
The ideological movements discussed in this book had their own 
techniques for dealing with the tempering effects of routinization.14 
Pastor Kadyrjan’s approach was to remain on the offensive, adopting a 
forward-moving strategy in which constantly new battles were sought 
and a pioneer mentality was fostered. Generating a continuous supply of 
impulses (such as miracle occurrence), the church had grown rapidly and 
produced an environment of constant fervor, yet one that was always on 
the brink of collapse and led to disillusion among those who could not 
keep up. The Tabighi Jamaat displayed a similar frontier mentality, but 
its practice of dawat revealed a somewhat different approach to tackle the 
balancing act. As in their “dry-dock” parable that spoke of the need of 
ships to regularly leave the rough sea to be patched up in a safe haven, so 
did their practice of dawat insist that adherents to the movement regularly 
retreat into the company of a fellowship and be nourished with spiritual 
food, providing them with strength to weather the storms of ordinary life. 
Ideological work in each of these movements was thus characterized by 
a form of pulsation, which served to maintain a sense of chosen-ness and 
uniqueness, and to perpetuate ideological fervor.
Let me end with a few final reflections on the notion of pulsation. For 
living organisms pulsation is a precondition of life: the impulse provides 
a boost of energy, and it is the retreating of energy that triggers a new 
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pulsation: the inhalation of oxygen, the intake of food, the pumping of 
blood, the contraction of muscles. While movements such as those of Ta-
blighis and Pentecostals devised their own ways of generating new im-
pulses, the contraction did not always have to be generated from within as 
it was also produced in the confrontation with an external adversary—a 
combination, so to speak, of the “beat and the pulse.”
Conviction, on the one hand, involves reaching out to a transcenden-
tal value, while on the other it implies a claim of uniqueness. The tran-
scendental project provides a direction and a goal, while the assertion of 
uniqueness keeps the involved on their toes. Conviction is about keeping 
the external threat at bay; it is also about the utopian horizon that can be 
approached but that more often than not remains out of reach. These as-
pects work, however, in contradictory ways. The promise of the utopian 
horizon energizes, but its inaccessibility also frustrates and exhausts. The 
external threat provokes and stimulates up to a point, but once it becomes 
overwhelming it crushes communal integrity. The important point here is 
that convictions are not simply present, but are produced in dialogue with 
challenges.
And this, then, brings us back to the fragility of conviction. The efficacy 
of ideology should never be taken for granted: it takes arduous work, oper-
ating in the right conditions, to establish affective links between ideologi-
cal messages and subjects. Ironically, at the very moment when ideational 
power reaches its greatest intensity, the risk of dissipation and disintegra-
tion reaches its peak as well, thereby setting in motion new cycles of affec-




1. KelKel, which translates as “renaissance,” is a youth movement modeled on the Ukrainian 
and Georgian youth protest movements (which were influential during the Orange and Rose rev-
olutions) and established for the purpose of fostering political change.
2. As is common practice in anthropology, I have replaced the names of my interlocutors 
with pseudonyms, except when they spoke in an official capacity or had asked me to use their ac-
tual name. In choosing pseudonyms I have tried to be mindful of their social, regional, and eth-
nic connotations.
3. As the last of the post-Soviet “color revolutions,” after Georgia’s Rose Revolution in 2003 
and Ukraine’s Orange Revolution in 2004, Kyrgyzstan’s Tulip Revolution has been much com-
mented on. See Pelkmans 2005; Cummings 2010; and Radnitz 2010.
4. In this book I use the term “affect” to refer to the emotive charges or “intensities” that arise 
in the complex interplay between human interiority and the exterior world and in which visceral 
and reflective responses merge. This use of the term implies that I distance myself from the central 
ideas promoted by authors associated with the affective turn, especially the idea that affect would 
be “prediscursive,” a position that focuses too narrowly on the materiality of the brain and ignores 
how emotive charges or “intensities” are socially, culturally, and cognitively mediated. See Mar-
tin 2013 for a particularly compelling critique of the assumptions underlying the affective turn.
5. I use the term “frontier town” to invoke the power asymmetries and ideas of superior-
ity that are implied in the term, and that were part and parcel of Soviet development, not least in 
Central Asia.
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 6. For example, Appadurai argues that “Islamic fundamentalism, Christian fundamental-
ism, and many other local and regional forms of cultural fundamentalism may be seen as a part of 
an emerging repertoire of efforts to produce previously unrequired levels of certainty about social 
identity, values, survival, and dignity” (2006, 7).
 7. A related issue, associated with Louis Althusser’s top-down or centered theory of the 
“ideological state apparatus,” is that if all aspects of society are seen as contributing to a single over-
arching ideological system, coherence tends to be overstated, thereby making it difficult to account 
for change. In response to these issues various alternatives have been proposed. Pierre Bourdieu, 
for instance, uses the terms “symbolic power” and “doxa” (unquestioned truth) to refer to the sub-
tle and implicit ways by which ideational domination operates. Michel Foucault, rejecting Alt-
husser’s top-down and state-centered understanding of ideological power, adopts the more fluid 
and agentless concept of “discourse.”
 8. This was a central theme in post-Soviet literature. As Günther writes, “Emptiness may 
be considered to be a characteristic trait of the atmosphere of the 1990s when Russians felt to live 
in a cultural vacuum somewhere between state economy and unbridled capitalism” (2013: 100).
 9. In the early 2010s others have written about the “rebirth of the Idea” as in a revival of ide-
ological alternatives to the “corrupt, lifeless versions of ‘democracy’ ” (Badiou 2012, 6).
10. This reflects Antonio Gramsci’s notion of hegemony, which connects the direct (institu-
tional) and indirect (cultural) ways by which the interests of the elite become part and parcel of 
the ideas of the people.
11. As Wolf suggests, “societies under increasing stress” caused by social, political, or ecolog-
ical crisis often develop ideologies that are an extreme expression of underlying trends and ten-
sions (1999, 274).
12. In the Marxist tradition ideology is traditionally seen as serving relations of domination, 
but as Eagleton argues, the ideas promoted by nondominant groups need not be less ideological, 
and he therefore defines ideology as being about “any kind of intersection between belief systems 
and political power” ([1991] 2007, 8).
13. It has been observed by others that interpellation works indeed almost effortlessly when 
these “types” or elements evoke each other and the chain of signification thus achieves “temporary 
coherence” (Finlayson 1996, 94; see also Laclau 1977, 102).
14. Althusser fails to convincingly explain why individuals would “accept as evident” the 
voice of ideology (Pêcheux 1994), with his theory presupposing “a prior and unelaborated doc-
trine of conscience” that is predicated on guilt (Butler 1995, 8). This unelaborated doctrine is re-
flected in his choice of examples—Christian sin and violation of the law—both of which suggest 
that the subject is drawn to ideology by being promised an identity that will soften this sense of 
guilt. But there is no reason why guilt should be singled out as the primary or even only emotive 
driver of “interpellation.”
15. The term “utopian horizon” is inspired by Ernst Bloch’s suggestion that “concrete uto-
pia stands on the horizon of every reality” (1995, 223), as part of his emphasis on the role of the 
“Not-Yet” in history. As this suggests, I use “utopian” in a nonderogatory way to refer to imagina-
tions and conceptualizations of a desired and better way of being (cf. Levitas 2011, 209).
16. The next day a new friend, from the train, made inquiries with the authorities. On learn-
ing that our undocumented traveling would get us into serious trouble, we decided to keep a low 
profile, staying in Kyrgyzstan for four weeks, before traveling back to Moscow by train.
1. Shattered Transition
 1. This is not to say that all was quiet. The previous year (1990) had seen significant polit-
ical unrest following ethnic conflict in Osh Province, with demonstrations demanding resigna-
tion of the first secretary Absamat Masaliev (Anderson 1999, 20; McGlinchey 2011, 77–78). But, 
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significantly, over 90% of the population voted in favor of retention of the Soviet Union (Cum-
mings 2012, 52).
 2. See www.youtube.com/watch?v=NEewvq_8CxU, accessed December 6, 2014. See also 
the newspapers Delo No August 27, 2003, 3 and Vechernii Bishkek August 14, 2003, 1–2.
 3. Given that Bishkek had several prominently placed Manas statues already, erecting the 
hero on the central square in 2011 was not a novel statement, but it was a significant one given the 
central location and sensitive moment.
 4. Morozova writes that the untimely rotation of monuments suggests “a failed attempt by 
the state at collective national identity construction” (2008, 18).
 5. Alan Cranston and Michael Green, “Kyrgyzstan Takes Quiet Path to Democracy,” Chris-
tian Science Monitor, May 4, 1994, http://www.csmonitor.com/1994/0504/04141.html.
 6. Mikhail Gorbachev had frequently used the motto “The USSR is our common 
home” to express the view that in the Soviet Union the nationality question had been resolved 
(Zisserman-Brodsky 2003, 11).
 7. Taken from an interview with Akaev by R. Sagdeev, June 24, 1997, that originally ap-
peared on www.eisenhowerinstitute.org; also quoted in McBrien and Pelkmans 2008, 91.
 8. This amounted to a decrease from 11,803,000 to 6,715,000 heads of cattle. The 63% de-
crease in sheep and goats was particularly steep. For an account of the impact on the village level, 
see Boris Petric’s Where Are All Our Sheep? (2015).
 9. Frederick Lamy suggests that local actors “mobilized into informal networks faster than 
state institutions were able to re-establish formal social and economic relations with communi-
ties,” a process that “reinforced patterns of informality in state-society relations” (2013, 151).
10. McGlinchey (2011) argues that even the position of those who benefited most from priva-
tization (such as the government) remained fragile. Although the government used economic re-
sources to temporarily satisfy the elite, such rewards were insufficient to turn them into long-term 
loyal dependents.
11. Hirsch shows that by the early 1930s “even rural and nomadic populations that previ-
ously had not exhibited national consciousness were describing themselves as members of nation-
alities” (2005, 145).
12. This was not unlike the situation in post-Soviet Turkmenistan, about which Adrienne 
Edgar wrote that genealogy and tribal differences continued to be significant aspects of political 
ordering and were seen as a threat to national unity (2004, 264–65).
13. The term “European” is used locally to refer to Russians, Ukrainians, Germans, and 
people from the Baltic republics, in contrast to Turks, Caucasians, and Asians such as Kyrgyz, 
Uzbeks, and Kazakhs.
14. Estimates of the death toll from fighting in Osh, Jalalabad, and Bazar-Korgon in 2010 
ranged from the official figure of 393 to one thousand (International Crisis Group 2010, 1, 18).
15. Times of Central Asia, April 4, 2005.
16. For in-depth analyses of the 2005 Tulip Revolution, see Radnitz 2010; Cummings 2010; 
and Pelkmans 2005. On the second Kyrgyz revolution, see Tabyshalieva 2013 and Reeves 2014b. 
On the 2010 conflict, see Gullette and Heathershaw 2015; McBrien 2011; and Abashin and 
Savin 2012.
17. International Crisis Group (2010) documented that most eyewitnesses agreed the con-
flict started as a fight between young Kyrgyz and Uzbek men in a gambling hall. When each side 
phoned their friends for assistance, the brawl started to escalate.
18. Daniel Kimmage, “Kyrgyzstan: The Failure of Managed Democracy,” RFE/RL (Radio 
Free Europe / Radio Liberty), April 12, 2005, http://www.rferl.org, accessed June 10, 2005.
19. By 2009 my disillusioned acquaintances in the south were making jokes about the Bakiev 
family’s greed, saying that Kyrgyzstan is too small a country for a president with seven (greedy) 
brothers.
2. Condition of Uncertainty
 1. Emigration peaked in 1994, when, in the span of just nine months, Kokjangak’s popula-
tion dropped from 19,100 to 15,857 (Howell 1996, 63).
 2. See also the works of Joshua Barker (2009, 47) and Janet Roitman (2006, 255), as these 
make similar claims about the structures of disorder in, respectively, Indonesia and Chad.
 3. Vechernii Bishkek, July 6, 2001.
 4. Vechernii Bishkek, October 16, 1997.
 5. These lines of thought are further inspired by the work of Morten Pedersen (2012), Hiro-
kazu Miyazaki (2004), and Henrik Vigh (2006), who each emphasize the reflective work that is 
triggered by personal and societal crises, and how this process activates aspirations, hopes, and 
desires.
 6. In the late 1920s, when pressured to hand over his cattle to the newly established collective 
farm, Osman decided to chase his horses to an uninhabited mountain valley, hoping that things 
would have changed by the next spring. Things did not change, and most of his horses died dur-
ing the cold winter.
 7. Kirgizskaia SSR (Gos. izdatel′stvo geograficheskoi literatury, 1956).
 8. For this purpose the town administration organized voskresniki, or “voluntary labor Sun-
days” (which coexisted with subbotniki, or “voluntary labor Saturdays”), ostensibly because of the 
enthusiasm of committed citizens, but surely also because labor was in short supply.
 9. In 2004 approximately 160 men were involved in informal mining activities, but dur-
ing the high season (in the fall) these numbers would go up. Arrangements varied from semi-
professional brigades made up of former miners, to more informal groups of young men, called 
“apaches.” The problems they faced were similar in that they mostly worked manually, without 
contracts, and without guarantees.
10. According to data compiled by the town administration (otdel statistiki), as of January 1, 
2004, Kokjangak had 10,727 inhabitants, of which 75% (8,091) was classified Kyrgyz; 7% (804) 
Russian; 6% (670) Uzbek; 3% (347) Tatars; 2% (251) Kurds; 2% (198) Kazaks; 2% (159) Ukraini-
ans; and some 200 people representing other nationalities.
11. This is consistent with other parts of Kyrgyzstan. Between 1989 and 1999 the official 
number of 688,000 people, the majority of which was Russian, emigrated (Schmidt and Sagyn-
bekova 2008, 116).
12. Three of the four schools used Kyrgyz and one used Russian as the language of instruc-
tion, an inversion of the situation in Soviet times.
13. There had indeed been no open violence between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks in Kokjangak or 
other small industrial towns in 2010, despite the conflict having spread across both urban and rural 
settings across the region.
14. The joke was hardly funny but referred to the fact that most fifth-floor flats were occupied 
by single women (with or without children) and suggested that men ascending to this floor were 
visiting their (secret) lovers or in search of (paid) sex.
15. Apartments had been handed to their registered inhabitants in the early 1990s; industrial 
and communal buildings often remained public property. Many of these public buildings were 
“deregistered” in the 2000s, after which the construction materials were sold, with the profits usu-
ally ending up in the pockets of administrators.
16. Labor migration to Russia has become endemic throughout Kyrgyzstan, with an esti-
mated one-third of the employable population working abroad, mostly in Russia (Schmidt and 
Sagynbekova 2008).
17. My use of the term “navigation” in this section is indebted to Vigh’s stimulating discus-
sion of social navigation in Navigating Terrains of War (2006), which is equally concerned with the 
relation between uncertainty and agency.
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18. In most cases, the miners paid around 30% of their income to “officials” (chinovniki), 
which in this context means well-connected people who obtained the property rights of land 
that previously belonged to the state and had been managed through the “state forest” (leskhoz) 
administration.
19. In August 2007 the mayor closed the informal mining pits for a week after three men died, 
probably because news had reached the provincial government and news agencies, thus making 
(symbolic) action necessary. The effect of such temporary closures was that casualties were dealt 
with in confidence. For explicit reference to Kokjangak, however, see “Illegal Coal Mining Takes 
Several Lives but . . . ,” which appeared several years earlier in the Bishkek Observer, April 5, 2004.
20. Hobbes refers to this saying in his work De Cive (1642/1651), which is also where he first 
mentions his idea of “war of all against all” (bellum omnium contra omnes).
21. As in Achille Mbembe’s characterization of the postcolonial “chaotic plurality,” there was 
an internal coherence, yet one that resulted not from a single specific order but was instead pro-
duced through the friction between different orders that were nevertheless inescapably linked 
(2006, 381). J.P. Olivier de Sardan’s (1999) depiction of the postcolonial condition as “schizo-
phrenic,” that is, as a disempowering confrontation between an imposed (colonial) politico-legal 
structure and the locally prevalent sociocultural logics, also hints at the same problem.
22. Kokjangak was included in the program because of its reputation as one of the most des-
titute settlements in the region. Beyond this basic fact the UNDP workers knew little about the 
town and had no idea what to expect.
23. Vechernii Bishkek, October 16, 1997.
3. What Happened to Soviet Atheism?
 1. Judging from the book’s final paragraph, the manuscript must have gone to press shortly 
after October 9, 1990, when Pravda published the new law “about freedom of consciousness and 
religious organization.” Melis Abdyldaev mentions that although this law may change the rela-
tionship with some facets of atheism, it was decided to publish the manuscript in its then-existing 
form (1991, 127).
 2. Similar observations about the contradictory and counterproductive effects of anti-
religious propaganda have been made by Kendzior (2006) and Exnerova (2006, 106).
 3. The trend is not restricted to the former Soviet Union. Western scholars used to be inter-
ested in the “what” and “how” of Soviet atheist ideology and antireligious policies, but the pro-
duction of knowledge on these topics came to an abrupt end with the collapse of the USSR. While 
for Western religious scholars the failure of atheism was to be celebrated rather than questioned, 
for liberal atheists Soviet atheism was an embarrassment of sorts, because of its associations with 
totalitarianism. As if to illustrate this descent into oblivion, The Cambridge Companion to Atheism 
(Martin 2007a) does not even mention the Soviet experience.
 4. One of Yurchak’s telling examples concerns an interviewee who, while attending the 
Komsomol (Communist Youth League) meetings, hardly paid attention to what was being said, 
yet whenever a sign of affirmation was required, “a certain sensor would click in the head” tell-
ing him how to act (2003, 492).
 5. See Yurchak’s (2005, 102–18) discussion of the concept svoi, which he suggests is best 
translated as “those who belong to our circle,” referring to a sense of intimacy and understand-
ing among members.
 6. Yurchak does not use the term “routinization” as such, but the idea is implied when he 
talks about the “progressively form-centered normalization of language” (2003, 490) in which ide-
ological discourse became “hyper-normalized” (491).
 7. It could be argued, with some justification, that this is a rather literal reading of Alt-
husser that fails to sufficiently take into consideration his emphasis on the structural and material 
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underpinnings of ideology. However, the point of the literal reading is to make the concept of in-
terpellation amenable to fragmented ideological landscapes, and to less than hegemonic assertions 
of ideology (as discussed in the introduction).
 8. Similar distinctions have been suggested by others. Michael Martin (2007b) differentiates 
between positive and negative atheism, with negative atheism referring to a lack or absence of 
“theism,” and positive atheism indicating an ideological stance, which can either be antireligious 
or substantively “atheist.”
 9. In contrast to my interviews with Olga Nikolaevna and Asel′ Kosobaeva, this one was re-
corded in Bishkek, and is included in this chapter because it contains important complementary views.
10. The sacralization of secular leaders is, of course, not restricted to the Soviet Union. For ex-
ample, Yael Navaro-Yashin writes about Ataturk that this “secular founder of [the Turkish] state 
was not remembered in a secularist fashion” (2002, 191).
11. Malte Rolf similarly shows that in the 1920s and 1930s the organizers of Soviet festivals 
made great efforts to compete with the buoyant religious-festival culture—an invigorating strug-
gle, but with limited success (2000).
12. Although admiring the revolutionary power of Luther’s reformation, Marx retained his 
ambivalence, as reflected in his statement that “if Protestantism was not the true solution it was at 
least the true setting of the problem” (Marx [1844] 1975, 182).
4. Walking the Truth in Islam with the Tablighi Jamaat
 1. In contrast to the other chapters in this book, most of the research for this one was con-
ducted outside of Kokjangak. The reason for this is that although Tablighis were active in 
Kokjangak, for my entrance to the group I depended on contacts in Bishkek. The three tours 
I participated in all took place in Chui Province, in northern Kyrgyzstan.
 2. Dungans are a Chinese-speaking Muslim people. Most Dungans live in China, but sev-
eral hundred thousand live in the Central Asian republics, including fifty thousand in Kyrgyzstan. 
Most of these Kyrgyz Dungans know Chinese, and all are fluent in Russian.
 3. This Kyrgyz “joking relationship” with Islamic knowledge is reflected in the title of 
Maria Louw’s 2012 text “Being Muslim the Ironic Way.”
 4. See Kirsch 2004 for a useful critique of static perspectives of belief.
 5. The method of Tabligh, as its founder Mawlana Ilyas envisioned it in 1920s India, was ex-
plicitly designed to combat complacency and instill vigor, qualities that were seen to be lacking in 
other techniques such as education and dhikr (remembrance) (Masud 2000b, 7).
 6. This is one reason why academic literature on the Tablighis is sparser than the size and 
influence of the movement would predict, as also Janson (2008) and Noor (2010) have observed.
 7. The number ten thousand was mentioned by Igor Rotar (2007). Kadyr Malikov, director 
of the Center for Religion, Law, and Politics in Kyrgyzstan, gave me an estimate of fifteen thou-
sand adherents in 2011.
 8. According to Shamsibek Zakirov, an official with the State Agency for Religious Affairs, 
most Tablighis in Kyrgyzstan are ethnic Kyrgyz (Rotar 2007).
 9. The corresponding view holds that the Kyrgyz would be less receptive to intense forms 
of religiosity than Uzbeks and Tajiks. The reason for this would be their nomadic past, a view 
that was popularized in Soviet times but also expounded by, for example, President Akaev. (See 
also chapter 1.)
10. The reported answer of the dawatchi was that the purpose of dawat is to learn rather than 
to teach others.
11. Emil Nasritdinov (2012) argues that an important reason for Tablighi success is their em-
phasis on traveling, as this resonates better with formerly nomadic people such as the Kyrgyz than 
with the traditionally stationary Uzbeks. However, since there are few actual pastoralists among 
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the Tablighis, it may be more accurate to speak of “nomadic nostalgia” (which is largely urban 
based) than actual nomadism.
12. This is not to deny that the movement can have an empowering effect for its female par-
ticipants, as Mukaram Toktogulova (2014) demonstrates. The potential emancipatory effect is also 
stressed by scholars working in other regions, such as Marloes Janson, who reports (2008) that in 
the Gambia, dawat encourages gender emancipation because it transgresses boundaries between 
male and female tasks.
13. For an in-depth discussion of the changing configurations of “religion” and “culture” in 
Kyrgyzstan, see Khalid 2006, 84–115; and Pelkmans 2007.
14. The muftiate issued a recommendation to wear a Kyrgyz-style robe and a kalpak, instead 
of Pakistani dress, which was being discussed within Tablighi circles during my last visit, in 2013. 
Farish Noor comments (2010, 720) on similar tensions in Southeast Asia, which resulted in the Ta-
blighis opting for local modes of dress.
15. Despite their “relentless apoliticism,” which contributed to their harmless image (Metcalf 
1996, 117), the Tablighis are seen by Kyrgyz authorities as potentially dangerous (Murzakhalilov 
and Arynov 2010). See Sikand 2003, for a discussion of this issue from a South Asian perspective.
16. The data presented in this section are largely based on one dawat in the summer of 2009, 
but have been augmented by two other three-day dawats I participated in, in 2009 and 2010.
17. The Tablighi jamaat has a clearly defined hierarchical structure in which at each level an 
amir takes charge, but this hierarchy is “mostly loose and temporary” (Masud 2000b, 28), with the 
amir expected to consider all opinions.
18. The mashvara, or council, is a central organizing feature of the Tablighis. Most decisions 
(at all levels) are made after consulting those involved, though the final decision rests with the amir.
19. The baian, or sermon, given by one person selected from the jamaat, discusses worldly life 
in relation to the hereafter, and is expected to highlight “the positive and negative aspects of the 
two worlds” (Masud 2000b, 27).
20. The six tenets are kalmah, article of faith; salah, the five daily prayers; ilm and zikr, knowl-
edge and remembrance of Allah; ikraam-e-Muslim, respect for fellow Muslims; Ikhlas-e-Niyyat, or 
self-transformation; and dawah or dawat.
21. The food is particularly basic on the first day. Thereafter villagers tend to provide food, 
the quantity of which depends on local attitudes to dawat.
22. Barbara Metcalf usefully suggests that the interview has limited value in studies of the 
Tablighi Jamaat because researcher and respondents adhere to different speech conventions. Sim-
ilar to what I experienced, her questions were often brushed aside as irrelevant (1996, 117–19).
23. Jacques Cousteau (1910–1997) was a French scientist and filmmaker who became famous 
in Europe and the former Soviet Union through his documentaries of maritime expeditions that 
were shown on television for many decades.
24. Similarly, Justine Quijada has argued that as a result of the Soviet atheist experience, “sci-
ence and religion exist in a long-standing dialogic” and co-constitutive relationship to one an-
other (2012, 148).
25. In 1990 at least six hundred people died in Uzgen and Osh. In 2010 at least 393 and up to 
one thousand people were killed in Osh, Jalalabad, and Bazar-Korgon (ICG 2010, 1, 18).
26. Such logic is mirrored in this suggestion made by alim Muhammad: “Muslims always 
win! If he wins in war, then he has the spoils of victory, while if he dies, he goes to heaven. A beg-
gar is only happy if he is a Muslim. A president is only happy if he is a Muslim.”
27. To quote Mohamed Tozy’s rendering of the parable: “Man is a ship in trouble in tumul-
tuous sea. It is impossible to repair it without taking it away from the high seas where the waves of 
ignorance and the temptations of temporal life assail it. Its only chance is to come back to land to 
be dry-docked. The dry-dock is the mosque of the jamaat” (Tozy 2000, 166).
28. I am indebted to Sondra Hausner for directing me to this line of analysis.
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5. Pentecostal Miracle Truth on the Frontier
1. The official name is Full Gospel Church of Jesus Christ, but was commonly referred to as 
Tserkov′ Iisusa Khrista (Church of Jesus Christ).
2. Or to quote Weber’s phrasing, at times of distress the “natural” leaders “have been holders 
of specific gifts of the body and spirit” (1948, 245).
3. What I have in mind is the combination of assumed “superiority,” self-ascribed creativity, 
and imagined independence that tends to characterize the missionary, colonial settler, and devel-
opment worker. I rely here on work that draws, critically, on Frederick Jackson Turner’s (1893) 
Frontier Thesis.
4. For example, church members mentioned being taken aback by the exuberant worshiping, 
and especially by “the speaking in tongues.” Reflecting more widely held sentiments, one young 
male congregant mentioned that “the word ‘God’ was fine with me. But when Jesus’s name was 
mentioned I would be scared. I feared that I was becoming a kaffir [infidel].”
5. As Robert Orsi has written, prayer is not an innocent psychological activity. Rather, “it is in 
and through prayer that the self comes into intimate and extended contact with the contradictions 
and constraints of the social world” (Orsi 1996, 186).
6. The development of such stable connections can refer to institutionalization in the Webe-
rian sense, meaning that miracle occurrence gains bureaucratic authority by becoming embed-
ded in church structures. It can also refer to a deepening of personal relationships with the divine. 
A good example is Tanya Luhrmann’s analysis of “new paradigm” Christians in California who 
described “spiritual maturity” as having developed a long-term friendship with God in which “the 
problem of unanswered prayer becomes the problem of why your good buddy appears to be let-
ting you down” (2007, 95).
7. This is not to say that there are no other ways to deal with disappointment. Naomi Haynes 
discusses the problem of disappointment with the prosperity gospel among Pentecostal Christians 
on the Zambian Copperbelt, showing how they adjusted their expectations to local economic and 
social realities, producing what she calls a “limited prosperity gospel” (2012, 127). Such adjustment 
of expectations also happened in the Church of Jesus Christ, but the differences between Jalala-
bad and Kokjangak show the limitations of such adjustment and hence the fragility of the church 
in destitute contexts.
8. The remaining 30% tended to have family members who converted before them, belong to 
Russian or Tatar minorities, or had kept their conversion secret from their relatives.
6. The Tenacity of Spiritual Healing and Seeing
1. I should mention that while Nurgul knew that I was “writing about religion,” she was not 
fully aware of my financial situation and may have thought that my position was similar to those 
of the two Peace Corps Volunteers who were living in Kokjangak at the time.
2. In fact, Dinara had been painfully wrong a second time, when she saw that I did not have 
any children yet. When learning that I had two daughters, Sophie and Emma, living in a nearby 
town, she cleverly replied that I better take a DNA test.
3. In fact, most of my contacts with spiritual practitioners were established through 
acquaintances.
4. Elements of uncertainty and skepticism in post-Soviet “spirituality” have been noted by 
others. Marjorie Balzer writes that the Sakha she studies wonder about spiritual powers: “Are 
they real?” (2002, 144).
5. Similarly, Danuta Penkala-Gawęcka writes that in southern Kazakhstan “shamans were 
and still are highly esteemed” (2014, 42).
6. Zarcone (2013, xxv) mentions that the term emchi originates in Mongolia and means 
“healer,” but is also commonly used in Tibet.
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 7. This flexibility of categories due to the borrowing from multiple sources has been noted 
by several others including Penkala-Gawęcka 2014, 38 and Biard 2013, 88.
 8. In their discussion of shamanism in, respectively, Siberia and Mongolia, King (1999) and 
Pedersen (2011) observed a similar tendency among their informants to lament that there were no 
“real” shamans left. In the Mongolian case this created serious existential and ontological prob-
lems because “far too many spirits were on the loose [and] far too little shamanic knowledge and 
skill were available to rein in this occult excess” (Pedersen 2011, 8).
 9. This energizing quality of doubt has been brilliantly illustrated by Giulia Liberatore in 
her discussion of pondering pious Somali Muslim women in London (2013).
10. However, other clairvoyants in the neighborhood were of the opinion that one of these 
orphans was karmicheskii—i.e., had a bad karma—and that this was affecting Marzia’s powers 
negatively.
11. Stories about “shamanic sickness” are in fact very widespread, and constitute one of the 
elements through which the authenticity of a healer is assessed. See also Biard 2013.
12. These items are usually left by clients in the healer’s house for a designated period of time 
in order to absorb powers that can then be used to fight off bad spirits.
13. I rely here on Chinara’s memory because the whispered phrases were partly inaudible to 
me. In her appeals to invisible forces Marzia was assisted by the spirits of two holy women who 
showed her the way.
14. Perhaps I should mention that on the day of Akaev’s arrival, the president’s schedule was 
changed so that Chinara did not get a chance to actually give the talk.
15. A quantitative study of medical help–seeking behavior found that 25% of respondents in 
Kyrgyzstan mentioned financial difficulties as the main reason for their nonuse of biomedical ser-
vices. An equal percentage mentioned not filling prescriptions because they were too expensive. 
The same study found that people in Tajikistan who made use of medical services spent as much 
money on informal payments as on formal payments for doctors and medicine combined (Falk-
ingham 2002, 50–52).
16. For example, Vuillemenot (2013, 70–71) documents the story of a female bakhsi Khaiat 
living in southern Kazakhstan who had become temporarily deaf and ill as a teenager, was treated 
by two bakhsis, and recovered fully after accepting the role of bakhsi. She was unable to marry as 
a consequence.
17. It is in light of similar observations that Patrick Garrone writes: “In the fight for the su-
premacy over souls, Islam gains advantages from its more institutional nature, its financial power, 
its capacity to penetrate the highest levels of society and the international support it enjoys” (2013, 
18). Although I observed similar differences, in my analysis the absence of institutionalization is 
ironically also the strength of “shamanism.”
Conclusion
 1. The term “frontier” is useful precisely because it is politically suspect, refracting reality 
through the prism of asserted superiority and (assumed) dominance. When this is kept in mind, 
the term highlights that we are talking about encounters playing out in a tilted and unstable zone 
of asymmetric forces. See Chappell (1993, 270) and Baud and Van Schendel (1997, 213) for ele-
ments of this definition of the frontier, and its critical grounding in Frederick Jackson Turner’s 
(1921) discussion of the frontier in US history.
 2. Kadyrjan told me that he could always tell if someone was from Kokjangak by shaking 
hands: the hands of people from Kokjangak were noticeably colder than those of people living 
elsewhere—a clear sign of the presence of evil.
 3. Risbek (Richard Hewitt) wrote several books about this, the first of which appeared in 
English and in Kyrgyz as Ak Kalpak in 2003. He subsequently wrote a more elaborate account, 
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Manas Lost and Found: A Bridge Linking Kyrgyzstan’s Epic to Ancient Oracles, which was also 
self-published, and appeared in 2012. For a short discussion of “Manas-Christianity,” see 
Pelkmans 2007.
 4. Three years after this encounter one of these dawatchis told me that such a spiritual awak-
ening was under way in Ak-Tiuz: a new mosque had been constructed (with money from an 
external source), which was said to be increasingly used for the Friday prayers by the town’s 
inhabitants.
 5. On “resource frontiers,” Anna Tsing insightfully writes that frontiers “create wildness so 
that some—and not others—may reap its rewards” (2005, 27).
 6. This idea has long been acknowledged in the study of borders, where it is argued that the 
existence of borders as barriers to movement simultaneously creates the reasons for crossing them 
(Donnan and Wilson 1999, 87).
 7. Wittgenstein’s observations about the need for friction in order to make progress in logi-
cal investigations are suggestive here: “We have got onto slippery ice where there is no friction and 
so in a certain sense the conditions are ideal, but also, just because of that, we are unable to walk. 
We want to walk so we need friction. Back to the rough ground!” (Wittgenstein [1953] 2010, 46).
 8. It is quite evident that a similar balancing played a role in what made the Pentecostal 
Church attractive. Some of its practices, such as speaking in tongues, were confounding to nov-
ices, while its message of empowerment was closely tuned to popular ideas of spiritual realities.
 9. While agreeing with Zigon that the passive and active dimensions of hope should be seen 
in relation to hope’s temporal aspects (2009, 256), I disagree with him that Crapanzano (2004) fails 
to address this. In fact Crapanzano shows persuasively how undefined and silent hope may gain 
in concreteness and agency. It is just that when Crapanzano discusses these complex processes he 
uses the English term “desire” for the more concrete forms of the “not-yet,” while Zigon prefers 
to continue with the term “hope.”
10. This “being defined as the enemy” is the corollary to Buck-Morss’s suggestion (2000, 9) 
that “to define the enemy” brings the collective into being.
11. These findings point to what Laclau refers to as the constitutive role played by social het-
erogeneity in the construction of “the ‘people’ ” (2005, 223). For him collective identity gains in in-
tensity when facing an “antagonistic frontier” as this provides direction to collective action (80, 
84–85).
12. I am grateful to Jim Lance for bringing this quotation to my attention. Appropriately, 
the line has been associated as much with Joseph Conrad, the doubter who uses it as the epigraph 
of his book Lord Jim, as with its writer, Novalis, the man with a mission who wrote the line as a 
thought fragment.
13. The reader might have expected more engagement with Durkheim’s collective effer-
vescence, not least because of his emphasis on reverberation: “each re-echoes the others, and is 
re-echoed by the others. The initial impulse thus proceeds, growing as it goes, as an avalanche 
grows in its advance” (1915, 215–16). However, Durkheim assumes that the “emotional and pas-
sional faculties of the primitive” allow for effervescence to simply arise in the act of congregation 
(215), an obviously problematic view that is unhelpful in understanding the strengths and weak-
nesses of collective ideas.
14. In Weber’s sociology, “routinization” refers to the process by which charisma becomes 
embedded in or absorbed by rational-legal and traditional structures. Weber argues that the char-
ismatic does not completely evaporate but can be enhanced by these other registers of authority 
(1968, 54–61).
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